Bruno:
  I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here.
  I have problems with infinite time and resources for your
computations, if done in this physical Universe.
                                                             Ronald

On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Ronald,
>
> On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote:
>
> > Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can
> > understand?
>
> UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that "physics statement". So it  
> would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem  
> of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in  
> the archives for older or more recent versions,  or read my SANE2004  
> paper:
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract...
>
> In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are  
> duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal  
> memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they  
> cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self-
> duplicating experience, or in "many-identical-states preparation" like  
> a concrete universal dovetailer would do "all the time".
> So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer,  
> with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la  
> Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person  
> indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all  
> the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to  
> remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state,  
> from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational  
> history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to  
> believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree  
> to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y =  
> II principle (that if a story bifurcate," Y ", you multiply their  
> similar comp-past, so Y gives  II), then you can understand that the  
> cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is  
> 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person  
> distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite  
> part of that enumeration.  "Stable consciousness" need deep stories  
> (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a  
> notion of linear multiplication of independent stories.
> Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with  
> OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of  
> mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein  
> & Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey).
> Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA,  
> which shows that form their first point of view universal machine  
> cannot distinguish "real" from "virtual", but they cannot distinguish  
> "real" from "arithmetical" either, so that the arithmetical realm  
> defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal  
> machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual  
> mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a  
> weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis.
>
> If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any  
> questions, or find a flaw  etc.
> (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page)
>
> Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the  
> knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and  
> the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now).
>
> Hope this helped a bit.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same
> >> "error" with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those
> >> are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the
> >> mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge
> >> toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened)  
> >> ontologies.
> >> But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that,
> >> where, saying "yes" to the surgeon requires to abandon that very  
> >> idea.
> >> Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure
> >> among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all
> >> mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much  
> >> more
> >> fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of
> >> mechanical laws.
> >> Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem
> >> and still use an identity relation between a mind and a  
> >> implementation
> >> of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank.
> >> This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and they
> >> may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies
> >> problems. Sure.
>
> >> Bruno
>
> >> On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote:
>
> >>> Hi Bruno,
>
> >>> Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent
> >>> article out in Complexity:
>
> >>>http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY=
> >>> ...
>
> >>> (Complexity, 14, 40-46)
>
> >>> It basically explores the organisational properties of the integers,
> >>> prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure  
> >>> mathematical
> >>> way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent
> >>> properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a  
> >>> much
> >>> earlier one that is not behind a paywall:
> >>>http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/
>
> >>> I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in Townsville,
> >>> about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's  
> >>> presentation
> >>> is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who consider
> >>> him a genius.
>
> >>> It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme  
> >>> is to
> >>> yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint for
> >>> starters.
>
> >>> Cheers
>
> >>> --
>
> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>  -
> >>> Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> >>> Mathematics
> >>> UNSW SYDNEY 2052                    hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> >>> Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>  -
>
> >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text -
>
> >> - Show quoted text -
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
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