2010/1/11 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >> >> >> >>> But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract >>> Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which >>> is >>> not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued? >>> >>> >> >> No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by >> the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two >> machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating >> systems. Once the program is loaded into M2 from the disc, S2 proceeds >> exactly the same as it would have had the computation been allowed to >> continue running on M1. Therefore, at least after the first few >> milliseconds, the subjective content of S2 must be the same as it >> would have been on the one machine. Could the subjective content be >> different at the transition between S1 and S2 if the computation is >> split up? If there is a subjective difference it won't be something >> the subject can notice because, later in the course of S2, he can have >> no memory of it. >> > > But if you're only assuming that consciousness is produced by the physical > process then the process of downloading and uploading the microstates and > shifting the data into registers in the CPU and memory could produce a > difference in consciousness. These are all computations too, done by the > operating system. And why can't there be memory of it in the sense that it > effects some later conscious state? There are traces of the transfer > process left on the original computer, the disc, and the second computer. > Some subsequent program could retrieve these traces, as is done in forensic > cases. If physical processes instantiate consciousness, why shouldn't these > make a difference.
Because those states are not part of the "computation" you sliced on the two computers. And also assuming computationalism... Any implementation that does the job... effectively does the job. That means while it's true there are additionnal steps in the two case computer... it's just another *valid* implementation of the same computation on one computer, assuming computationalism that change *nothing*, arguing otherwise is denying computationalism (maybe it's right and computationalism is false). > > > It also can't be a difference that would disrupt the >> completion of a task or thought that requires continuity of >> consciousness spanning S1-S2, since again the subject cannot have any >> evidence that such a disruption occurred. >> >> > > Unless we have a theory of how consciousness is related to the physical > computation I don't think we can conclude that. We already know that > subliminal perceptions can affect conscious thoughts - so why not subliminal > memories. > > We don't, but what Bruno is showing is the consequences *if* we are turing emulable. If we are turing emulable, all your above objections are not valid because your objections are a level way too high (they are completely valid objections at the level you describe, but assuming comp, those are *still* computed at a lower level and hence are *part* of a computation that generate consciousness, see the generalized brain argument of Bruno). Quentin > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.--
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