Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a
look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a
In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person)
I don't think it makes sense to attribute consciousness to anything
which "do" the computation, but only to the (abstract or immaterial)
person supervening on the logical and arithmetical relations defining
those computations, (infinitely many exist).
Persons need to be self-referentially correct relatively to their most
probable computations, only.
I don't understand what "self-referentially correct" means nor in what
sense computations can be "theirs"?
Persons are conscious, not machine, nor computation, nor states, nor
numbers, except in a metaphorical way.
So you take "person" as well as arithmetic to be fundamental.
A universal machine, or number inherits a notion of first person
plausibly when the machine can, qua computatio, infer its own
ignorance (G-G* gap), that is when the machine is Löbian (like Peano
Arithmetic). Then a physics can be associated too. (8 "hypostases"
appear, or 6 + 2 * infinity, actually).
Is Peano Arithmetic conscious? No! That would be the same mistake. But
by Lobianity it defines a "natural" (Theaetetical) first person view,
and its physics and metaphysics. (or then it is a metaphor or a short
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at