On 23 Sep, 15:33, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 23 Sep 2009, at 10:39, Flammarion wrote:
> >> Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why
> >> does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?
> > It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as
> > an accident.
> Then it needs the essential property of being able to have accidental
> property.

That's more of a purely logical 'Cambidge' property.

> Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached
> to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached
> accidentally, so it does need some essential properties.

I don't follow

> >>>>> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
> >>>> It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
> >>>> programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
> >>>> dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with
> >>>> the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with
> >>>> the
> >>>> shape ExP(x) with P decidable).
> >>> I don;t see what that has to do with information.
> >> Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the
> >> arithmetical truth, and the "meaning-consciousness information" comes
> >> from the fixed point of machine self-observability.
> > The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information
> > is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically
> > necessarty
> > tautologies.
> Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be
> derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum).

No, the SE is not logically necessary.

> your own:

> > Why would they get different physical properties?
> > Answer: starting conditions+physical laws.
> But mathematical theorems are not necessary tautologies, in general.
> By Godel completeness theorem, all you can say is that they are true
> in all models of the (first order logical) theories.

Have you an exampel fo a theorem which is provably
true, and which is not derived analytcially from axioms?

> But even this is not relevant, given that the information are relative
> from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which
> emulates all theories).

You are appealing to your theory to justify your theory.

> This is explains explicitly in AUDA. Even for ideally correct machine
> there is a notion of contingency, which is provided by the notion of
> consistency (unprovable by the theory), so that such machine develop
> according to different histories.
> Information is provided then by self-analysis after self-
> multiplication, like discovering "I am in Moscow" after the WM-
> duplication.

subjective indeterminacy is no more than subjective information.

I find myself in the world where Hitler lost WWII, but I just *am*
that version
of Peter. SO it boils down to the tatutology that Hitler-lost-WWII
Peter is in the
 Hitler-lost-WWII world,  Hitler-won-WWII Peter is in the
 Hitler-won-WWII world, etc.

> All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to the
> doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the
> execution of the UD?

I have answers that a million times. Since I don't agree that there
is either a material or an immaterial UD, i do not believe I am
running on a  UD

> Once you say "yes" to the digital surgeon, you know that your physical
> state will be truncated and encoded through a number (the digital
> backup, the teletransport information, ...).

AFIAC it is always encoded in some physical form.

>The UD will generate all
> the computations generating that state.

A non-existent UD generates nothing.

>For example, it will generate
> the quantum state of the Milky Way, and emulates its wave equation,
> and thus all relative states of all its subsystems. That emulation
> will generate your actual computational states, and the 3-you will be
> generated. All the 3-you will behave as if they were you, and talk
> about primary matter and so one.

None of that follows without the actual existence
of an immaterial UD. Equally, you will continue
to believe in dreamign machines even if every existing
thign is material and Platonism is completely false.

> Before the MGA, I can understand you may consider them as immaterial
> zombie.

The problem is not that the UD only generates zombies. The problem
is that it does not exist.

> The MGA shows that if you survive qua computatio then each of those 3-
> you will have a 1-you (actually captured by the non formalizable-by-
> you notion of Bp & Dp & p).
> To be sure the emulation of the galaxy will not be among the winning
> computations, but that is not the point here.
> The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter, and
> to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing
> emulated.

That is false. All I have to do is reject the immaterial UD. (In
I can accept PM and Turing Emulation so long as I reject Platonism
and the immaterial UD).

>But then you cannot say yes to the doctor "qua computatio".

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to