2011/2/4 Andrew Soltau <andrewsol...@googlemail.com>
> Hi Bruno
>> In step seven what is proved is that
>> MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science.
>> Do you see that?
> I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer
> Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for
>> having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy
>> on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe.
>> In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is
>> eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish
>> arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any
>> universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or
>> any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory).
> OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical
> reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation,
> This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.
>> With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done,
>> by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem
>> in computer science.
> This seems straightforward.
>> At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation
>> of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche
>> of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just "white noisy"
>> To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very
>> difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the
>> logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen
>> because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to
>> describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can
>> infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the
>> work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.)
> Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of
> white rabbits.
> Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of
> white rabbits.
You can't infer that because you do not observe white rabbits that there is
Quite like the anthropic principle, if at each moments there are
overwelmingly more moments where you are just turned into gaz dust... there
exists a continuation of you (at least one) that is consistent with a world
devoid of WR. The WR problem seems the same question as ... Why am I in that
particular universe ? You are because that is consistent with you... As you
can't feel all the other you who have not your luck you can't say that
because you do not observe it, it is not like that after all...
If tomorrow you observe a WR (a magical one ;) ) well... You'll know at
least you're no more in a physical world devoid of white rabbits... and you
can begin to be really scared ;)
Also I think you will agree that all continuation where you're not... have a
zero measure (from your POV). So you can't be where you can't be, nothing to
be astonished here ;)
> Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always
> observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism.
> Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the record
> of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each moment,
> even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment, according to
> quantum rules, from this structure of information.
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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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