On 23 Sep 2009, at 10:39, Flammarion wrote:
>> Also, what is primary matter and where does it comes from, and why
>> does it organize into living being if it is propertyless?
> It only lacks essential properties. It can have any property as
> an accident.

Then it needs the essential property of being able to have accidental  

Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached  
to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached  
accidentally, so it does need some essential properties.

>>>>> How do you get from providing information to an immaterial UD?
>>>> It is program without input which generates all the Pi, that is
>>>> programs computing the phi_i, together with their arguments and
>>>> dovetel on the execution of the computations. It is equivalent with
>>>> the finite + infinite proof of the Sigma_1 sentences (those with  
>>>> the
>>>> shape ExP(x) with P decidable).
>>> I don;t see what that has to do with information.
>> Which information? The Shannon like information comes from the
>> arithmetical truth, and the "meaning-consciousness information" comes
>> from the fixed point of machine self-observability.
> The idea that mathematical theorems have shanning information
> is contradicted by the idea that mathematical theorems are logically
> necessarty
> tautologies.

Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be  
derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum). Cf  
your own:

> Why would they get different physical properties?
> Answer: starting conditions+physical laws.

But mathematical theorems are not necessary tautologies, in general.  
By Godel completeness theorem, all you can say is that they are true  
in all models of the (first order logical) theories.
But even this is not relevant, given that the information are relative  
from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which  
emulates all theories).

This is explains explicitly in AUDA. Even for ideally correct machine  
there is a notion of contingency, which is provided by the notion of  
consistency (unprovable by the theory), so that such machine develop  
according to different histories.
Information is provided then by self-analysis after self- 
multiplication, like discovering "I am in Moscow" after the WM- 

All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to the  
doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the  
execution of the UD?

Once you say "yes" to the digital surgeon, you know that your physical  
state will be truncated and encoded through a number (the digital  
backup, the teletransport information, ...). The UD will generate all  
the computations generating that state. For example, it will generate  
the quantum state of the Milky Way, and emulates its wave equation,  
and thus all relative states of all its subsystems. That emulation  
will generate your actual computational states, and the 3-you will be  
generated. All the 3-you will behave as if they were you, and talk  
about primary matter and so one.
Before the MGA, I can understand you may consider them as immaterial  
The MGA shows that if you survive qua computatio then each of those 3- 
you will have a 1-you (actually captured by the non formalizable-by- 
you notion of Bp & Dp & p).
To be sure the emulation of the galaxy will not be among the winning  
computations, but that is not the point here.

The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter, and  
to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing  
emulated. But then you cannot say yes to the doctor "qua computatio".



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