On 27 Jul 2009, at 16:25, David Nyman wrote:

> On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two
>> matter hypostases, and this in a context where space (not juts time)
>> has to be a self-referential context, in that weak sense, such work
>> seems to go in the right direction. Of course the approach are
>> different, and loop gravity suffers the usual weakness of the whole
>> aristotelian theology, where the observer's experiences are  
>> abstracted
>> away. All this relies to AUDA.
> Essentially you're saying that any truly successful mind-body (not
> just 'body') TOE *must* be a generative account of the emergence of
> observers and their specific relations to their observed
> environments.  Of course this is explicitly 'non-objective', which is
> probably equivalent to heresy if not blasphemy for physicists.

Well the 'non-objective part' is treated "objectively" with a usual  
third person sharable theory, and indeed already shared, given that  
the TOE is number theory.

What could be heresy for some physicalist is that physics is no more a  
fundamental science and physical reality emerge from a first person  
plural self-reference, but not based on us, but on all universal  
numbers (so it is neither a solipsism nor an anthropomorphism).

What is the fundamental science? I would call that the theology of  

> What is presented in the NS piece is - as always - a structural
> description of a generalised environment that presumably relies
> without further justification on some assumed 'identity' with 'parts'
> of it to account for observers and their experiences: e.g. "we could
> be nothing more than a bundle of stubborn dreadlocks in space".


I think we are persons, universal persons.
You could say, with a bit of salt, that  person is a number which  
moves itself,  relatively to many numbers.

> As
> you say, the observer is in effect abstracted out of such accounts.
> But let's say, for argument's sake, that my mind *isn't* a digital
> machine (i.e. can't be replaced by a digital computer). Nonetheless, I
> still need to give an explicit account of observers and their
> experiences in some other - presumably non-digital-computational -
> way.


>  This might rely on, say, a fundamentally topological/analogical
> analysis in terms of some primary continuum, that could nevertheless
> incorporate generative and recursive features analogous to those of
> COMP (but as you see I'm way out of my depth here).
> So my question is: do you think that there could be a non-COMP account
> of such a kind *in principle*?

Yes. It is even a consequence of COMP. COMP implies the possibility  
that COMP could be false. It justifies the "act of faith" needed for  
saying "yes" to the doctor. It "un-trivializes" the act.

> Or does the UDA analysis intend to
> show that *only* an account that is fundamentally digital/
> computational can explain the emergence of observers and their
> experiences with *all* the features that must actually be accounted
> for?  And even in the absence of any prior claim that the mind itself
> is a digital computation?

Actually, the real axiom is a self-duplicability principle. According  
to the duplicability, you will have the whole of AUDA remaining  
correct and even complete, at the propositional level, for many  
"gods" (non emulable entities). The theology of the machine van be  
lifted to almost all "self-duplicable" entities (but the proofs get  
more complex). It applies to most of the "gods" I mentioned in some  
post. You have to go very near the big unnameable for getting rid of  
the completeness of G/G* propositional theology. This was seen by  
Solovay (with other terms).
Or you have to postulate we are much less than universal machine,  
which is just "obviously false", imo.
This is a weakness, it means we can only test a very general  
principle. Most gods have similar physical realities, they have the  
same observable. Physics become a very strong invariant, it is stable  
for many non recursive permutations. But it is real hard math to  
handle all this material.
Actually, comp itself has a huge spectrum according to the choice of  
substitution level. Transfinite weakenings of the notion of  
substitution level can help to extend most comp consequence on those  
weakenings. But this could be only of academical interest, I don't know.
I am not sure I would say "yes" to a doctor who does propose me an  
actual infinite brains.



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