David,

`It is the motivation of Everett to make coherent the wave equation and`

`the idea that mind is not something substantial acting on matter (like`

`Copenhagians are obliged to admit in a way or another).`

`To derive the phenomenology of the collapse, he used only "local`

`interactions" and local memories, that is, intuitive mechanism.`

`Quantum indeterminacy is made first person indeterminacy (Everett uses`

`"subjective").`

`We will never know if Everett would have said yes to a digitalist`

`doctor of course.`

## Advertising

`But the origin of the physical laws have to be independent of the`

`choice of the computational base, so we have to explain why the`

`appearances favor a quantum universal machine in "our" neighborhood.`

`The answer is that below our substitution level the information flux`

`relates to our stories through a sum on all computations (going`

`through the actual states, relative). And what I say here can be`

`translated in arithmetic.`

`The other way round is probable too: Quantum mechanics makes the laws`

`of physicist (but not of observation) computable, unless you introduce`

`in physics explicit non computable Halmitonian. For example e^icH(x,t)`

`with c Chaitin number may be an acceptable physical wave, but it is ad`

`hoc if used to say that some non computational object exist in the`

`physical world. e^icH(x,t) is even worst than an UFO, it justifies`

`that we cannot recognize it. c, for us (machine) is undistinguishable`

`from randomness.`

`Here we meet really the question "what is a computable function from R`

`to R". Unlike for N to N, the question is not settled. Does real`

`number exist in the physical world, etc. With comp, this can be said`

`to be solved: real number exists epistemologically, but not`

`ontologicallly. I recall that Physics is also epistemological: it is`

`the map of our indeterminate histories.`

Bruno On 02 Mar 2010, at 17:45, David Nyman wrote:

On 2 March 2010 16:13, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That isthe MovieGraph Argument (MGA). It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to beabandonned, and should be substituted by the comp superveniencethesis,which is that, roughly speaking: consciousness has to be associatedwithcomputation (a purely mathematical notion), and not with anythingphysical.I seem to be frustratingly unable to get my point across (maybe it wasn't a very good point!) No, I clearly recall the 8th step and the MGA (although a detailed restatement of the latter on the list would be very nice). I'm sure you haven't forgotten how many discussions we've had on these topics. Consequently, whenever you make a statement clearly "assuming comp", as you say above, I always have this in mind. Therefore, when I asked my question about EQM, it was because I wasn't sure on what basis you would take the view that *Everett himself assumed comp*. I wondered if it was because, as you say, it is more or less the default theory of mind amongst physicists, and that consequently you feel justified in attributing it to him. Or is there something aspect of EQM, or the SWE, that inescapably entails comp as a theory of mind, irrespective of the originators' assumptions? That's my question. Sorry about the confusion. DavidOn 01 Mar 2010, at 11:58, David Nyman wrote:On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because hecharacterizestheobserver by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology ofthewavepacket reduction, by showing it to appears through "physicalinteraction"inthe memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-collapse asbeing a way for not using a magical dualism between mind andmatter. Hedoesnot mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but hisreasoningpresupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself,which is acomputational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation areTuringemulable).When you say "Turing emulable" - i.e. literally "*capable* of beingemulated by a TM" - it's not clear to me that this should be takentobe equivalent to "actually being computed by a TM or itsequivalent".In the latter case (i.e. something achieved through an actualoccasionof computation) I can see that digitalism and its consequences are entailed, but in the former case, I don't see why this necessarily follows. To be merely *capable* of being computed is surely not equivalent to an actual occasion of computation? I'm obviously missing something, because you typically use the term "Turing emulable" as a knock-down statement to the effect that digital mechanism is to be assumed as a consequence, but I still don't see why. Do you perhaps mean it to be taken in conjunction with the assumption that digitalism is the default (and hence Everett's) explanation for mind in physics (i.e. the desire to avoid "magic dualism")? In that case computation, and hence Turing-emulability, would indeed be a prerequisite for "being capable of having a mind", and I could see why your arguments would apply.If I could clear up this confusion it would help my understandingof alot of threads in the list.I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That isthe MovieGraph Argument (MGA). It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to beabandonned, and should be substituted by the comp superveniencethesis,which is that, roughly speaking: consciousness has to be associatedwithcomputation (a purely mathematical notion), and not with anythingphysical.A nice thing when you remember that physicist have not yetsucceeded indefining what is, in general, a physical computation (cf notably the implementation problem, etc.)Already in UDA-step-7, (where I recall that the protocol is that weare in a"concrete physical universe executing integrally a UD"), to becapable ofbeing computed (or Turing emulated) ENTAILS being computed (bythat UD,soon or later, but the first person invariance makes this "soon orlater"irrelevant for the first person experience). But in step 8, that is by the MGA, consciousness is attached to themathematical (and thus arithmetical) notion of computation. All"actuality"notions (now, here, actual, current, etc.) becomes indexical, that is relative computational (mathematical) state.If you want I will (re)send the MGA. Less people get it than theUDA-sevenfirst steps (and even some part of the seven step is not always wellunderstood). Only in my french papers and books the argument isdeveloped indetail. Maudlin found (later) a very similar argument, but sincethe lastexplanation of MGA on this list, I have understood that MGA is moreprecisethan Maudlin, and even more simple (no need to even mention thecounterfactuals; yet still subtle, but then the mind body problemis subtle.Many scientist miss it entirely. Some people take a long time tounderstandthe term 'qualia').In my older (french) presentation of the UDA, the MGA was the firststep. Itis *the* argument showing that the mind body problem is not solved bymechanism per se, as many materialist believe. The MGA argument(UDA-8) is aproof by reductio ad absurdum. It shows that comp+physicalsupervenienceentails that consciousness has to be attached to a physical movieof acorresponding physical computation "in real time", which is absurdbecausethe movie don't compute at all. The movie does describe acomputation, but adescription of a computation is not a computation. That last pointstillmakes problem for some other, I think. You may search in thearchive (lastyear notably) on MGA, MGA1, MGA2, MGA3 (but I am not entirelysatisfied byMGA3: the absurdity comes before).It is really the movie graph which "eliminates" the possibility toinvokephysicalness, if we keep comp. WE have to choose between digitalmechanism,or materialism. This solves also the question "what is now", "whatis here",etc. It reduce all this to the handling of indexicals in the mannerofKleene, Post, Gödel, etc. With comp, physics get a purely mathematical justification or (re)definition, with both the quanta and the qualia distinguished andexplained. Propositional physics, or observable logic, is given bythelogic of the "provability and consistency predicate (and truthvariants),with atomic formula the sigma_1-sentences (with or withoutoracle, ...).In plotinian like terms, Physics is the border of Mind, or theborder ofGod. Actually, the border of something unameable, undefinable.(AssumingMechanism). BrunoOn 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has toemergefrom a relative state measure on all computational histories.The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of theabandon ofthe identity thesis.Bruno, I'm sorry but I think I failed to make clear what I was actually asking you. I assumed, when you made you comment about Everett Quantum Mechanics, that you didn't simply mean EQM in thecontext of *already assuming* the computationalist hypothesis tobetrue, but even in the contrary case of assuming some notion of the"primitively physical" to be the case. When you mention UDA asyou doabove, I can only assume that you intend the reader tounderstand yourcomment in the context of the comp hypothesis. Of course, I understand that in this case, EQM and physics in general would bederived from comp, and not vice versa, and hence your commentaboutEQM would necessarily follow. But my question was whether youwereintending to say something stronger - i.e. that EQM, or the SWEitselfunder any interpretation, reveal the implausibility of the mind/body(or minds-bodies) identity thesis, as when you say:Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursuehis taskandderive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from thecollection ofall computations (by UDA).What do you mean by " Everett uses comp (or one of itsweakening)"?Do you mean that he was explicitly assuming the comp hypothesis,orthat his approach implicitly presupposes it? I'm confused.Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because hecharacterizestheobserver by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology ofthewavepacket reduction, by showing it to appears through "physicalinteraction"inthe memory/diary of the experimenter. He presents QM-without-collapse asbeing a way for not using a magical dualism between mind andmatter. Hedoesnot mention Church thesis, so digitalism is implicit, but hisreasoningpresupposes that the observer is described by the wave itself,which is acomputational object (the solution of Schroedinger equation areTuringemulable). This is hardly original: comp is the implicit hypothesis of all materialistor physicalist. (Thus, it is normal some takes some time tounderstandthat comp is incompatible with (weak) materialism).On the contrary, those who believed (without evidences) that thecollapseofthe wave is a real phenomenon are obliged to refer to a non compdualisttheory of mind. Since Descartes, we can say that comp is thedefaulthypothesis of all rationalist. Comp is just Mechanism made clear mathematically by the discover of Turing, Post, Church. BrunoOn 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicitidentitythesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assumethecomputationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with EverettQuantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches isthatthey ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body or consciousness/reality problem.Bruno, I'm just trying to catch up with some older posts whilstcontinuing to think about your most recent comments, and I'dlike toenquire why you say above "and thus cannot work with EverettQuantumMechanics either".UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has toemergefrom a relative state measure on all computational histories.The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of theabandon oftheidentity thesis. You can still locally ascribe a "mind" to anapparent"body", but you cannot ascribe a body to a mind. You can onlyascribeaninfinity of "body", corresponding to the possible computationsof yourpartsbelow your level of substitution. By the "invariance" delay ofthefirstperson experiences, in UD-time/step, the "average" first person"body"is afunction depending on all possible universal machine/numbers.Negativeinterference, and indeed a quantum computer, should appear fromthestatistic or "measure" logic, with observability described byBp & Dt,forprobability or credibility one (true in all accessible worlds +thereis a world, p Sigma_1). It corresponds plausibly to Plotinus "bastard calculus", an expression borrow to Plato, and used in their "matter" theory.Everett uses comp (or one of its weakening), he has to pursuehis taskandderive the phenomenology of the wave (or matrix) from thecollection ofall computations (by UDA).I think I've asked before about the distinction between "can be computed" and "is (in fact) being computed".A can be computed if there is a UD-time-step t such that A isbeingcomputed."is being computed" is an arithetical proposition which isrecursive(computable), Sigma_0."can be computed" is recursively enumerable (semi-computable),Sigma_1.It'sonly in the latter case, AFAICS, that your comment would apply(i.e.if we assume that we're participants in an Everett multiversethat isin fact a computational artefact, as per the comp hypothesis).It is just that with comp, we inherite (all lobian machinesinherit) a"multiverse". To derive the Schroedinger (Dirac DeWitt-Wheeleretc.)equation of physics consists in showing that the sharablephysical partofthe lobian machines (the 3th, 4th, 5th hypostases, with pSigma_1) isthe same as the one described by the physicists.But if - as physicalists would - we take the view that what exists is "primitively-physical", as opposed to computationally-generated,Careful, "the primitively physical" apparent in comp is NOT(never)computednor computable. It is really the 1-p-p view. In particular itis 1-p,and1-p is unaware of the arithmetical delay of the UD. In a senseall UD*isprocessed in 0 seconds, at each of its "observer moments". Apriori,the results of any observation for any observer moment depends on a statisticinvolving all universal machines and all their computations(emulatedinfinitely often by the UD). The mystery here is that the laws of physics seems (empirically) to be computable. No White Rabbits! But the differenceof points of view (the hypostases) suggests clearly themathematicalreasonwhy the non computable take refuge below our substitutionlevel, givingriseto locally sharable universal structures (sharable bypopulation ofuniversal machines).I'm no longer sure of your reason for saying "thus".It seems to me that the UD Argument explains whycomputationalism makesthenotion 'primitively physical' meaningless, or without anyexplanationpowerfor the "appearance of the primitively physical". On thecontrary, theappearance of the 'primitively physical' are 'completely' (=completelyexcept for a justified gap), explained in a theory of belief (knowledge, observable, sensible, etc.) by universal machines.UDA is a reduction of the mind body problem to the bodyproblem. Mindiswhatever universal machine can experience. And eventuallymatter iswhat mind cannot determinate (in arithmetic).Is it related towhat I've been saying about the non-computability of the mindfrom thestarting-point of purely 3-p processes (thus EQM): i.e. thatmind - 1-p qualitative experience - is simply inaccessible from aprimitively-physical 3-p pov?I am not sure. The 1-p are inaccessible by any computation, andareeven notdefinable in the language of a Löbian machine on which itapplies. The1-pare accessible, and even 'defined' on infinite sets "in somesense".If you want a "primitively physical universe" to play any rolewithconsciousness, not only should it be non Turing emulable, butit hasalso tobe different from the 1-(infinite) result of the interferenceof alluniversal machines.If tomorrow it happens that comp implies the probability is thepowerfourof the amplitude, then the quantum empirical evidence for"power two",wouldbe empirical evidence that comp is false, and that, may be,matterexists insome primitive sense. That would be the first serious evidencesfor it,beyond our animal instinct.Mechanism and Materialism are incompatible, and we can testthem. It isall what I say.Well I add also that Mechanism leads to a cute Plotiniantheology, whenMaterialism leads to the Aristotle theology which, I think,has atendency to eliminate the persons. BrunoActually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work Iexplainhere (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (orSchmidhuber), except that it has been published many yearsbefore,and relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's "theology".The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicitidentitythesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assumethecomputationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with EverettQuantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such approaches isthatthey ignore somehow the complexity and non triviality of the mind-body or consciousness/reality problem.This is relevant for the (very hard) question "what is a(physical)universe?". This is a notion more or less taken for grantedby thephysicalists, but which can no more taken as such by thecomputationalist cognitive scientist. Indeed machine dreamsbecomesprevalent, and the question of "universe" becomes equivalentwith thequestion of how does the dreams glue together. It is theproblem ofpassing from first person to first person plural, and thisneeds anotion of entanglement of computation.If you define a universe by the coherent structurecorresponding toall what is observable, the question becomes: is there a uniquecoherent structure accounting for all observations? What isitsinternal and external logic?Today, if we accept (Everett) QM, we may say that such acoherentstructure exists, has Boolean (classical) logic as externallogic,and some quantum logic as internal logic. Indeed, it is the major interestof Everett QM that it reintroduces booleanity at the basicthirdperson description level. Such a logical completion of thequantumobservation leads to the multiverse, and it can be seen auniquecoherent (super) universe (nut multi-cosmos, multi-histories). But Everett uses comp, and comp per se leads to an explosion ofrealties (first person and first person plural), and it isjust anopen problem to really count the number of complete boolean structures capable of attributing values to anything observable.This should be clear for the reader of the UD argument. Imean thosefew who get the whole thing clearly in their mind (I am awareof somesubtleties not yet well understood: like what is a(mathematical)computation.The fact that we have empirical data giving evidences thatwe sharethe quantum indeterminacy suggests that we all share some computation:this really means that we (human population) are multipliedby theindeterminacy below our level of substitution. Suchhappenings makesdifficult to even define precisely what is a universe, and ifthat"really" exists beyond its local appearances. This why Iprefer tousethe expression many-dreams or many--histories instead of manyworldsor many-universes. "Universe" becomes defined by the completeboolean extension of sharable dreams/histories (computationsas seenfrom a first person perspective).All this looks probably like utter nonsense for those whomiss theseven first steps of the universal dovetailer argument. Bruno On 07 Feb 2010, at 21:07, Brian Tenneson wrote:Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited byTegmarkhere... http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical structures.On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey <min...@gmail.com>wrote:Hello,I was just wondering, we are talking so much aboutuniverses, buthow do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.Inyuki http://www.universians.org--You received this message because you are subscribed to theGroups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .--You received this message because you are subscribed to theGroups "Everything List" group. 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