On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
> > Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> > Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> > some
> > possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> > is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> > defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-
> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor  
> numbers).

If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is
no UD.

>   I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent  
> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.

I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
existence. It is not a structure of anything.

> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the  
> existence of primitive matter.

Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each

> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or  
> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter does  
> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and  
> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter Jones  
> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a  
> contradiction.

It's not  a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial
PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all.

> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your "consciousness  
> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.

No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. You keep confusing the
that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
with the
actual existence of those entities and beliefs.

> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that  
> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease to  
> give referents to such "Peter Jones".

False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or  AR.
I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
no-one can see it, so it ain't there.

>Fregean sense is enough to see  
> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove that  
> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they  
> are not.

So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
 doesn't make us wrong
about anything.

> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing emulable.

No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
*would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.

> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.

Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me
Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out.
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