On 03 Feb 2011, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the
physical
world extracted from comp.
What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has
to"
in the above.
It means that if we assume MEC, then, for explaining the mind whe
have to
explain the quanta from a theory which does NOT assume a real primary
physical world.
The "has to" is a modality of necessity.
It means that the UDA has reduced a problem (the mind-body problem)
into
another problem (the problem ro explain why computers develop
beliefs in a
natural world).
A natural world can still exist, if you really want it to exist,
but is made
entirely devoid of any explanatory purpose. Even if it exists, we
can see it
and it cannot interfere in anyway with pur consciousness, including
the
consicousness we have when doing experiments in physics. So it
exists in the
sense that you can say that, despite thermodynamics explain how car
can
moven you still believe that the real reason is that invisible
horses pull
the cars. With the usual omnipresent form of Occam, we can say that
if comp
is correct, there is no physical universe at all.
Of course we don't know, the comp-physics is still in his infancy,
and it
might taken 1 biilions years to extract physics, and perhaps to
refute comp.
AUDA refutes just the simple idea that we know already that comp
entials too
much white rabbits. AUDA just reminds people that the psychologfy/
theology
of actual well defined ideally correct machine is hugely non
trivial, and in
particular that it gives an arithmetical interpretation of the
usual initial
theory of matter by Aristotle---Plotinus quite close to quantum
mechanics.
What is supposed to follow from NOT finding any such
difference?
Then we can abandon the idea of materialism, like the biologist have
abandoned the principle of vitalism, and we can go back to the
Platonist
conception of reality.
We know then that the theory of everything is elementary arithmetic
(or any
first order Turing universal system).
We can explain both mind (qualia) and matter (quanta) in a simple
coherent
picture, which, contarary to materialism gives the big role to the
notion of
(Löbian) person.
As far as I follow you, the full entailment of "the
physical world extracted from comp" isn't entirely clear yet.
UDA+MGA does not extracts physics from computer science, but it
reduces the
mind body problem to the problem of extracting physics (as common
hallucination of universal machine, if you want, from computer
science/number theory.
Everett uses comp implicitly. So a consequence of UDA+MGA is that
Everett
has not finished its task. IF comp is correct, the SWE has to be
deduced
from comp, and not to be postulated.
Have you understand UDA1-7? If you get each points of UDA1-7, you
know that
IF there is (primary) physical universe, and if that universe is
enough big,
then the reversal physics/machine-theology is proved. MGA (UDA-8)
just
remove the assumption of that big universe, and by doing so, it
eliminates
the assumption of any universe. Then with OCCAM, a 'believer' in
comp has no
reason at all to believe in a primary universe (big or little).
But if
this could eventually be achieved, and it could be shown to be
entirely consistent with what we observe (so that one couldn't find
the difference you mention above) what conclusion would this
justify,
other than NOT RULING OUT comp as an ultimate theory?
With occam, it rules out materialism and physicalism. And without
occam it
makes those theory pseudo-religious, given that they would explain
nothing
and just reintroduce a mysterious matter, a mysterious mind, and a
mysterious link in between.
Comp on the contrary provides an explanation of a (non computable)
matter,
of a (non computable) mind and of no mysterious link between the two.
Besides comp explains rather easily, already, the quantum
weirdness, given
that indeterminacy, non locality, non clonability, MW, are direct
consequences. And quantum computability is partially explained
formally by
the classical theory of knowledge and matter (by the greeks), when
translated in the language of a Löbian machine.
Of course such
an achievement would be a major, and pretty convincing, result in
itself, but is there some stronger reason why it would definitively
rule out ANY alternative, natural-world, non-CTM theory of mind-
body?
If so, I haven't quite grasped the point yet.
Science never rules out any theory. Only a pseudo-religious
conception of
science does this. Science only suggests simpler theory, and thus
less
hypotheses. Evolution does not rule out creationism. It makes it just
ridiculous. Likewise comp makes ridiclous the belief in a prmiary
physical
universe. Comp gives a simpler explanation for the origin of the
belief by
machine in a physical universe.
Science + occam rules out theories in practice.
My initial goal was just to show that comp does not solve the mind-
body
problem, but makes it two times more difficult, given that comp
FORCES US to
reduce the appearance of matter to number relations (*even* if matter
exists. Matter has no role in the mind at all. You can add it like
you can
believe in astronomy and in the idea that planets move thanks to
invisible
angels).
Of course, we see in the process that comp does explain the
difference
between quanta and qualia, and does explain why appearance of
quanta appears
and are sharable. It reduces the whole mind and matter to the
mystery of the
natural numbers, but then it can explain why that mystery has to
remain a
mystery. In that sense, comp solves conceptually both the mind-body
problem
and the problem of the origin of things. Practically the solution is
testable.
Hope this help. Tell me if you see that UDA1-7 leads to the
reversal between
physics and 'machine's self-reference (theology)'. Then MGA is
"just" an
elimination of the need of a big universe in the seven step.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
