In step seven what is proved is that
MEC + 'big universe' entails that physic is a branch of computer
Do you see that?
I have no problem with the concept that psychology is a branch of
Step 5 plays the big role there. You don't need to be annihilated for
having your continuations determined by the first person comp
indeterminacy on UD*, once a UD, a fortiori an omega point, is in the
OK in that 'no universal machine at all can distinguish arithmetical
reality from anything else.' We cannot tell if we are in a simulation,
In step eight, the assumption of the existence of a big universe is
eliminated. Roughly because no universal machine at all can
distinguish arithmetical reality from anything else. This throws away
the need of any universe. Physics has to be justified by number
relations only (numbers or any elementary terms of a Sigma_1 complete
This leaves us with the white rabbit problem.
With the whole UDA1-8, you should understand that all what has been
done, by the use of MEC, is a reduction of the mind body problem to a
body problem in computer science.
This seems straightforward.
Perhaps you can explain the principle on which there is a restriction of
Our experience, apparently of the phsyical world, is entirely devoid of
Thus, at each moment, the range of possible next observations is always
observed to be constrained precisely according to the quantum formalism.
Given that the only definition of the history of the observer is the
record of observations, I am greatly intrigued to know how one can, at
each moment, even in principle, derive the sensory specific next moment,
according to quantum rules, from this structure of information.
At first sight we might think that we are just very close to a
refutation of comp, because, as I think you have intuited, there might
be an avalanche of first person 'white rabbits' that is aberrant, or
just "white noisy" experiences.
To find a proper measure on the consistent continuations is very
difficult, and that is why I have restricted myself to the search of
the logic of the certainties, for Löbian machines. Löban machines are
chosen because they have enough introspection power and cognitive
abilities to describe what they can prove about their certainties, and
what they can infer interrogatively. That is not entirely trivial and
relies mainly on the work of Gödel, Löb and Solovay (and Post, Turing,
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