On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 7:18 AM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen <rexallen...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
>> while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
>> idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and
>> gives rise to the mere perception of a material world (as everyone
>> accepts happens in dreams).
>>
>> What is the problem with this solution?
>
> The problem with it, with reference to the situation as I've stated
> it, is that it doesn't take us one step nearer elucidating the
> relation between 1-p and 3-p.  In Dennett's formulation, there only
> "seems" to be 1-p in a uniquely 3-p world; in yours, there only
> "seems" to be 3-p in a fundamentally 1-p world.  But what neither
> "solution" addresses, or even acknowledges - but rather obscures with
> these linguistic devices - is what any fundamental relation between
> these two undeniably manifest perspectives could possibly be.  What we
> seek is a penetrating analysis of "seeming" that encompasses both 1-p
> and 3-p aspects.

So we can have the experience of an external world without actually
having an external world.  Dreams and hallucinations prove this.

Therefore, our experience of an external world does not prove that the
external world which is experienced actually exists.

With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by "two undeniably
manifest perpectives."  Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's
1-p.

My proposal is that "seeming" is all there is to reality.  It's all
surface, no depth.  However, using reason to build models with
ontologies that are consistent with our observations provides the
illusion of depth.


> Now of course it's open to you, as you consistently reiterate, to
> reject this issue as unworthy of discussion on the grounds that it is
> permanently inexplicable. You may be right, but in effect this would
> simply exclude you from the community of those who'd like to know
> more, even if they're destined never to be enlightened.  In my view,
> such an attitude is premature.

Hmmm.  Well, I think you've missed my point.

So the question is, what causes consciousness.  The typical answer is
something along the lines of neurons, which are made of quarks and
electrons, which interact in ways approximately described by the laws
of physics.

There are two follow up questions to that answer:

1)  Why would quarks and electrons interacting that way result in my
conscious experience?  (the explanatory gap)

2)  What causes quarks and electrons (and the universe that contains
them)?  And what causes them to interact in the way they do rather
than some other way (plus the rest of the laws of physics)?

You seem to have focused primarily on the first follow up question.
However, I think the second follow up question is actually more
interesting with respect to consciousness.

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