Ronald,

On 21 Dec 2010, at 21:46, ronaldheld wrote:

Bruno:
  Behind in this group. I think that if you had a this Universe and
replace the particles with its antiparticles.there should be no
difference from the human observer POV.


Again, this is a simple consequence of mechanism + a level of substitution higher than the elementary particles description level. But in that case you inherit all the UDA consequences. Well, even if the level is below the level of the particles.

But without the digital mechanist assumption, you have to give what is your theory of mind and justify why it makes you think that consciousness is invariant for matter/antimatter exchange, unless you decide to take such invariance as an axiom.

OK? To develop a non mechanist theory of mind you have to die or to become a zombie for *any* possible digital substitution. If your brain is still a causal natural mechanism, you have to use an non Turing- emulable phenomenon. That exists in the mathematical literature, but nothing in physics points to it. It *is* logically possible, though, and mechanism could be false. Up to now, I would say that physics confirms all aspect of mechanism.

Bruno







Ronald

On Dec 20, 4:51 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 19 Dec 2010, at 18:29, ronaldheld wrote:

Jason
I would think normally the implant should work as well. Being
Bajorean, could the missing essence be the influence of the Prophets?
Data and the EMH should be able to pass the Turing test.
Maybe I am missing something. A matter human in a matter universe
should function the same as an antimatter human in an antimatter
universe, AFAIK

How do you know that?

Of course it is a consequence of comp + the level is enough high to
allow electron to to be substituted by positron, etc. But if comp is
false, then you need an explicit hypothesis of invariance for the
matter/antimatter change.
And from a logical point of view, we can make a comp theory of mind
with the matter/antimatter change no more working (using string
theory, for example).

Comp, or digital mechanism assumes that there is a substitution level,
not that we can know what is that level. Indeed, it can be shown that
if we are machine, then we cannot know which machine we are, but can
infer it with some degree of plausibility from the observable reality. Saying "yes" to the doctor asks for a leap of faith. Of course we have
biological reasons/observations to assume that the level is probably
much higher than the internal working of particles and strings.

Bruno





                                            Ronald

On Dec 18, 12:57 pm, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
Ronald,

I remember that episode. I thought it was quite a departure from the
atheistic slant that was usual to star trek.
( For those not familiar with the 
scene:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihdI8U9eS4c#t
=2m30s)

They seemed to suggest in the episode that the operation failed not
because
of a defect in the artificial brain but because there was something
more to
the mind that the machine didn't capture, some soul or some essence
that
couldn't be copied.  This is contrary to the frequent use of
transporters
throughout the series, unless you accept something like biological
naturalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism),
the idea
that only biochemistry has the right stuff or can do the right
things to
create consciousness.  I don't think the writers of that episode
were well
versed in philosophy of mind, so I wouldn't put too much stock in
the ideas
they promote.  For that episode to make sense you either have to
accept
dualism or biological naturalism (which is almost like a form of
dualism).

Do you think that Commander Data, whose entire brain is positronic,
lacks
consciousness?  I like the argument Picard gave for Data's
sentience:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWNPeNEvMN4

You mentioned that you had no problem with the idea of a person
made from
anti-matter particles.  What if scientists invented tiny machines
that were
not atoms but operated all the same, would you accept that you
could build a
person using these?  Taking the idea slightly further, lets say
these little
faux-atoms were expensive, so scientists decided to model the
machines in a
computer rather than make them.  Simulating a small number of them
together
they could predict how  nano-machines behaved.  If the scientists
modeled a
much larger collection of these atoms, organized in the same way as
in a
person, do you think any of the complexity is lost?

Jason

On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 8:05 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Bruno and Jason
  The complexity issue concerns me, perhaps because of the Deep
space
9 episode:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Life_Support_(Star_Trek:_Deep_Space_Nine)
                                                            Ronald

On Dec 16, 11:39 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 7:57 AM, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Jason:
  I do not think a neutron take more trhan a finite amount of
voltage
to be able to fire. I do wonder if merely replacing the bio
parts by
processing hardware, do you lose the part of the complexity of the
mind? Np problem with an antimatter man and mind.

If the mechanical replacements have the same repertoire and
behavior as
the
biological parts I don't see how the complexity would be
lessened.  Many
people feel lessened to be thought of as a machine, but they
probably
don't
fully appreciate just how complex of a machine the brain is.  It
has 100
billion neurons (about 1 for each stars in this galaxy) and close
to 1
quintillion connections or 1,000,000,000,000,000 (about 1
connection for
every cent of US debt).  People aren't familiar with man-made
machines
anywhere near this level of complexity and so it is
understandable that
one
could doubt a machine acting like a human. However, I think this is
mainly a
prejudice instilled by the types of (comparatively simple)
machines we
deal
with on a daily basis.

Jason

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