Bruno,
Another plea for understanding. For clarity I will delete some
questions from previous pages leaving only the ones that continue to puzzle me,
in bold type.
----- Original Message -----
From: Bruno Marchal
To: [email protected]
Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2010 1:45 AM
Subject: Re: Free will: Wrong entry.
For a computer the input is man; for the brain the input might be God,
chance, spirits or what have you.
Both for the computer and man, the inputs are given by their most probable
universal neighbor, emerging from a competition among all universal computer
below their substitution level.
Well, it is really the consequence of the UD Argument. If my relevant (at
the right substitution level, or below) computational state is S, my next first
person state, (my next OM) is given by a measure on all computations, executed
(in arithmetic) going through that state S. But the UD generates all universal
machines, and all executions of each of those universal machine, so it
generates the state S infinitely many often, as S is generated by any universal
machines (themselves generating S an infinity of times).
By "computer" I assume you're referring here to the arithmetical universe
of comp rather than to a silicone-based machine.
Here I am not sure to follow you. The comp indeterminacy on all our
"incarnations" in arithmetic, or in the universal dovetailing may on the
contrary restrict that freedom, by making us live consequences of act we don't
do.
How can there be indeterminacy in comp when there are no material particles
subject to Heisenberg's theory, only numbers? Is there an element of chance in
the universal dovetailing of pure numbers?
m.a.
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