Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Ronald,
> 
> On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote:
> 
>> Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can
>> understand?
>>
> 
> UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that "physics statement". So it  
> would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem  
> of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in  
> the archives for older or more recent versions,  or read my SANE2004  
> paper:
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
> 
> In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are  
> duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal  
> memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they  
> cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- 
> duplicating experience, or in "many-identical-states preparation" like  
> a concrete universal dovetailer would do "all the time".
> So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer,  
> with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la  
> Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person  
> indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all  
> the computations going through your actual state. 

I'm not sure how to understand "your state".  Is it a finite piece of the state 
of computation?  In that case it seems it would be revisited arbitrarily many 
times and in different orders relative to other states.

>Sometimes I have to  
> remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state,  
> from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational  
> history you belong, 

Is "history" meant in the sense of a thread in the completed infinite 
computation, or does it mean just the "past" part of the thread going back to 
the beginning of the UD?

Brent

>but you can believe (as far as you are willing to  
> believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree  
> to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y =  
> II principle (that if a story bifurcate," Y ", you multiply their  
> similar comp-past, so Y gives  II), then you can understand that the  
> cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is  
> 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person  
> distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite  
> part of that enumeration.  "Stable consciousness" need deep stories  
> (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a  
> notion of linear multiplication of independent stories.
> Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with  
> OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of  
> mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein  
> & Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey).
> Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA,  
> which shows that form their first point of view universal machine  
> cannot distinguish "real" from "virtual", but they cannot distinguish  
> "real" from "arithmetical" either, so that the arithmetical realm  
> defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal  
> machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual  
> mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a  
> weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis.
> 
> If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any  
> questions, or find a flaw  etc.
> (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page)
> 
> Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the  
> knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and  
> the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now).
> 
> Hope this helped a bit.
> 
> Bruno

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to