On 17 Sep 2009, at 23:55, Flammarion wrote:

> On 17 Sep, 00:52, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>>> The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
>>> have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
>>> Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
>>> "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
>>> makes the label-attachment correct.
>> Yes, but 'flammable' and 'exists' are horses of different colours,
>> surely.  You and Bruno are disputing whether mathematics is a formal
>> abstraction from physics or vice versa.  But in either case this  
>> seems
>> to me fundamentally a question of methodological, not ontic,  
>> priority.
> In either case the  conclusion is ontological , so the assumptions
> must be.

No, the conclusion is epistemological. Physics becomes a branch of  
computer science/number theory.
The ontological "conclusion" is a consequence of Occam Razor, and is  

>>  We cannot hope to have any final criterion for what is really real;
>> rather we search for the deepest theory we can find, one that can
>> explain whatever we are currently persuaded needs explaining, and in
>> terms of which we are able to subsume subsidiary theories.  Then we
>> feel justified in saying that our theory describes what exists.   
>> Isn't
>> that about the size of it?
> Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it
> is ontological.
> Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure
> maths.

I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not  
pure math.
I'm afraid you are continuing to systematically confuse the  
consequences of comp and comp itself.


> But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take
> certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be
> taken
> literally in the mathematical context  is an ontological question, as
> the material
> in the first posting indicates
> >


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