Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com <mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>>
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>>>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2010/1/12 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
<mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com>>>>:
I know. I'm trying to see
what exactly is being
assumed
about the
computation being "the same". Is it the
same Platonic
algorithm? Is it
one that has the same steps as described in
FORTRAN, but
not those in LISP?
Is it just one that has the same
input-output? I
think
these are questions
that have been bypassed in the "yes doctor"
scenario.
Saying "yes" to the
doctor seems unproblematic when you think of
replacing a
few neurons with
artificial ones - all you care about is the
input-output.
But then when you
jump to replacing a whole brain maybe you care
about the
FORTRAN/LISP
differences. Yet on this list there seems to
be an
assumption that you can
just jump to the Platonic algorithm or even
a Platonic
computation that's
independent of the algorithm. Bruno pushes
all this
aside by referring to
"at the appropriate level" and by doing all
possible
algorithms. But I'm
more interested in the question of what would I
have to do
to make a
conscious AI. Also, it is the assumption of
a Platonic
computation that
allows one to slice it discretely into OMs.
Start by replacing neurons with artificial neurons
which are
driven by
a computer program and whose defining
characteristic is
that
they copy
the I/O behaviour of biological neurons. The
program has to
model the
internal workings of a neuron down to a certain
level.
It may
be that
the position and configuration of every molecule
needs
to be
modelled,
or it may be that shortcuts such as a single
parameter
for the
permeability of ion channels in the cell
membrane make no
difference
to the final result. In any case, there are many
possible programs
even if the same physical model of a neuron is used,
and the same
basic program can be written in any language and
implemented
on any
computer: all that matters is that the artificial
neuron works
properly. (As an aside, we don't need to worry about
whether these
artificial neurons are zombies, since that would
lead
to absurd
conclusions about the nature of consciousness.)
From the
single neuron
we can progress to replacing the whole brain,
the end
result
being a
computer program interacting with the outside
world through
sensors
and effectors. The program can be implemented in any
way - any
language, any hardware - and the consciousness
of the
subject will
remain the same as long as the brain behaviour
remains
the same.
You're asserting that neuron I/O
replication is the
"appropriate
level" to make "brain behavior" the same; and I tend to
agree that
would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary).
But that's
preserving a particular algorithm; one more specific
than the
Platonic computation of its equivalence class. I
suppose a
Turing
machine could perform the same computation, but it would
perform
it very differently. And I wonder how the Turing
machine would
manage perception. The organs of perception would
have their
responses digitized into bit strings and these would be
written to
the TM on different tapes? I think this illustrates
my point
that, while preservation of consciousness under the
digital
neuron
substitution seems plausible, there is still another
leap in
substituting an abstract computation for the digital
neurons.
Also, such an AI brain would not permit slicing the
computations
into arbitrarily short time periods because there is
communication
time involved and neurons run asynchronously.
Yes you can, freeze the computation, dump memory...
then load
memory back, and defreeze. If the time inside the
computation
is an internal feature (a counter inside the program),
the AI
associated to the computation cannot notice anything if
on the
other hand the time inside of the computation is an input
parameter from some external then it can notice... but I
always can englobe the whole thing and feed that
external time
from another program or whatever.
That assumes that the AI brain is running synchronously,
i.e. at a
clock rate small compared to c/R where R is the radius of the
brain. But I think the real brain runs asynchronously, so
if the
AI brain must do the simulation at a lower level to take
account
of transmission times, etc. and run at a much higher clock rate
than do neurons. But is it then still "the same" computation?
The fact that you can disrupt a computation and restart it
with some different parameters doesn't mean you can't
restart
it with *exactly* the same parameters as when you froze it.
That's arbitrarily excluding the physical steps in
"freezing" and
"starting" a computation, as though you can pick out the "real"
computation as separate from the physical processes. Which
is the
same as assuming that consciousness attaches to the Platonic
"real" computation and those extra physical steps somehow don't
count as "computations".
But it is the same... When I write a program in say java...
that's not my "program" that is run on the machine, it is a
translation in the target machine language. Yet it is the
same, that's what we use UTM for.
Also the restarted computation has no knowledge at all of
having been freezed and restarted in the first place.
Well maybe I'm confused about this, but you're talking about a
program that has the same input/output and therefore all the
processes after the input and before the program halts are
irrelevant. You're saying it's "the same" if the same inputs halt
with the same outputs - which is the abstract Turing machine or
Platonic meaning of "the computation". I don't see that as being
the same as attaching consciousness to brain processes which don't
halt? How are you mapping the Turing computation to the brain
process? If you replace each neuron with a Turing machine that
reproduces the same input/output, I can understand the mapping.
But then you reproduce that collection of interacting Turing
machines with a single, super-Turing machine which includes some
simulation of the local environment too. Because the neuron level
Turing machines ran asynchronously, the super-Turing machine has
to include a lot of additional computation to keep track of the
signal passing. Yet we are to bet that it instantiates the same
stream of consciousness because - exactly why?...because it will
halt on the same outputs for the same inputs?
Because it is isomorphic to the "platonic" computation.
But there's my hang-up. What does "isomorphic" mean in this context.
It certainly doesn't going thru the same physical states, since a
computer could do arithmetic base 3 instead of base 2. I can understand
isomorphic to the program ADD, it means given two input numbers n and m
it halts with n+m in the output, i.e. it is functionally isomorphic.
But how does that meaning translate to an AI brain that presumably
doesn't halt?
If it was not the case... I don't see how I could write a program in
any language in the first place, if a compilator couldn't make an
equivalent program for the target machine.
Just incidentally (it probably has no bearing on your point) but
compilers generally don't realize whole functions - i.e. for some inputs
they crash. And it seems likely to me that for some inputs brains crash
too.
Also what you're saying is that somehow the machine which executes it
adds something to the computation...
I'm saying the implementation adds something to the Platonic abstraction.
that somehow super AI could know (without having necessary "sensor"
for) information outside the computation. That it could sense that it
is run on super Quantum Computer 360 and not on the super x86_2048 or
on a virtual machine running on ... ?
Or written out on a piece of paper. I'm not saying it could sense
anything that specific, but that it might make a difference in the
consciousness realized. To say otherwise is to simply assume that
consciousness = Platonic abstract computation, since that the only thing
invariant among the different realizations.
This thread really originated with a discussion of observer-moments
though. Of course any synchronous computer run can in principle be
stopped and started and modulo some initialization, go through the same
computational steps. But what bothered me was the idea that a state of
such computation, which realisitically for a human being would have a
cycle time of a nanosecond, would correspond to a "thought" or an OM.
ISTM that a thought would have a duration of many millions of cycles and
hence might be said to overlap preceding and suceeding "thoughts" and
this would provide an ordering that did not depend on some memory
content inherent in the OM.
Brent
Quentin
Brent
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