On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: > Rex Allen wrote: >> The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused >> while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the >> idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and >> gives rise to the mere perception of a material world (as everyone >> accepts happens in dreams). >> >> What is the problem with this solution? >> > The material world didn't lead to solipism.
Is hard determinism as bad an outcome as solipsism? If not, why not? It would seem to me to be about the same. And further, how would quantum indeterminism improve things? But, regardless, if you mean solipsism in the sense that only I exist, then that's not entailed by my position. > And it proved to have a lot of predictive power. If deterministic physicalism is true, then your experience of having made a successful prediction is entirely a result of the universe's initial conditions plus the causal laws that govern it's change over time (if there are any such laws). The only significant part is that you have an experience of it. Not the prediction itself. If the universe is completely indeterministic, then the success of your prediction is pure luck. If the universe is has probabilistic laws, then the success of your prediction is due entirely to the interplay of luck, initial conditions, and the particular nature of the probabilistic laws that we have. Like the card game example. In poker, whether you are dealt rags or a Royal flush is due to luck. BUT, there's no chance of you getting 5 Aces of the same suit, because the rules of the game don't allow for that. You can say you still have a choice in how you play your hand, but that's is putting yourself outside the game. Which is not an option with the universe. Inside the game there are no choices...there is only luck and the rules. Right? So. There's no significance to predictive success. It just *seems* that way to you. > However, let me put in a modest word for a third possibility - instead of a > first cause, and instead of an infinite regress, let me recommend the > circular explanation; in this case: 1-p => 3-p => 1-p =>... I realize > these are in disfavor and are given the name "vicious circle", but I'd like > to suggest that when the circle is so large as to encompass all the > explandums it integrates them into a kind of cyclic monism and is no longer > vicious, but virtuous. Wellllllllllllll. I don't find this possibility very compelling. So there are still "laws" that govern the transitions from 1-p to 3-p and back, right? I think the same argument applies. Why this particular virtuous circle with it's particular causal laws and not some other virtuous cirlce? If you find a law that explains it, why does that law hold and not some other? And why not no circles at all? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.