`Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain`

`here (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or`

`Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before, and`

`relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's "theology".`

`The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity`

`thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the`

`computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett`

`Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is that`

`they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body`

`or consciousness/reality problem.`

## Advertising

`This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a (physical)`

`universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted by the`

`physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the`

`computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams becomes`

`prevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalent with the`

`question of how does the dreams glue together. It is the problem of`

`passing from first person to first person plural, and this needs a`

`notion of entanglement of computation.`

`If you define a universe by the coherent structure corresponding to`

`all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique`

`coherent structure accounting for all observations? What is its`

`internal and external logic?`

`Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a coherent`

`structure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as external logic, and`

`some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major interest`

`of Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic third`

`person description level. Such a logical completion of the quantum`

`observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a unique`

`coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories).`

`But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of`

`realties (first person and first person plural), and it is just an`

`open problem to really count the number of complete boolean structures`

`capable of attributing values to anything observable.`

`This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I mean those`

`few who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware of some`

`subtleties not yet well understood: like what is a (mathematical)`

`computation.`

`The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that we share`

`the quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some computation:`

`this really means that we (human population) are multiplied by the`

`indeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such happenings makes`

`difficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if that`

`"really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I prefer to use`

`the expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of many worlds`

`or many-universes. "Universe" becomes defined by the complete`

`boolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations as seen`

`from a first person perspective).`

`All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who miss the`

`seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument.`

Bruno On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:

Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmarkhere...http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematicalstructures.On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com> wrote: Hello, I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it. Inyuki http://www.universians.org --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.