On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
>> problem.
>>
>> 1)  Get rid of 1-p.  (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)
>>
>> OR
>>
>> 2)  Get rid of 3-p.  (subjective idealism)
>>
>> For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing the
>> idea of a material world explains anything at all.  Therefore, I vote
>> for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device.
>>
>> The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
>> while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
>> idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and
>> gives rise to the mere perception of a material world (as everyone
>> accepts happens in dreams).
>>
>> What is the problem with this solution?
>
> You forget "3)
>
> 3) get rid of physical-3-p, but keep mathematical (arithmetical) 3-p. That
> is "objective idealism".
>
> And this you need in any account ... if only as 'calculational device'.
>  Then computer science solves the hard part of the mind problem, with the
> price of having to derive the physical laws from the belief that the numbers
> develop naturally from self-introspection. And it is not so amazing we
> (re)find the type of theory developed by the greeks among those who were
> both mystic and rationalist. They did introspect themselves very deeply,
> apparently.
>
> Wait my next post to David for how comp does solve the hard problem of
> consciousness.
>
> Bruno Marchal


Hmmmm.  Well, I think that your proposal suffers from the same
explanatory gap as physicalism.

So numbers and their relations and machines and whatnot exist
platonically.  Okay.  So far so good.

BUT I don't see why these things in any combination or standing in any
relation to each other should give rise to conscious experience - any
more than quarks and electrons stacked in certain arrangements should
do so.

I believe you that there is some mathematical description or
representation of my experiences...but I don't see why the existence
of such a representation, platonic OR physically embodied, would
result in conscious experience...?

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