On 01 Mar 2010, at 11:58, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he
characterizes
the
observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of
the
wave
packet reduction, by showing it to appears through "physical
interaction"
in
the memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-
collapse as
being a way for not using a magical dualism between mind and
matter. He
does
not mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but his
reasoning
presupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself,
which is a
computational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation are
Turing
emulable).
When you say "Turing emulable" - i.e. literally "*capable* of being
emulated by a TM" - it's not clear to me that this should be taken
to
be equivalent to "actually being computed by a TM or its
equivalent".
In the latter case (i.e. something achieved through an actual
occasion
of computation) I can see that digitalism and its consequences are
entailed, but in the former case, I don't see why this necessarily
follows. To be merely *capable* of being computed is surely not
equivalent to an actual occasion of computation? I'm obviously
missing something, because you typically use the term "Turing
emulable" as a knock-down statement to the effect that digital
mechanism is to be assumed as a consequence, but I still don't see
why. Do you perhaps mean it to be taken in conjunction with the
assumption that digitalism is the default (and hence Everett's)
explanation for mind in physics (i.e. the desire to avoid "magic
dualism")? In that case computation, and hence Turing-emulability,
would indeed be a prerequisite for "being capable of having a mind",
and I could see why your arguments would apply.
If I could clear up this confusion it would help my understanding
of a
lot of threads in the list.
I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That is
the Movie
Graph Argument (MGA).
It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to be
abandonned, and should be substituted by the comp supervenience
thesis,
which is that, roughly speaking: consciousness has to be associated
with
computation (a purely mathematical notion), and not with anything
physical.
A nice thing when you remember that physicist have not yet
succeeded in
defining what is, in general, a physical computation (cf notably the
implementation problem, etc.)
Already in UDA-step-7, (where I recall that the protocol is that we
are in a
"concrete physical universe executing integrally a UD"), to be
capable of
being computed (or Turing emulated) ENTAILS being computed (by
that UD,
soon or later, but the first person invariance makes this "soon or
later"
irrelevant for the first person experience).
But in step 8, that is by the MGA, consciousness is attached to the
mathematical (and thus arithmetical) notion of computation. All
"actuality"
notions (now, here, actual, current, etc.) becomes indexical, that is
relative computational (mathematical) state.
If you want I will (re)send the MGA. Less people get it than the
UDA-seven
first steps (and even some part of the seven step is not always well
understood). Only in my french papers and books the argument is
developed in
detail. Maudlin found (later) a very similar argument, but since
the last
explanation of MGA on this list, I have understood that MGA is more
precise
than Maudlin, and even more simple (no need to even mention the
counterfactuals; yet still subtle, but then the mind body problem
is subtle.
Many scientist miss it entirely. Some people take a long time to
understand
the term 'qualia').
In my older (french) presentation of the UDA, the MGA was the first
step. It
is *the* argument showing that the mind body problem is not solved by
mechanism per se, as many materialist believe. The MGA argument
(UDA-8) is a
proof by reductio ad absurdum. It shows that comp+physical
supervenience
entails that consciousness has to be attached to a physical movie
of a
corresponding physical computation "in real time", which is absurd
because
the movie don't compute at all. The movie does describe a
computation, but a
description of a computation is not a computation. That last point
still
makes problem for some other, I think. You may search in the
archive (last
year notably) on MGA, MGA1, MGA2, MGA3 (but I am not entirely
satisfied by
MGA3: the absurdity comes before).
It is really the movie graph which "eliminates" the possibility to
invoke
physicalness, if we keep comp. WE have to choose between digital
mechanism,
or materialism. This solves also the question "what is now", "what
is here",
etc. It reduce all this to the handling of indexicals in the manner
of
Kleene, Post, Gödel, etc.
With comp, physics get a purely mathematical justification or
(re)definition, with both the quanta and the qualia distinguished and
explained. Propositional physics, or observable logic, is given by
the
logic of the "provability and consistency predicate (and truth
variants),
with atomic formula the sigma_1-sentences (with or without
oracle, ...).
In plotinian like terms, Physics is the border of Mind, or the
border of
God. Actually, the border of something unameable, undefinable.
(Assuming
Mechanism).
Bruno
On 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to
emerge
from
a relative state measure on all computational histories.
The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the
abandon of
the
identity thesis.
Bruno, I'm sorry but I think I failed to make clear what I was
actually asking you. I assumed, when you made you comment about
Everett Quantum Mechanics, that you didn't simply mean EQM in the
context of *already assuming* the computationalist hypothesis to
be
true, but even in the contrary case of assuming some notion of the
"primitively physical" to be the case. When you mention UDA as
you do
above, I can only assume that you intend the reader to
understand your
comment in the context of the comp hypothesis. Of course, I
understand that in this case, EQM and physics in general would be
derived from comp, and not vice versa, and hence your comment
about
EQM would necessarily follow. But my question was whether you
were
intending to say something stronger - i.e. that EQM, or the SWE
itself
under any interpretation, reveal the implausibility of the mind/
body
(or minds-bodies) identity thesis, as when you say:
Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue
his task
and
derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the
collection of
all
computations (by UDA).
What do you mean by " Everett uses comp (or one of its
weakening)"?
Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis,
or
that his approach implicitly presupposes it? I'm confused.
Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he
characterizes
the
observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of
the
wave
packet reduction, by showing it to appears through "physical
interaction"
in
the memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-
collapse as
being a way for not using a magical dualism between mind and
matter. He
does
not mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but his
reasoning
presupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself,
which is a
computational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation are
Turing
emulable).
This is hardly original: comp is the implicit hypothesis of all
materialist
or physicalist. (Thus, it is normal some takes some time to
understand
that
comp is incompatible with (weak) materialism).
On the contrary, those who believed (without evidences) that the
collapse
of
the wave is a real phenomenon are obliged to refer to a non comp
dualist
theory of mind. Since Descartes, we can say that comp is the
default
hypothesis of all rationalist. Comp is just Mechanism made clear
mathematically by the discover of Turing, Post, Church.
Bruno
On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:
On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit
identity
thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume
the
computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is
that
they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the
mind-body
or consciousness/reality problem.
Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilst
continuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'd
like to
enquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with Everett
Quantum
Mechanics either".
UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to
emerge
from
a relative state measure on all computational histories.
The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the
abandon of
the
identity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a "mind" to an
apparent
"body", but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can only
ascribe
an
infinity of "body", corresponding to the possible computations
of your
parts
below your level of substitution. By the "invariance" delay of
the
first
person experiences, in UD-time/step, the "average" first person
"body"
is
a
function depending on all possible universal machine/numbers.
Negative
interference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear from
the
statistic or "measure" logic, with observability described by
Bp & Dt,
for
probability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds +
there
is
a
world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus "bastard
calculus",
an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their "matter" theory.
Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursue
his task
and
derive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from the
collection of
all
computations (by UDA).
I think I've asked before about the distinction
between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".
A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A is
being
computed.
"is being computed" is an arithetical proposition which is
recursive
(computable), Sigma_0.
"can be computed" is recursively enumerable (semi-computable),
Sigma_1.
It's
only in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply
(i.e.
if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiverse
that is
in fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).
It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machines
inherit) a
"multiverse". To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeler
etc.)
equation of physics consists in showing that the sharable
physical part
of
the lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with p
Sigma_1) is
the
same as the one described by the physicists.
But if
- as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is
"primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated,
Careful, "the primitively physical" apparent in comp is NOT
(never)
computed
nor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular it
is 1-p,
and
1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a sense
all UD*
is
processed in 0 seconds, at each of its "observer moments". A
priori,
the
results of any observation for any observer moment depends on a
statistic
involving all universal machines and all their computations
(emulated
infinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws of
physics
seems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But the
difference
of points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly the
mathematical
reason
why the non computable take refuge below our substitution
level, giving
rise
to locally sharable universal structures (sharable by
population of
universal machines).
I'm
no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".
It seems to me that the UD Argument explains why
computationalism makes
the
notion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without any
explanation
power
for the "appearance of the primitively physical". On the
contrary, the
appearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (=
completely
except for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief
(knowledge,
observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines.
UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the body
problem. Mind
is
whatever universal machine can experience. And eventually
matter is
what
mind cannot determinate (in arithmetic).
Is it related to
what I've been saying about the non-computability of the mind
from the
starting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. that
mind - 1-
p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from a
primitively-
physical 3-p pov?
I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, and
are
even
not
definable in the language of a Löbian machine on which it
applies. The
1-p
are accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets "in some
sense".
If you want a "primitively physical universe" to play any role
with
consciousness, not only should it be non Turing emulable, but
it has
also
to
be different from the 1-(infinite) result of the interference
of all
universal machines.
If tomorrow it happens that comp implies the probability is the
power
four
of the amplitude, then the quantum empirical evidence for
"power two",
would
be empirical evidence that comp is false, and that, may be,
matter
exists
in
some primitive sense. That would be the first serious evidences
for it,
beyond our animal instinct.
Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible, and we can test
them. It is
all
what I say.
Well I add also that Mechanism leads to a cute Plotinian
theology, when
Materialism leads to the Aristotle theology which, I think,
has a
tendency
to eliminate the persons.
Bruno
Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I
explain
here (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or
Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years
before,
and
relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's
"theology".
The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit
identity
thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume
the
computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches is
that
they ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the
mind-body
or consciousness/reality problem.
This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a
(physical)
universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for granted
by the
physicalists, but which can no more taken as such by the
computationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreams
becomes
prevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalent
with the
question of how does the dreams glue together. It is the
problem of
passing from first person to first person plural, and this
needs a
notion of entanglement of computation.
If you define a universe by the coherent structure
corresponding to
all what is observable, the question becomes: is there a unique
coherent structure accounting for all observations? What is
its
internal and external logic?
Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such a
coherent
structure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as external
logic,
and
some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major
interest
of Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basic
third
person description level. Such a logical completion of the
quantum
observation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen a
unique
coherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories).
But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion of
realties (first person and first person plural), and it is
just an
open problem to really count the number of complete boolean
structures
capable of attributing values to anything observable.
This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. I
mean those
few who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am aware
of some
subtleties not yet well understood: like what is a
(mathematical)
computation.
The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences that
we share
the quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some
computation:
this really means that we (human population) are multiplied
by the
indeterminacy below our level of substitution. Such
happenings makes
difficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and if
that
"really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why I
prefer to
use
the expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of many
worlds
or many-universes. "Universe" becomes defined by the complete
boolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computations
as seen
from a first person perspective).
All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those who
miss the
seven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument.
Bruno
On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by
Tegmark
here...
http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1
Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical
structures.
On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <[email protected]>
wrote:
Hello,
I was just wondering, we are talking so much about
universes, but
how
do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
Inyuki
http://www.universians.org
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