Bruno Marchal wrote: > Ronald, > > On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: > >> Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can >> understand? >> > > UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that "physics statement". So it > would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem > of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in > the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 > paper: > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are > duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal > memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they > cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- > duplicating experience, or in "many-identical-states preparation" like > a concrete universal dovetailer would do "all the time". > So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer, > with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la > Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person > indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all > the computations going through your actual state.

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I'm not sure how to understand "your state". Is it a finite piece of the state of computation? In that case it seems it would be revisited arbitrarily many times and in different orders relative to other states. >Sometimes I have to > remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, > from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational > history you belong, Is "history" meant in the sense of a thread in the completed infinite computation, or does it mean just the "past" part of the thread going back to the beginning of the UD? Brent >but you can believe (as far as you are willing to > believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree > to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y = > II principle (that if a story bifurcate," Y ", you multiply their > similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the > cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is > 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person > distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite > part of that enumeration. "Stable consciousness" need deep stories > (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a > notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. > Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with > OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of > mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein > & Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). > Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, > which shows that form their first point of view universal machine > cannot distinguish "real" from "virtual", but they cannot distinguish > "real" from "arithmetical" either, so that the arithmetical realm > defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal > machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual > mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a > weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. > > If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any > questions, or find a flaw etc. > (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) > > Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the > knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and > the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now). > > Hope this helped a bit. > > Bruno --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---