On 4 February 2011 15:20, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to" >> in the above. > > It means that if we assume MEC, then, for explaining the mind whe have to > explain the quanta from a theory which does NOT assume a real primary > physical world.
I thought the point was that he does NOT assume MEC. If I understand him, he's trying to develop a non-MEC theory. All theories, of course, must undergo the test of agreement with observation. Sometimes you seem to be saying that the UDA refutes all non-MEC theories a priori. I didn't think you claimed that - only that UDA 1-7 shows us that one's locus of observation must always be a posteriori, insensible of interruption, and hence indeterminate. Of course, UDA assumes MEC (hence cut-and-paste) and this is why step 8 can provide the intuition that the assumption of a natural world is irrelevant to what is observed. In a natural-world non-MEC theory, the possibility of cut-and-paste may be defeated by Heisenberg, but nonetheless I can at least perform the same thought experiment, since if I *could* be copied "physically", I still couldn't predict which copy I would be, or what had occurred in the interim, and for similar reasons. David > > On 03 Feb 2011, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>>>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the >>>>> physical >>>>> world extracted from comp. >> >> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to" >> in the above. > > It means that if we assume MEC, then, for explaining the mind whe have to > explain the quanta from a theory which does NOT assume a real primary > physical world. > The "has to" is a modality of necessity. > It means that the UDA has reduced a problem (the mind-body problem) into > another problem (the problem ro explain why computers develop beliefs in a > natural world). > A natural world can still exist, if you really want it to exist, but is made > entirely devoid of any explanatory purpose. Even if it exists, we can see it > and it cannot interfere in anyway with pur consciousness, including the > consicousness we have when doing experiments in physics. So it exists in the > sense that you can say that, despite thermodynamics explain how car can > moven you still believe that the real reason is that invisible horses pull > the cars. With the usual omnipresent form of Occam, we can say that if comp > is correct, there is no physical universe at all. > Of course we don't know, the comp-physics is still in his infancy, and it > might taken 1 biilions years to extract physics, and perhaps to refute comp. > AUDA refutes just the simple idea that we know already that comp entials too > much white rabbits. AUDA just reminds people that the psychologfy/theology > of actual well defined ideally correct machine is hugely non trivial, and in > particular that it gives an arithmetical interpretation of the usual initial > theory of matter by Aristotle---Plotinus quite close to quantum mechanics. > > > > >> What is supposed to follow from NOT finding any such >> difference? > > Then we can abandon the idea of materialism, like the biologist have > abandoned the principle of vitalism, and we can go back to the Platonist > conception of reality. > We know then that the theory of everything is elementary arithmetic (or any > first order Turing universal system). > We can explain both mind (qualia) and matter (quanta) in a simple coherent > picture, which, contarary to materialism gives the big role to the notion of > (Löbian) person. > > > >> As far as I follow you, the full entailment of "the >> physical world extracted from comp" isn't entirely clear yet. > > UDA+MGA does not extracts physics from computer science, but it reduces the > mind body problem to the problem of extracting physics (as common > hallucination of universal machine, if you want, from computer > science/number theory. > > Everett uses comp implicitly. So a consequence of UDA+MGA is that Everett > has not finished its task. IF comp is correct, the SWE has to be deduced > from comp, and not to be postulated. > > Have you understand UDA1-7? If you get each points of UDA1-7, you know that > IF there is (primary) physical universe, and if that universe is enough big, > then the reversal physics/machine-theology is proved. MGA (UDA-8) just > remove the assumption of that big universe, and by doing so, it eliminates > the assumption of any universe. Then with OCCAM, a 'believer' in comp has no > reason at all to believe in a primary universe (big or little). > > > > > >> But if >> this could eventually be achieved, and it could be shown to be >> entirely consistent with what we observe (so that one couldn't find >> the difference you mention above) what conclusion would this justify, >> other than NOT RULING OUT comp as an ultimate theory? > > With occam, it rules out materialism and physicalism. And without occam it > makes those theory pseudo-religious, given that they would explain nothing > and just reintroduce a mysterious matter, a mysterious mind, and a > mysterious link in between. > > Comp on the contrary provides an explanation of a (non computable) matter, > of a (non computable) mind and of no mysterious link between the two. > Besides comp explains rather easily, already, the quantum weirdness, given > that indeterminacy, non locality, non clonability, MW, are direct > consequences. And quantum computability is partially explained formally by > the classical theory of knowledge and matter (by the greeks), when > translated in the language of a Löbian machine. > > > > > >> Of course such >> an achievement would be a major, and pretty convincing, result in >> itself, but is there some stronger reason why it would definitively >> rule out ANY alternative, natural-world, non-CTM theory of mind-body? >> If so, I haven't quite grasped the point yet. >> > > Science never rules out any theory. Only a pseudo-religious conception of > science does this. Science only suggests simpler theory, and thus less > hypotheses. Evolution does not rule out creationism. It makes it just > ridiculous. Likewise comp makes ridiclous the belief in a prmiary physical > universe. Comp gives a simpler explanation for the origin of the belief by > machine in a physical universe. > Science + occam rules out theories in practice. > > My initial goal was just to show that comp does not solve the mind-body > problem, but makes it two times more difficult, given that comp FORCES US to > reduce the appearance of matter to number relations (*even* if matter > exists. Matter has no role in the mind at all. You can add it like you can > believe in astronomy and in the idea that planets move thanks to invisible > angels). > > Of course, we see in the process that comp does explain the difference > between quanta and qualia, and does explain why appearance of quanta appears > and are sharable. It reduces the whole mind and matter to the mystery of the > natural numbers, but then it can explain why that mystery has to remain a > mystery. In that sense, comp solves conceptually both the mind-body problem > and the problem of the origin of things. Practically the solution is > testable. > > Hope this help. Tell me if you see that UDA1-7 leads to the reversal between > physics and 'machine's self-reference (theology)'. Then MGA is "just" an > elimination of the need of a big universe in the seven step. > > Bruno > >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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