Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 28 Jul 2009, at 20:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> David Nyman wrote:
>>> 2009/7/28 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>>> David Nyman wrote:
>>> However I have a wacky intuition: despite the platonic criterion of
>>> co-existence, 1-person experience of the temporal dynamism (i.e.
>>> sequentiality) of the part - i.e. each OM - might reasonably persuade
>>> us that sequentiality should also possess, in some ineliminable
>>> a role in the whole. Consequently, under this assumption, could the
>>> UD (to reify it only to this degree) be conceived for this purpose to
>>> be 'sequentially resolving' each 'OM-programme-step'? Indeed my
>>> understanding is that this dovetailed sequentiality is actually a key
>>> conceptual element of COMP. In this sense - and in this sense only -
>>> could the UD therefore be thought of as temporally instantiating that
>>> OM *uniquely* at each step on behalf of the whole COMP-multiverse,
>>> thus bringing into focus - in effect - its *unique* point of view?
>> As I understand it the sequence of the states computed by the UD is
>> unrelated to
>> sequence of experienced states.
> Why? The UD does compute the complete evolution of the quantum state
> of the Milky Way, at all finite levels of description, which include
> ridiculous precision like computation with omega[omega]omega digits,
> and this in all consistent (with comp) manners to marry GR and QM. Why
> wouldn't the sequence of "Brent Meeker's'states", corresponding to all
> the approximations of your actual life, not be experienced?
I wasn't saying they were not experienced - only that the order experienced,
1-person time, need not the be same as the computated order.
> I am going to explain in detail that the UD computes, in the
> mathematical sense. This is different from an enumeration description
> of computations, or of computational states. The UD, or elementary
> arithmetic (or combinator theory, etc.) does not just enumerate
> computational states, it relates them to their possible computational
>> The sequence in which states are experienced is
>> determined by something inherent to the states and may be completely
>> from the order of their computation.
> Why? The UD dovetailing just introduces delays, but the order of
> states is respected in most computations, except in the "Harry
> Potter" or white rabbit computations. And the "first persons views"
> are delay independent.
But aren't the exceptions infinite and even dense in the set of states?
>> I don't know that this is a particular
>> problem for COMP though. Physics already has a notorious problem
>> with time and
>> it is not clear that time exists at the fundamental level.
> Apparently Lee Smolin and Loop Gravity theorists seems to give time a
> foundational role, like they speculate on the uniqueness of the
> universe. Of course the existence even of the appearance of physical
> time or space and matter is still an unsolved problem once we assume
> we are digital machine. Computationalism has problems. It is the point
> of the UD derivation to show that. The only point which has been
> solved with comp is an explanation of the appearance of many worlds,
> the non booleanity of observability logics, the appearance of strong
> indeterminacy, the appearance of subjective (1-person) time, and the
> gap between self-referential science and self-referential theology,
> and (trivially) the appearance of mathematics in physics and science.
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