On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two
> matter hypostases, and this in a context where space (not juts time)
> has to be a self-referential context, in that weak sense, such work
> seems to go in the right direction. Of course the approach are
> different, and loop gravity suffers the usual weakness of the whole
> aristotelian theology, where the observer's experiences are abstracted
> away. All this relies to AUDA.

Essentially you're saying that any truly successful mind-body (not
just 'body') TOE *must* be a generative account of the emergence of
observers and their specific relations to their observed
environments.  Of course this is explicitly 'non-objective', which is
probably equivalent to heresy if not blasphemy for physicists.

What is presented in the NS piece is - as always - a structural
description of a generalised environment that presumably relies
without further justification on some assumed 'identity' with 'parts'
of it to account for observers and their experiences: e.g. "we could
be nothing more than a bundle of stubborn dreadlocks in space".  As
you say, the observer is in effect abstracted out of such accounts.
But let's say, for argument's sake, that my mind *isn't* a digital
machine (i.e. can't be replaced by a digital computer). Nonetheless, I
still need to give an explicit account of observers and their
experiences in some other - presumably non-digital-computational -
way.  This might rely on, say, a fundamentally topological/analogical
analysis in terms of some primary continuum, that could nevertheless
incorporate generative and recursive features analogous to those of
COMP (but as you see I'm way out of my depth here).

So my question is: do you think that there could be a non-COMP account
of such a kind *in principle*?  Or does the UDA analysis intend to
show that *only* an account that is fundamentally digital/
computational can explain the emergence of observers and their
experiences with *all* the features that must actually be accounted
for?  And even in the absence of any prior claim that the mind itself
is a digital computation?

David

> On 27 Jul 2009, at 03:04, m.a. wrote:
>
> > Bruno,
> >               I am indeed ready to pursue further and since we'll be  
> > covering both topics anyhow, I would prefer that you choose which  
> > would be the most natural next step for us.
>
> Hmm... The problem is that it is natural or not according to different  
> people on the list. I have to think a little bit. I pursue asap.
>   I can be slow down a little bit by my work. But I will try to  
> already pursue today, may be with a little post.
>
>
>
> >               Also, I assume you have seen the following and I  
> > wondered if it tends to confirm UDA.
>
> >http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19125645.800-you-are-made-of-sp...
>
> Well, comp does not yet confirm just quantum mechanics in full, so it  
> is too much early to decide, with comp, what would be the better  
> marriage between GR and QM.
> ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two  
> matter hypostases, and this in a context where space (not juts time)  
> has to be a self-referential context, in that weak sense, such work  
> seems to go in the right direction. Of course the approach are  
> different, and loop gravity suffers the usual weakness of the whole  
> aristotelian theology, where the observer's experiences are abstracted  
> away. All this relies to AUDA.
> To be sure, some aspect of string theory (the rival of loop gravity)  
> are very nice with respect to the idea that physics comes from number.  
> Thanks for the link.
>
> Bruno
>
> (*) May be you could search "Temperley" on the archive. I have already  
> said a few words on this in the list.
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to