2010/1/14 Brent Meeker <[email protected]>: >> I think it would be enough for the AI to reproduce the I/O of the >> whole brain in aggregate. That would involve computing a function >> controlling each efferent nerve, accepting as data input from the >> afferent nerves. The behaviour would have to be the same as the brain >> for all possible inputs, otherwise the AI might fail the Turing test. >> > > To have the same output for all possible inputs is a very strong condition > and seems to go beyond functionalism. Suppose (as seems likely) there are > inputs that "crash" the brain (e.g. induce epileptic seizures). Would the > AI brain be less conscious because it didn't experience these seizures? > Passing or failing the Turing test is a rather crude measure - after all > interlocutor might simply guess right.
It would depend on whether the aim was to reproduce a particular person (which you would want if you were thinking of replacing your own brain) or just a generic human level intelligence. If we want to reproduce a particular person the I/O behaviour would be allowed to vary as much as your behaviour might vary from day to day without those who know being alarmed. If we want to make a generic AI the allowed variation could be greater. >> It's not clear if the modelling would have to be at the molecular, >> cellular or some higher level in order to achieve this, but in any >> case I expect that there would be many different programs that could >> do the job even if the hardware and operating system are kept the >> same. It could therefore be a case of multiple computations leading to >> the same experience. Pinning down a thought to a location in time and >> space would pose no more of a problem for the AI than for the brain. >> > > Then among those AI brains with different computations but the same I/O, you > would have to find the same OMs constituted by different sequences of > computational steps. > > My intuition is that having the same O for "most" (some very large set of ) > I would be enough to instantiate consciousness - just not the same > consciousness. I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a > look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a > different way. Yes. -- Stathis Papaioannou
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