I know. I'm trying to see
what exactly is being
assumed
about the
computation being "the same". Is it the
same Platonic
algorithm? Is it
one that has the same steps as described in
FORTRAN, but
not those in LISP?
Is it just one that has the same
input-output? I
think
these are questions
that have been bypassed in the "yes doctor"
scenario.
Saying "yes" to the
doctor seems unproblematic when you think of
replacing a
few neurons with
artificial ones - all you care about is the
input-output.
But then when you
jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care
about the
FORTRAN/LISP
differences. Yet on this list there seems to
be an
assumption that you can
just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even
a Platonic
computation that's
independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes
all this
aside by referring to
"at the appropriate level" and by doing all
possible
algorithms. But I'm
more interested in the question of what would I
have to do
to make a
conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of
a Platonic
computation that
allows one to slice it discretely into OMs.
Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons
which are
driven by
a computer program and whose defining
characteristic is
that
they copy
the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The
program has to
model the
internal workings of a neuron down to a certain
level.
It may
be that
the position and configuration of every molecule
needs
to be
modelled,
or it may be that shortcuts such as a single
parameter
for the
permeability of ion channels in the cell
membrane make no
difference
to the final result. In any case, there are many
possible programs
even if the same physical model of a neuron is
used,
and the same
basic program can be written in any language and
implemented
on any
computer: all that matters is that the artificial
neuron works
properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry
about
whether these
artificial neurons are zombies, since that would
lead
to absurd
conclusions about the nature of consciousness.)
From the
single neuron
we can progress to replacing the whole brain,
the end
result
being a
computer program interacting with the outside
world through
sensors
and effectors. The program can be implemented in
any
way - any
language, any hardware - and the consciousness
of the
subject will
remain the same as long as the brain behaviour
remains
the same.
You're asserting that neuron I/O
replication is the
"appropriate
level" to make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to
agree that
would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary).
But that's
preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific
than the
Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I
suppose a
Turing
machine could perform the same computation, but it
would
perform
it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing
machine would
manage perception. The organs of perception would
have their
responses digitized into bit strings and these would be
written to
the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates
my point
that, while preservation of consciousness under the
digital
neuron
substitution seems plausible, there is still another
leap in
substituting an abstract computation for the digital
neurons.
Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the
computations
into arbitrarily short time periods because there is
communication
time involved and neurons run asynchronously.
Yes you can, freeze the computation, dump memory...
then load
memory back, and defreeze. If the time inside the
computation
is an internal feature (a counter inside the program),
the AI
associated to the computation cannot notice anything if
on the
other hand the time inside of the computation is an input
parameter from some external then it can notice... but I
always can englobe the whole thing and feed that
external time
from another program or whatever.
That assumes that the AI brain is running synchronously,
i.e. at a
clock rate small compared to c/R where R is the radius of the
brain. But I think the real brain runs asynchronously, so
if the
AI brain must do the simulation at a lower level to take
account
of transmission times, etc. and run at a much higher clock
rate
than do neurons. But is it then still "the same" computation?
The fact that you can disrupt a computation and restart it
with some different parameters doesn't mean you can't
restart
it with *exactly* the same parameters as when you froze
it.
That's arbitrarily excluding the physical steps in
"freezing" and
"starting" a computation, as though you can pick out the
"real"
computation as separate from the physical processes. Which
is the
same as assuming that consciousness attaches to the Platonic
"real" computation and those extra physical steps somehow
don't
count as "computations".
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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