On 21 Dec 2010, at 21:40, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/21/2010 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Dec 2010, at 20:01, Brent Meeker wrote:


Russell has given the correct answer. Here by mind I mean the conscious first person mind. By UDA-8 (MGA), consciousness is not attached to the physical running of a computer, but is attached to the logical number-theoretical relations describing that computation ... and all similar (with respect to the relevant levels) computations which exist in Sigma_1 (computational) arithmetical truth (and which might bear on beliefs and proofs which extends far beyond the computable).

But do you mean to assert that all computations have consciousness attached? In what sense does this allow us to distinguish human introspection from human perception from my dog's awareness from a snail's awareness from a rock's awareness?


Not at all. Only very special computations have consciousness, although it is better to attach consciousness to the sheaf of equivalent computations, going through the relevant (relative) states. For example, assuming many things by default, for any different electron positions in the atoms in your brain you have a different computations. Your actual consciousness is attached to all those computations.

When you express it that way it sounds as if you take consciousness to be something apart from the sheaf of equivalent computations - something I have but maybe a snail does not. Don't you rely on Everett's idea that consciousness just goes with the computations - so that when computations of quantum events become classically inconsistent then there is a different consciousness associated with the each (classically) consistent sheaf?


Consciousness differentiates only when it is aware of a specific result making his world different from the worlds where the observer would have seen another result, both in the WM duplication, or in the measure of an electron position or spin. If not, we would not been able to be aware of the quantum coherence. Here there is an ambiguity present in both quantum mechanics and computationalism.

Suppose an electron in your brain, or elsewhere, is in the superposition state here+there. You are described by B. The state of you + the electron is described as well by B . (here +there) or by B . here + B . there. If B does not interact (observe) the electron he will be able to decide to do a measure of the electron in the complementary base of {here, there}, and observe interference between the two different "classical" worlds (where the electron is respectively here and there. But if the observer looks where is the electron, then the evolution leads to B_here . here + B_there . there. And without amnesia, the observer will be unable to make the two worlds above fusing, and he has lost the ability to observe the interference.

The ambiguity is due to the factorization. I suggest, both for the definition of the measure on the computational histories, and the consistent quantum histories, to use the rule Y = II. This consists in interpreting a(b+c) always as a shorthand for a.b + a.c. I think that David Deutsch does the same in the quantum case when he says that the universe never splits: it is split right at the start, and the parallel universe only differentiate. With comp it is really consciousness which differentiate, and somehow the subjective experience plays the role of the universes.

But those two views are really equivalent. The splitting/fusing vocabulary is more easy for the description of the statistical interference between subjective experience/ first person plural realities, but the global measure on the computations is better seen when distributing all the factors at once, unravelling all histories by applying the rule Y = II all along the complete universal deployment.

Does this make sense?

Bruno







Brent

If electrons are specified by continuous variable, your consciousness will be related to a continuum of computations generated by the UD. In that case you have to consider the dovetailing of the UD on the real and complex numbers. Of course that continuum is an internal first person view which existence is due to your non-awareness of the delays made by the UD. It belongs to the epistemology, not the ontology where everything is finite (can be considered as finite once we assume digitalism). Humans, dogs, snails and even rock (immaterial rock patterns) share histories, notably thanks to the plausible linearity of the computations at the bottom, and the computational depth of our very long history. Actually I begin to think that computationalism makes the big bang a cosmic explosion among an infinity of similar explosions. First person computational depth is probably infinite (but here I speculate a little bit, and I will not insist on that).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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