On 16 Mar 2010, at 16:17, m.a. wrote:

By 3-determinacy I assume you mean 3rd person determinacy.

Yes. It is the content of the diary of an experimenter, teleporting some rabbits or guinea pig, perhaps human. As opposed to the first person view, which is the one described by the rabbits, or the human, being teleported. It is classical teleportation, to ease the thought experiments/ experiences.

So I gather from this (and what's written below) that "first-person I" cannot decide which alternative the UD will shuffle out of the deck. Therefore: no free will as we conceive of it.

Yes, you can! Because either the theory is wrong, or it gives a notion of normal accessible worlds. This can ensure that you may be able to choose between alternatives like "with coffee", or "with tea". It is because those normal worlds are lawful, and can sustain machines and organisms that free will can develop. The UD illustrates that in the comp setting indeterminacy does not add anything that self-determinacy can already offer to the will.

Or, are you saying here that choices made by the (3rd person) UD tend to be influenced by one's life-history to the extent of (often) providing the very alternatives that the (1st) person would have chosen?

Exactly. Except I would not say that the UD, or arithmetic, makes choices. But the first person did, and can realize her consistent choice. Our consciousness is related to the normal histories which makes us (the lobian numbers) having a relative partial self control with respect to our most probable universal history. That can be reflected in notion like responsibility, remorse, conscience, well founded feeling of guiltiness, badly founded feeling of guiltiness, etc.).

That would be close enough to free will for me.

In other term free will is more related to determinist chaos, or Gödelian self-reference, than to the abrupt indeterminacy provided by the 'matter' of comp or the 'matter' of quantum mechanics.



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