On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
> > Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> > Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> > some
> > possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> > is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> > defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
> That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-
> Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
> And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor
If you are not reifying anything. then there is nothing, hen there is
> I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent
> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
existence. It is not a structure of anything.
> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the
> existence of primitive matter.
Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each
> All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or
> Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter does
> not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and
> logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter Jones
> will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a
It's not a contradiction of materialism. If there are no immaterial
PJ's, nothing is believed by them at all.
> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your "consciousness
> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.
No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. You keep confusing the
that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
actual existence of those entities and beliefs.
> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that
> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease to
> give referents to such "Peter Jones".
False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR.
I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
no-one can see it, so it ain't there.
>Fregean sense is enough to see
> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove that
> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they
> are not.
So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
doesn't make us wrong
> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing emulable.
No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
*would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.
> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.
Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me
Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out.
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