On 24 Feb, 16:09, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > We would seek unambiguous evidence > that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states, > certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable without the > hypothesis of 1-p --> 3-p causal influence.
In the unlikely event that anyone else has endeavoured to penetrate this far into what I wrote above, I see that what I meant to say was: "We would seek unambiguous evidence that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states, certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable, thus necessitating the hypothesis of 1-p --> 3-p causal influence." Hope this helps ;-) David > 2010/2/23 Diego Caleiro <diegocale...@gmail.com>: > > Thanks for this. I have to say, though, that Yablo's approach strikes > me again as waving-away, or defining-out-of-existence, a real issue > that doesn't deserve such treatment. The motive for this seems to be > that academic philosophy has become embarrassed by this question in > the face of the apparently decisive colonisation of the territory by > science - i.e. the so-called "over-determination" issue. Of course, > such an approach may turn out to be valid, and we would perforce have > to settle for remaining puzzled. But I still believe that there is > reason to take persons seriously in the causal narrative - i.e. > something like our sense of real "personal causation" is possible > without resorting, for example, to such infertile territory as > substance dualism. Comp, as I understand it, is one theory that has > something like this implication. > > Another possibility (which may be in some sense compatible with comp, > I can't yet tell) is to look towards the "duality" of whole and part - > i.e. that the differentiation of the world-system into persons and > their generalised impersonal environment gives scope both for > "unconscious" (3-p <--> 3-p) and "conscious" (1-p <--> 3-p) causal > sequences. ISTM that this is not ruled out by current physical > theory, and indeed is empirically testable, given a sufficiently > sophisticated state-of-the-art. We would seek unambiguous evidence > that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states, > certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable without the > hypothesis of 1-p --> 3-p causal influence. Alternatively, such > detailed observation might entirely convince us that, in fact, the > whole objective narrative could always be accounted for without > reference to 1-p subjective states, and without stepping outside > exclusively 3-p <--> 3-p causal sequences (i.e. the current default > assumption). > > David > > > I'm not reading the whole discussion here, but the reason I recommended > > those readings is that I sensed a mix between accounting for phenomenal > > consciousness and access conciousness in the discussion. Both were used > > as 1p and 3p, depending on what was being talked about. > > This is the reason for > > readinghttp://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Abridged%20BB... > > > The reason for reading Yablo, on the other > > hand:http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/mc.pdf > > > Is because he gives the only satisfactory account of the overdetermination, > > double causation problem (stronger than Kim's for instance). it seems that > > was befuzzling you...... > > > Reason to read Rorty is he will try to convince you that all this > > discussion is just historic accident and that it relies in forgetting Kant > > on the one hand, and the mith of the given, by sellars, on the other. > > > Bye Bye > > > Diego Caleiro > > > Phil of Mind. > > > On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 9:18 AM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen <rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> > For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing the > >> > idea of a material world explains anything at all. Therefore, I vote > >> > for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device. > > >> > The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused > >> > while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the > >> > idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and > >> > gives rise to the mere perception of a material world (as everyone > >> > accepts happens in dreams). > > >> > What is the problem with this solution? > > >> The problem with it, with reference to the situation as I've stated > >> it, is that it doesn't take us one step nearer elucidating the > >> relation between 1-p and 3-p. In Dennett's formulation, there only > >> "seems" to be 1-p in a uniquely 3-p world; in yours, there only > >> "seems" to be 3-p in a fundamentally 1-p world. But what neither > >> "solution" addresses, or even acknowledges - but rather obscures with > >> these linguistic devices - is what any fundamental relation between > >> these two undeniably manifest perspectives could possibly be. What we > >> seek is a penetrating analysis of "seeming" that encompasses both 1-p > >> and 3-p aspects. > > >> Now of course it's open to you, as you consistently reiterate, to > >> reject this issue as unworthy of discussion on the grounds that it is > >> permanently inexplicable. You may be right, but in effect this would > >> simply exclude you from the community of those who'd like to know > >> more, even if they're destined never to be enlightened. In my view, > >> such an attitude is premature. > > >> David > > >> > On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> > >> > wrote: > >> >> On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen <rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> >>> So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. > >> >>> However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the > >> >>> weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of" > >> >>> 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be unproblematic, fundamental, > >> >>> and needing no explanation. > > >> >> You're right that I'm starting from this assumption, but only because > >> >> it is indeed the default assumption in the sciences, and indeed in the > >> >> general consciousness, and my intention was to illustrate some of the > >> >> consequences of this assumption that are often waved away or simply > >> >> not acknowledged. > > >> > So let's assume that an independently existing material world exists > >> > and fully explains what we observe and also THAT we observe. > > >> > If this reality is deterministic, then what we experience is strictly > >> > a result of the world's initial conditions and the laws that govern > >> > it's change over time. Which means that what we can know about > >> > reality is also strictly a result of the initial conditions and causal > >> > laws, since we only learn about the world through our experiences. > > >> > What would explain the all-important initial conditions and causal > >> > laws? Nothing, right? They just would be whatever they were, for no > >> > reason. If they had a reason, that reason would be part of the > >> > material world, not something separate from and preceding it. > > >> > In this case there would be no reason to believe that what we > >> > experienced revealed anything about the *true* underlying causal > >> > structure. It could be like a dream or The Matrix, where what is > >> > experienced is completely different than the cause of the experience. > > >> > Even if what we experienced did reflect the true underlying nature of > >> > what caused the experience...what would the significance of this be, > >> > really? The future is set, all we do is wait for it to be revealed to > >> > our experience. > > >> > An indeterministic physical world is no more helpful. Here, we would > >> > seem to have a range of scenarios. > > >> > At one end is pure indeterminism...where there is absolutely no > >> > connection between one instant and the next. Things just happen, > >> > randomly, for no reason. No events are causally connected in any way. > >> > If transitions between particular arrangements of matter is what > >> > gives rise to conscious experience, then given enough random events > >> > every possible experience would eventually seem to be generated. > >> > However, if any of these experiences revealed anything about the true > >> > nature of reality, this would be purely coincidental. > > >> > At the other end of the range is a nearly deterministic system where > >> > only on very rare occasions or in specific circumstances would the > >> > orderly sequence of cause and effect give way to some sort of tightly > >> > constrained but completely unpredictable indeterministic state > >> > change...which would then alter in an orderly way the subsequent > >> > deterministic behavior of the physical world as the consequences of > >> > this random event spread out in a ripple of cause-and-effect. > > >> > So our experiences would be completely "determined" by the initial > >> > state of the world, plus the causal laws with their tolerance for > >> > occasional randomness, PLUS the history of actual random state > >> > changes. > > >> > This doesn't seem to provide any improvement over the purely > >> > deterministic option. Each "random" occurrence is just another brute > >> > fact, like the initial state or the particular causal laws that govern > >> > the evolution of the system (allowing for occasional random events). > >> > The random occurrences don't add anything, and actually could be just > >> > taken as "special cases" of the causal laws. > > >> >> This, ISTM, is a paradoxical, or at the very least an extremely > >> >> puzzling, state of affairs, and it was to promote discussion of these > >> >> specific problems that I started the thread. > > >> > Is it a paradox, or a reductio ad absurdum against the idea that our > >> > perceptions are caused by an independently existing external reality? > > >> > What does introducing an independently existing physical world buy us? > > >> > So we have our orderly conscious experiences and we want to explain > >> > them. To do this, we need some context to place these experiences in. > >> > So we postulate the existence of an orderly external universe that > >> > “causes” our experiences. But then we have to explain what caused this > >> > orderly external universe, and also the particular initial conditions > >> > and causal laws that result in what we observe. > > >> > So this is basically Kant's first antinomy of pure reason. Either > >> > there is a first cause, which itself is uncaused, OR there is an > >> > infinite chain of prior causes stretching infinitely far into the > >> > past. But why this particular infinite chain as opposed to some other? > >> > In fact, why our particular "infinite chain of prior causes" or "first > >> > cause" instead of Nothing existing at all? > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.