On 12/21/2010 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Dec 2010, at 20:01, Brent Meeker wrote:

Russell has given the correct answer. Here by mind I mean the conscious first person mind. By UDA-8 (MGA), consciousness is not attached to the physical running of a computer, but is attached to the logical number-theoretical relations describing that computation ... and all similar (with respect to the relevant levels) computations which exist in Sigma_1 (computational) arithmetical truth (and which might bear on beliefs and proofs which extends far beyond the computable).

But do you mean to assert that all computations have consciousness attached? In what sense does this allow us to distinguish human introspection from human perception from my dog's awareness from a snail's awareness from a rock's awareness?

Not at all. Only very special computations have consciousness, although it is better to attach consciousness to the sheaf of equivalent computations, going through the relevant (relative) states. For example, assuming many things by default, for any different electron positions in the atoms in your brain you have a different computations. Your actual consciousness is attached to all those computations.

When you express it that way it sounds as if you take consciousness to be something apart from the sheaf of equivalent computations - something I have but maybe a snail does not. Don't you rely on Everett's idea that consciousness just goes with the computations - so that when computations of quantum events become classically inconsistent then there is a different consciousness associated with the each (classically) consistent sheaf?


If electrons are specified by continuous variable, your consciousness will be related to a continuum of computations generated by the UD. In that case you have to consider the dovetailing of the UD on the real and complex numbers. Of course that continuum is an internal first person view which existence is due to your non-awareness of the delays made by the UD. It belongs to the epistemology, not the ontology where everything is finite (can be considered as finite once we assume digitalism). Humans, dogs, snails and even rock (immaterial rock patterns) share histories, notably thanks to the plausible linearity of the computations at the bottom, and the computational depth of our very long history. Actually I begin to think that computationalism makes the big bang a cosmic explosion among an infinity of similar explosions. First person computational depth is probably infinite (but here I speculate a little bit, and I will not insist on that).



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