On 22 Sep 2009, at 17:18, Flammarion wrote:

> On 22 Sep, 16:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 22 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:
>>>> You have said nothing about the seventh first steps, which does not
>>>> invoke the materiality issue. Any problem there?
>>> "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a
>>> machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the
>>> pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of  
>>> computations
>>> (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as
>>> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). "
>> This is in the eight step.
>> I don't know which game you are playing, Peter, you never address the
>> point.
>> I have no clue what you mean by an immaterial UD, or actual existing
>> numbers.
> I mean exactly what you mean by "existing forever in the arithmetical
> Platonia which is accepted as
> existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism"

I mean that the truth status of statement having the shape ExP(x),  
with P written in first order arithmetic is true or false  
independently of me or of any consideration.

>> I believe that to say yes to someone who will replace my brain by a
>> digital machine, in this in the sense of believing that it is the
>> computation that matter at some level, I have to trust a minimal
>> amount of computer science.
>> If you agree that the proof of the existence of two irrational  
>> numbers
>> such that x^y is rational does provide information, then by MG
>> Argument you may understand the point or find a flaw, fatal or not.
>> Who knows?
> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?

It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is  
programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and  
dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with  
the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with the  
shape ExP(x) with P decidable).

>> I think you agree that dreamy-consciousness can supervene on the
>> physical laser-boolean graph activity. Does dreamy-consciousness
>> supervenes on the movie of the laser-boolean graph activity?
> I don't beleive it supervenes on causally-disconnected frames, no.

I agree with you. The movie cannot bring consciousness through comp,  
yet the physical activity of the movie can be made similar to the  
physical activity of the boolean graph. That is why if we want to keep  
the causal connectness relevant for having a computation, we have to  
replace the physical supervenience by the computaitonal supervenience,  
which is a very solid mathematical (even arithmetical,  
combinatoric, ...) notions, thanks to that unexpected Church thesis.
But then physical connection get blurred below our substitution level  
where an infinity of computations compete.



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