Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 28 Jul 2009, at 20:06, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> David Nyman wrote: >>> 2009/7/28 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > snip >>>> David Nyman wrote: >>> However I have a wacky intuition: despite the platonic criterion of >>> co-existence, 1-person experience of the temporal dynamism (i.e. >>> sequentiality) of the part - i.e. each OM - might reasonably persuade >>> us that sequentiality should also possess, in some ineliminable >>> sense, >>> a role in the whole. Consequently, under this assumption, could the >>> UD (to reify it only to this degree) be conceived for this purpose to >>> be 'sequentially resolving' each 'OM-programme-step'? Indeed my >>> understanding is that this dovetailed sequentiality is actually a key >>> conceptual element of COMP. In this sense - and in this sense only - >>> could the UD therefore be thought of as temporally instantiating that >>> OM *uniquely* at each step on behalf of the whole COMP-multiverse, >>> and >>> thus bringing into focus - in effect - its *unique* point of view? >> As I understand it the sequence of the states computed by the UD is >> unrelated to >> sequence of experienced states. > > > Why? The UD does compute the complete evolution of the quantum state > of the Milky Way, at all finite levels of description, which include > ridiculous precision like computation with omega[omega]omega digits, > and this in all consistent (with comp) manners to marry GR and QM. Why > wouldn't the sequence of "Brent Meeker's'states", corresponding to all > the approximations of your actual life, not be experienced?
I wasn't saying they were not experienced - only that the order experienced, 1-person time, need not the be same as the computated order. > > I am going to explain in detail that the UD computes, in the > mathematical sense. This is different from an enumeration description > of computations, or of computational states. The UD, or elementary > arithmetic (or combinator theory, etc.) does not just enumerate > computational states, it relates them to their possible computational > path. > > >> The sequence in which states are experienced is >> determined by something inherent to the states and may be completely >> different >> from the order of their computation. > > Why? The UD dovetailing just introduces delays, but the order of > states is respected in most computations, except in the "Harry > Potter" or white rabbit computations. And the "first persons views" > are delay independent. But aren't the exceptions infinite and even dense in the set of states? Brent > > > >> I don't know that this is a particular >> problem for COMP though. Physics already has a notorious problem >> with time and >> it is not clear that time exists at the fundamental level. > > Apparently Lee Smolin and Loop Gravity theorists seems to give time a > foundational role, like they speculate on the uniqueness of the > universe. Of course the existence even of the appearance of physical > time or space and matter is still an unsolved problem once we assume > we are digital machine. Computationalism has problems. It is the point > of the UD derivation to show that. The only point which has been > solved with comp is an explanation of the appearance of many worlds, > the non booleanity of observability logics, the appearance of strong > indeterminacy, the appearance of subjective (1-person) time, and the > gap between self-referential science and self-referential theology, > and (trivially) the appearance of mathematics in physics and science. > > Bruno > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
