Hi Bruno

In step seven what is proved is that

MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer science.
Do you see that?

I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of computer science.
Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for having your continuations determined by the first person comp indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the physical universe.

In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete theory).

OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation, obviously.
This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.

With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a body problem in computer science.
This seems straightforward.

At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or just "white noisy" experiences.

To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing, Kleene, etc.)
Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of white rabbits. Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of white rabbits. Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism. Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment, according to quantum rules, from this structure of information.

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