On 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:

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On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has toemerge froma relative state measure on all computational histories.The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of theabandon of theidentity thesis.Bruno, I'm sorry but I think I failed to make clear what I was actually asking you. I assumed, when you made you comment about Everett Quantum Mechanics, that you didn't simply mean EQM in the context of *already assuming* the computationalist hypothesis to be true, but even in the contrary case of assuming some notion of the "primitively physical" to be the case. When you mention UDA as you do above, I can only assume that you intend the reader to understand your comment in the context of the comp hypothesis. Of course, I understand that in this case, EQM and physics in general would be derived from comp, and not vice versa, and hence your comment about EQM would necessarily follow. But my question was whether you were intending to say something stronger - i.e. that EQM, or the SWE itself under any interpretation, reveal the implausibility of the mind/body (or minds-bodies) identity thesis, as when you say:Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue histask andderive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from thecollection of allcomputations (by UDA).What do you mean by " Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening)"? Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis, or that his approach implicitly presupposes it? I'm confused.

`Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he`

`characterizes the observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the`

`phenomenology of the wave packet reduction, by showing it to appears`

`through "physical interaction" in the memory/diary of the`

`experimenter. He presents QM-without-collapse as being a way for not`

`using a magical dualism between mind and matter. He does not mention`

`Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but his reasoning`

`presupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself, which`

`is a computational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation are`

`Turing emulable).`

`This is hardly original: comp is the implicit hypothesis of all`

`materialist or physicalist. (Thus, it is normal some takes some time`

`to understand that comp is incompatible with (weak) materialism).`

`On the contrary, those who believed (without evidences) that the`

`collapse of the wave is a real phenomenon are obliged to refer to a`

`non comp dualist theory of mind. Since Descartes, we can say that comp`

`is the default hypothesis of all rationalist. Comp is just Mechanism`

`made clear mathematically by the discover of Turing, Post, Church.`

Bruno

On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicitidentitythesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is thatthey ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-bodyor consciousness/reality problem.Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd like to enquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either".UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has toemerge froma relative state measure on all computational histories.The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of theabandon of theidentity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a "mind" to anapparent"body", but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can onlyascribe aninfinity of "body", corresponding to the possible computations ofyour partsbelow your level of substitution. By the "invariance" delay of thefirstperson experiences, in UD-time/step, the "average" first person"body" is afunction depending on all possible universal machine/numbers.Negativeinterference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from thestatistic or "measure" logic, with observability described by Bp &Dt, forprobability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds +there is aworld, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus "bastardcalculus",an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their "matter" theory.Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue histask andderive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from thecollection of allcomputations (by UDA).I think I've asked before about the distinction between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is being computed. "is being computed" is an arithetical proposition which is recursive (computable), Sigma_0."can be computed" is recursively enumerable (semi-computable),Sigma_1.It's only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply (i.e.if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse thatisin fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machinesinherit) a"multiverse". To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeler etc.)equation of physics consists in showing that the sharable physicalpart ofthe lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with p Sigma_1)is thesame as the one described by the physicists.But if - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is "primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated,Careful, "the primitively physical" apparent in comp is NOT (never)computednor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it is 1-p, and1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a sense allUD* isprocessed in 0 seconds, at each of its "observer moments". Apriori, theresults of any observation for any observer moment depends on astatisticinvolving all universal machines and all their computations (emulatedinfinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws ofphysicsseems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But thedifferenceof points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly themathematical reasonwhy the non computable take refuge below our substitution level,giving riseto locally sharable universal structures (sharable by population of universal machines).I'm no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".It seems to me that the UD Argument explains why computationalismmakes thenotion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without anyexplanation powerfor the "appearance of the primitively physical". On the contrary,theappearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (=completelyexcept for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief(knowledge,observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines.UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the body problem.Mind iswhatever universal machine can experience. And eventually matter iswhatmind cannot determinate (in arithmetic).Is it related towhat I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind fromthestarting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that mind- 1-p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from aprimitively-physical 3-p pov?I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, and areeven notdefinable in the language of a Löbian machine on which it applies.The 1-pare accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets "in some sense". If you want a "primitively physical universe" to play any role withconsciousness, not only should it be non Turing emulable, but ithas also tobe different from the 1-(infinite) result of the interference of all universal machines.If tomorrow it happens that comp implies the probability is thepower fourof the amplitude, then the quantum empirical evidence for "powertwo", wouldbe empirical evidence that comp is false, and that, may be, matterexists insome primitive sense. That would be the first serious evidences forit,beyond our animal instinct.Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible, and we can test them.It is allwhat I say.Well I add also that Mechanism leads to a cute Plotinian theology,whenMaterialism leads to the Aristotle theology which, I think, has atendencyto eliminate the persons. BrunoActually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work Iexplainhere (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (orSchmidhuber), except that it has been published many yearsbefore, andrelies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's"theology".The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicitidentitythesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is thatthey ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-bodyor consciousness/reality problem. This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a (physical) universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted by the physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams becomesprevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalent withthequestion of how does the dreams glue together. It is the problem of passing from first person to first person plural, and this needs a notion of entanglement of computation. If you define a universe by the coherent structure corresponding to all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique coherent structure accounting for all observations? What is its internal and external logic? Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherentstructure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as externallogic, andsome quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the majorinterestof Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic third person description level. Such a logical completion of the quantum observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories). But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of realties (first person and first person plural), and it is just anopen problem to really count the number of complete booleanstructurescapable of attributing values to anything observable.This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I meanthosefew who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware ofsomesubtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical) computation.The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that wesharethe quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share somecomputation:this really means that we (human population) are multiplied by theindeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happeningsmakesdifficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if that"really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I preferto usethe expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of manyworldsor many-universes. "Universe" becomes defined by the completeboolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations asseenfrom a first person perspective). All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who miss the seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument. Bruno On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmark here... http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical structures.On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com> wrote: Hello,I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes,but howdo we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.Inyuki http://www.universians.org--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . 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