Bruno: I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here. I have problems with infinite time and resources for your computations, if done in this physical Universe. Ronald

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On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Ronald, > > On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: > > > Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can > > understand? > > UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that "physics statement". So it > would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a problem > of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA in > the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 > paper: > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract... > > In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are > duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal > memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they > cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- > duplicating experience, or in "many-identical-states preparation" like > a concrete universal dovetailer would do "all the time". > So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal dovetailer, > with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la > Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person > indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all > the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to > remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, > from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational > history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to > believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree > to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the Y = > II principle (that if a story bifurcate," Y ", you multiply their > similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the > cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is > 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person > distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite > part of that enumeration. "Stable consciousness" need deep stories > (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a > notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. > Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, with > OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of > mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein > & Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). > Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, > which shows that form their first point of view universal machine > cannot distinguish "real" from "virtual", but they cannot distinguish > "real" from "arithmetical" either, so that the arithmetical realm > defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal > machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual > mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a > weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. > > If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any > questions, or find a flaw etc. > (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) > > Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well the > knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and > the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now). > > Hope this helped a bit. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the same > >> "error" with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. Those > >> are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the > >> mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge > >> toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) > >> ontologies. > >> But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, > >> where, saying "yes" to the surgeon requires to abandon that very > >> idea. > >> Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical structure > >> among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all > >> mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much > >> more > >> fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of > >> mechanical laws. > >> Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body problem > >> and still use an identity relation between a mind and a > >> implementation > >> of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank. > >> This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and they > >> may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies > >> problems. Sure. > > >> Bruno > > >> On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote: > > >>> Hi Bruno, > > >>> Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent > >>> article out in Complexity: > > >>>http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY= > >>> ... > > >>> (Complexity, 14, 40-46) > > >>> It basically explores the organisational properties of the integers, > >>> prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure > >>> mathematical > >>> way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent > >>> properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a > >>> much > >>> earlier one that is not behind a paywall: > >>>http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/ > > >>> I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in Townsville, > >>> about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's > >>> presentation > >>> is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who consider > >>> him a genius. > > >>> It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme > >>> is to > >>> yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint for > >>> starters. > > >>> Cheers > > >>> -- > > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > >>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > >>> Mathematics > >>> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > >>> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > >>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> - > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - > > >> - Show quoted text - > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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