On 17 Sep 2009, at 23:55, Flammarion wrote:
> > > > On 17 Sep, 00:52, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >> 2009/9/16 Flammarion <[email protected]>: >> >>> The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers >>> have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached. >>> Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label >>> "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that >>> makes the label-attachment correct. >> >> Yes, but 'flammable' and 'exists' are horses of different colours, >> surely. You and Bruno are disputing whether mathematics is a formal >> abstraction from physics or vice versa. But in either case this >> seems >> to me fundamentally a question of methodological, not ontic, >> priority. > > In either case the conclusion is ontological , so the assumptions > must be. No, the conclusion is epistemological. Physics becomes a branch of computer science/number theory. The ontological "conclusion" is a consequence of Occam Razor, and is *optional*. > >> We cannot hope to have any final criterion for what is really real; >> rather we search for the deepest theory we can find, one that can >> explain whatever we are currently persuaded needs explaining, and in >> terms of which we are able to subsume subsidiary theories. Then we >> feel justified in saying that our theory describes what exists. >> Isn't >> that about the size of it? > > Yep, and if the conclusion is ontological, the process that reaches it > is ontological. > > Bruno thinks he can reach an ontological assumption starting with pure > maths. I start from pure cognitive science. Saying "yes" to the doctor is not pure math. I'm afraid you are continuing to systematically confuse the consequences of comp and comp itself. Bruno > But he can't. "mathematical existence" means that mathematicians take > certain "exists" statements to be true. Whether "exists" should be > taken > literally in the mathematical context is an ontological question, as > the material > in the first posting indicates > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
