# Re: Seven Step Series

```On 28 Jul 2009, at 13:38, David Nyman wrote:
```
```

> Actually, I do follow the first six steps of the UD reasoning; my own
> 'beam me up, Scotty' reasoning had led me to similar conclusions. So,
> no problem with this.  But I do have trouble grasping what is, I
> think, a different aspect of the observer moment, and I'll try to
> state it as clearly as I can.  When I imagine an infinity of OMs, as
> it were, co-existing in some atemporal sense, I find I still can't
> satisfactorily answer the question: why am "I" experiencing JUST this
> one?

The UD generates, infinitely often, all 3-OMs, all as (universal)
machine states, and this through an infinity of computations.
But the 1-OMs belong to infinities of those "equivalent (by respect of
the substitution level) 3-OM. They are not aware, cf UDA step 2, of
the fact that in universal dovetailing time (defined by the
(mathematical) execution of the UD), some of those 3-OMs will take a
*very* long time to be generated.
Now, the question "why this 1-OM and not that other one", is like the
questions:

-  "why do I feel myself in W, and not in M" which is very natural for
the one going out at W.
-  "why do I feel myself in M, and not in W" which is very natural for
the one going out at M.

OK?

>  I don't mean of course, why does this experience possess just
> *these* characteristics - this is always determined by the structure
> of the OM, as per the UD steps.  The issue, rather, is that "I" is
> essentially a global referent that fundamentally applies only to the
> whole,

Hmm....

> and that the 'part' or 'little me' is thus nothing but the
> *viewpoint* of the whole at a given moment

This can be said for the different reason that you are universal
yourself (in Post Turing Church sense).
Here, all what happens is that the 1-OM of that universal machine
(fallen in entangled multi-computational histories) has all its
immediate expectation based on a set dense in the whole (like
fractions are dense in the real numbers). It is not the whole, but it
is the infinitely many possible computational histories leading to
that 1-OM and to those corresponding 3-OMs.

>
>
> So under this assumption the real question is: why is the *whole* at
> this moment seemingly limited to ONLY this view rather than any - or
> indeed all - of the available co-existing alternatives?

For the reason that when your body is duplicated, your soul is not.
You wake up at M, and only can bet "intellectually" on your
doppelganger in W.
It is the same reason why Everett quantum observer cannot feel the
split.
Amoebas divides, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, each can ask why me, and why here
and now.
But, as Plotinus and others have seen, "we" can somehow experience
some inverse path ... 8, 4, 2, 1 and going back to the universal. (But
this is not needed for the derivability of physics).

Here is a nice "inverse path", btw:
Push pause at the beginning, you will see a yellow things with 16
little appendices. With good eyes you can guess the 32 more little
appendices, and you can see behind the 64 and the balck 128.  So you
have at the start
M... 128 64 32 16.
Then start the video to see the sequel ... 8, 4, 2, 1, M. (followed
by ... M, and zooming in back).   Exercise  :)

>  And in the
> light of an infinity of co-existing OMs, I can't answer this, because
> such a co-existing whole should presumably co-presently see (i.e.
> 'be') ALL points of view 'at once'.  AFAICS, notions of measure do not
> suffice to resolve this.

Well, it has, or comp is false. But I suspect you confuse two
different questions (if I may say so to be short).
- the ability of the soul to remain conscious when getting to the
"universal-whole" in the 'conscious way'. This needs work, and typical
"let it go" abilities,  detachement, abnegation, amnesia (and is
another topic).
And then the consciousness of your most probable relative situation,
which eventually is determined by a measure on the infinity of
computations going (arithmetically) through your state.
And here the mystery is that the apparent physical worlds seem
computable. How could a sum on an infinity of computations be
computable? (it is the white rabbit problem).

>
>
> However I have a wacky intuition: despite the platonic criterion of
> co-existence, 1-person experience of the temporal dynamism (i.e.
> sequentiality) of the part - i.e. each OM - might reasonably persuade
> us that sequentiality should also possess, in some ineliminable sense,
> a role in the whole.  Consequently, under this assumption, could the
> UD (to reify it only to this degree)

The UD exists, like the number 17 exists. No less, no more.
(of course the UD is "really" universal if and only if Post-Church-
Turing thesis is true).

> be conceived for this purpose to
> be 'sequentially resolving' each 'OM-programme-step'?  Indeed my
> understanding is that this dovetailed sequentiality is actually a key
> conceptual element of COMP.

Not sure to see what you mean. It is a key to be sure to go through
all 3-OMs, with the correct (recursively invariant) redundancy
(without which there would indeed be no measure possible).

> In this sense - and in this sense only -
> could the UD therefore be thought of as temporally instantiating that
> OM *uniquely* at each step on behalf of the whole COMP-multiverse, and
> thus bringing into focus - in effect - its *unique* point of view?

Well, if you name the UD states U1, U2, U3, U4, ..., you go
sequentially through all 3-OMs, and this through the right
arithmetical relations defining the histories, but your problem
reappears at one level above: why "am I" in Um and not in Uw. But that
problem makes no sense, for the same reason that "why I am in M and
not in W" makes provably no sense in the self-duplication experience.

>
>
>> Then there is the global first person indeterminacy, which appears
>> at step
>> 7, although it is "definitely there" with the step 8. It is the
>> indeterminacy of your immediate subjective future "in front" of a
>> never
>> ending universal dovetailing. At that step, assuming (or not with
>> step 8) a
>> concrete universal dovetailing in the universe (or in arithmetic)
>> you should
>> understand that you are duplicated " at each instant", so that your
>> future
>> subjective instant is determined by an infinity of computations:
>> all those
>> (existing in the U dovetailing) going through your actual states.
>> So, in
>> order to attach your mind to a physical appearance, you have to
>> justify the
>> physical appearances from an infinite set of computational
>> histories. OK?
>
> Yes, I understand as I've said above that I am duplicated at each
> instant (what I used to think of as being 'teleported into the
> future').  However, I must press you on your use of the expression
> 'going through your actual states'.  I think you mean:
>
> 1) Your 'actual state' corresponds to some OM (i.e. the one you 'find'
> yourself in).

Well, my mental "RITSIAR" state corresponds to an infinity of  3-OM
generated by the DU.

>
> 2) The UD entails that an infinity of prior and posterior states is
> implied by your finding yourself in *this* OM - i.e. they 'go through'
> this state.

OK.

>
> 3) Hence the physical appearances you discover in this OM must depend
> on (i.e. be justified by) the totality of these states.

... in this 1-OM. Yes. But instead of "these states", it is more "the
totality of the computations leading to theses states". The
(in)determinacy weight depends on the relative densities of
computations.

>
> 4) It follows therefore that any association of your mind - as the
> collection of these states - can be correlated only with the
> *totality* of physical appearances derived from this collection.
>
> Is this right?

Not so sure that the phrasing is right.

>
>
>> The physical reality can no more be just a mathematical structure
>> among
>> others. There may or may not exist such a structure, but in any
>> case this
>> structure or quasi-structure has to result from the statistical
>> "interference" of an infinity of computations.
>
> Implied by 3) above.

OK.

>
>
>> AUDA illustrates the consistency of such an idea, and provides a
>> technical
>> way to extract already the logic of the observable events. But AUDA
>> is far
>> more demanding in logico-mathematical technicalities.
>
> You said it!

Hmm...

>
>
>> AUDA is UDA, where the "yes doctor" is replaced by a "direct"
>> interview of a
>> correct self-introspecting universal machine.
>> Somehow, what I am saying in AUDA is that, thanks to the work of
>> Gödel, Löb,
>> Solovay, etc., we can already have a talk with the universal
>> her opinion, and what "her" physics looks like.
>
> Now, the 'yes doctor' is an act of faith.  But how much further will
> we be able to rely on the machine's opinions on what her physics looks
> like?  Enough to take the leap with certainty, or is there always some
> irresolvable doubt? (I think the answer is yes, because the
> substitution level remains always below the level of introspection.)

And there is the doubt about our own correctness, and even consistency.
The doubt about the presence of a bug.
The doubt "am I dreaming?"
The doubt, as you say, that we have chosen the correct substitution
level.
The doubt about the ability of the surgeon,
the doubt about the reliability of the artificial brain,
the doubt "should I take a mac of a pc?"
That are the eternal doubts of the terrestrial numbers ...

>
>
>> Then it is a rather technical point to show that by adding non
>> computational
>> power to such a universal machine will not change the AUDA
>> interview, unless
>> you bring necessarily vague ad hoc "non comp" feature build for
>> changing the
>> interview.
>
> So what is consequential on this?  Do you mean that in this case the
> machine can still derive consistent (though incomplete) opinions on
> her physics and therefore make reasonable bets on her duplicability?

Consistent but false. (not even assuming comp, but assuming elementary
arithmetic).
Perhaps inconsistent.

>
>
>> If a universal machine bet that God create earth and heaven in
>> six days and that she is not duplicable, well, it becomes hard to
>> even argue
>> if the AUDA physics will change or not.
>
> And what is consequential on this? Do you mean that her view of her
> physics has become such that neither she (by fiat) nor we (per theory)
> can make reasonable bets on her duplicability?

We are leaving the topic here. ... of course there is the correct
theory of the insane machine. But there is also the insane theory of
the insane machine, and a correct theory can exist about that! I let
the subject to machine psychoanalysts.

But all machine are duplicable, I would say by definition.
.

>
>
>> Hope this "heroic failure" can help the grandma a little bit,
>
> Yes, it helps when we go more slowly and step by step, so that the
> ignoramus can keep up.

Step by step is my favorite pedagogy, inherited from mathematics. Some
mathematicians, like in category theory, will say that global pictures
and diagrams are best, and I agree with that. Step by step, but on
mail, it is hard to make quickly little drawings. Sigh.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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