On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the >>> physical >>> world extracted from comp.
What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to" in the above. What is supposed to follow from NOT finding any such difference? As far as I follow you, the full entailment of "the physical world extracted from comp" isn't entirely clear yet. But if this could eventually be achieved, and it could be shown to be entirely consistent with what we observe (so that one couldn't find the difference you mention above) what conclusion would this justify, other than NOT RULING OUT comp as an ultimate theory? Of course such an achievement would be a major, and pretty convincing, result in itself, but is there some stronger reason why it would definitively rule out ANY alternative, natural-world, non-CTM theory of mind-body? If so, I haven't quite grasped the point yet. David > > On 03 Feb 2011, at 01:41, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 2 February 2011 23:35, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide >>> a >>> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature >>> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain >>> of >>> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all >>> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line. >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the >>> physical >>> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is >>> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study >>> of >>> computer science)). >> >> I don't fully follow. You say that Colin must provide "a >> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature >> levels". Well, AFAICS, starting from a "natural world primary >> ontology", even in the case that, for example, the structure of >> chemical reactions could be shown to be fully digitalisable, it >> doesn't immediately follow that a digitalisation of a chemical process >> running in a "natural world" computer could literally REPLACE that >> process in the natural world. > > Well, a simulation or even an emulation of rain will not make you wet. > But an simulation of rain+you, will make you feel subjectively wet, and that > is all we need for the UDA-MGA to go through. > > > >> This is a well-known argument. >> Consequently if, on the same assumptions, it could be shown >> (hypothetically) that consciousness depends on (say) specific natural >> world bio-chemical processes, it wouldn't thereby follow that a >> digitalisation of those same processes could replace my bio-chemical >> brain. In that case it would be No Doctor. > > Indeed. I think that was my point. > > > >> >> I can of course see that, for DM to be a viable mind-body theory, it >> must be the case that any processes essential to the theory be >> digitalisable - the contrary would obviously rule out any such theory. > > That is a bit ambiguous, given that DM (I am a machine) entails that many > things are not machine, including the physical world, consciousness, etc. > > > >> But I don't see why the argument should go through in the opposite >> direction: i.e. that the assumption of a digital ontology is somehow >> FORCED by the very existence of Turing-emulable processes. > > ? The argument does not go through in the opposite direction. The ontology > (arithmetical truth) and above all the epistemology is no more digital at > all. For the ontology you can still restrict yourself to the tiny (Sigma_1 > part) of arithmetic (which is digital, by the UD), but the epistemology of > both consciousness (private, first person singular) and sharable (first > person plural) is no more digital at all. That is why I say that digital > physics is impossible. Digital physics => comp, and comp => the negation of > digital physics. So, with or without comp, digital physics contradicts > itself. > > > > > > >> I have a >> feeling I'm missing something. What is it? > > > You can remind, as a memo, that IF "I" am a machine (DM) then everything > else is not a machine. > Perhaps I am missing what you miss. saying "yes" to the doctor means that at > some point we understand that consciousness is not a product of a brain. It > is obviously counter-intuitive. A brain just makes your platonist > consciousness able to manifest itself relatively to us or the consensual > reality with the right measure. Nothing more. Tell me if this helps. > > > Bruno > >>> On 02 Feb 2011, at 01:46, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> On 1 February 2011 22:53, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Colin >>> >>> Do forgive me for butting in on an exchange I sometimes only dimly >>> follow, but I think I may possibly see a misunderstanding on your part >>> about what Bruno actually claims about "comp" (forgive me, both of >>> you, if I'm wrong). As I've understood Bruno over the years, he has >>> never asserted that comp(utational science) necessarily is the >>> fundamental science of body and mind. Rather, he is saying that IF >>> computational science is assumed (e.g. by proponents of CTM) to be the >>> correct mind-body theory, THEN the appearance of the body (and >>> consequently the rest of matter/energy) must emerge as part of the >>> same theory. In other words, EITHER the correctness of comp as a >>> mind-body theory directly implies the "emptiness" of any fundamental >>> theory of matter; OR alternatively (i.e. accepting a "fundamental" >>> theory of matter) comp can't be the correct mind-body theory. >>> >>> That's the point. >>> >>> >>> The establishment of this disjunction depends on a number of logical >>> steps, culminating in a class of "reductio" thought experiments >>> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of which >>> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of >>> computationalism and materialism. As it happens, Maudlin uses this >>> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting >>> materialism. >>> >>> Yes. The basic reason is as I said that it is more easy to explain the >>> illusion of matter to a mind than the reality of mind to an assumed >>> primary >>> matter. >>> Comp is delivered with a user guide: computer science. >>> >>> >>> There is some controversy over these results from >>> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with >>> auxiliary assumptions. Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as >>> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an >>> authority. >>> >>> Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the >>> conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational >>> science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to >>> take the same tack with respect to mind. I'm sure both he and you >>> will put me right on this. >>> >>> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide >>> a >>> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature >>> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain >>> of >>> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all >>> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line. >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the >>> physical >>> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is >>> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study >>> of >>> computer science)). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote: >>> >>> Hi Bruno, >>> >>> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you >>> >>> regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ... >>> >>> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..." >>> >>> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point. >>> >>> By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling >>> >>> Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of >>> how >>> >>> to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational >>> machine, >>> >>> ... >>> >>> I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church >>> >>> thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes >>> >>> universal machine extremely universal, if I can say. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have >>> >>> established within your overall framework of thinking. >>> >>> It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis. >>> >>> >>> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate. >>> >>> In my view >>> >>> ======================================================== >>> >>> A) There is a natural world. >>> >>> We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it. >>> >>> This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols >>> >>> The natural 'symbols' interact naturally. >>> >>> This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing. >>> >>> Universe U ensues. >>> >>> Scientist S is being computed within U >>> >>> Scientist S can observe U from within. >>> >>> U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable >>> >>> .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-O >>> >>> >>> If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with >>> >>> addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)". >>> >>> No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation >>> >>> between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural >>> world >>> >>> is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is made of a >>> >>> large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact simultaneously, on >>> >>> mass. The 'numbers' do not relate to each other like natural numbers, but >>> >>> they do relate in a way that can be MODELLED using natural numbers. >>> >>> If by natural world you mean the physical worlds as seen by 'numbers', >>> >>> what you say might be locally correct, but that remains to be proved >>> >>> (assuming comp). >>> >>> No. You have it all backwards. You can assume _nothing_ about the natural >>> >>> world and abstract number systems. >>> >>> >>> >>> B) This is a symbolic description of U created by S from within U >>> >>> S can concoct a description of the natural symbols in (A) >>> >>> It need not be unique, many (B) correspond to one (A) >>> >>> S can never know if it's completely done. >>> >>> S can never know the real nature of the sybols in (A) >>> >>> Descriptions (B), with P-O, explains observation and the observer S >>> >>> C) There is a _second_ description >>> >>> It is also concocted by S >>> >>> These are the normal empirical laws we all know so well >>> >>> ? >>> >>> >>> It describes how the U appears to S from inside >>> >>> It need not be unique, many (C) correspond to one (A) >>> >>> No (C) ever explains observation. >>> >>> In this framework >>> >>> (i) a computer running description/rules (B) is not the natural world. >>> >>> OK. With the two sense of natural world I accept above. >>> >>> >>> >>> (ii) a computer running description/rules (C) is not the natural world. >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> (iii) a computer running descriptions (B) or (C) is 'artificially >>> >>> computing' >>> >>> >>> Yes. it is an isolated malin génie. >>> >>> (iv) (C) is physics that present day scientists construct >>> >>> I don't get "C". >>> >>> So you don't understand what basic empirical scientists do. Boy have I >>> >>> failed to connect or what! >>> >>> >>> >>> (v) (B) is physics of a natural world prior to an observer. >>> >>> This exist for Löbian machine (although they can find it "looking >>> >>> inward"). >>> >>> Who's 'they'? >>> >>> >>> >>> (vi) (A) is 'NATURALLY computing' in the sense that it is literally >>> >>> 'computing' scientist S. >>> >>> ===================================================== >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> These options are the logically justifiable position we can take when we >>> >>> are, as we are, inside U trying to work U out from within, using an >>> >>> observation faculty provided by U as part of (A). Empirical evidence >>> >>> justifying (C) is normal overvation (contents of one or more >>> observer-agreed >>> >>> conscious experisnces). Empirical evidence justifying (B) is implicit in >>> the >>> >>> existence of an observer concocting a set (C). You can't be confused >>> about >>> >>> an bservation unless there is an observer to be confused. >>> >>> ===================================================== >>> >>> All that said.....now .... >>> >>> You mention "digital physics". You say "Are you aware that If COMP is >>> >>> true, that is if I am a machine ..." >>> >>> In terms of my framework....you are speaking of ...what? >>> >>> >>> >>> I postulate, eventually, only natural numbers and addition and >>> >>> multiplication. Then from this (it is not obvious but standard in good >>> logic >>> >>> textbook) you can show that the arithmetical relation (defined with "+" >>> and >>> >>> "*", and classical logic) emulate all computations. Physics or the >>> natural >>> >>> world is never emulated (but often simulated by malin génie program). >>> >>> Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person indeterminacy >>> >>> inyto account. A priori the natural world is not a computational object. >>> >>> "Physics is what appear from inside taking the first person indeterminacy >>> >>> inyto account. " >>> >>> This is (C). Standard empirical physics. >>> >>> "A priori the natural world is not a computational object" >>> >>> This is (A). the universe U is not a computational object. Not computed. >>> >>> OK. Clarity of a sort. Where does (B) fit in? I think you assume it as a >>> >>> com,puter program on a magical non-existent computer running something. I >>> >>> hold that descriptions (B) are accessible. I also hold that these >>> >>> descriptions are not the same as the (C) descriptions. Both constructed >>> by >>> >>> the same observer/scientist. >>> >>> No I think maybe you merge (A) and (B) and then replace them both with >>> your >>> >>> lower-case comp machine. OK. >>> >>> >>> (1) A 'Turing machine (digital computer)' inside U running (B) >>> >>> descriptions? >>> >>> (2) The natural computation itself, of kind (A)? >>> >>> I suspect >>> >>> (3) Some kind of magical 'computer' in idea-space computing us as (A)? >>> >>> i.e. A 'virtual machine' that 'acts as if' it generates an arbitrary >>> >>> number of different U? >>> >>> The COMP I talk about having refuted is in (i) or (ii) above. >>> >>> I suspect this is not the COMP you are speaking of... >>> >>> The comp I talk about is the assumption that my (generailzed) brain can >>> be >>> >>> emulated by a digital computer. The rest should follow. >>> >>> >>> The 'comp' you talk about is actually an abstract machine in a >>> non-existent >>> >>> abstract space that manipulates abstractions. It's got nothing to do with >>> >>> the COMP I talk about, which is a computer, made of the real world (not >>> >>> integers), in the real natural world, running a description (made by >>> humans) >>> >>> of the natural world. This applies to 'quasi-digital' (desktop style), >>> >>> analogue and quantum computers. >>> >>> You have a deep seated conviction that this abstract computer that 'is' a >>> >>> reality and a real computer that runs descriptions of a reality are >>> >>> indistinguishable. This is unjustifiable. The simpler, parsimonious >>> solution >>> >>> is to assume that is not the case, and work out what options exist for a >>> >>> describer and the possible relations between a describer and the >>> described. >>> >>> The reason your propositions have trouble getting accepted is because >>> they >>> >>> make this step into a faith-based presupposition that is >>> indistinguishable >>> >>> from a statement like "the natural world is erected in real time by the >>> >>> little purple regularity fairies". It has exactly the same level of faith >>> >>> and assumption. So the comp you speak of, I conclude, at last, is not the >>> >>> COMP I refute, nor is it the one of the many other refutations. Which is >>> >>> kind of good from your perspective. From my perspective it means I have >>> to >>> >>> battle no more with your comp. >>> >>> In relation to Stathis' request: >>> >>> If you model a natural environment presenting some problem to a human >>> >>> within that environment, the simulated human will arrive at the same >>> >>> solution as the real human would have. If intelligence is >>> >>> problem-solving behaviour, there is therefore no difference between >>> >>> the natural world and the model provided that the model is in fact a >>> >>> good one. Your claim that computers cannot replicate human >>> >>> intelligence is thus equivalent to a claim that there is some process >>> >>> in the human brain which is not Turing emulable. What process do you >>> >>> >>> No. This is just plain wrong. You cannot model an observation of >>> something >>> >>> that you have no idea of the evidence of .i.e. You cannot model the >>> unknown. >>> >>> If you could then you'd already know it (the observer and the >>> relationship >>> >>> of the observer to everything else. If you want to get at unknowns, then >>> you >>> >>> have to model a modeller of the unknown ... and then _assume_ that >>> >>> everything in a model captures the reality you are modelling, during the >>> >>> process. >>> >>> The non-Turing emulable part of the natural world is the relationship >>> >>> between every little bit X and every other bit of it that is NOT directly >>> >>> related to X. A product of massive parallelism created by a massive >>> >>> collection of the entities of which we are actually made, which is best >>> >>> assumed not to be abstract numbers if you want to understand it. This is >>> >>> something we inherit by 'being' in the world. Something that cannot be >>> >>> simulated. Something that a Turing Machine (computer), totally different >>> to >>> >>> us physically, does not get in its program. >>> >>> By way of example, I have attached a video of a simulated neuron firing. >>> >>> It's from a paper I have in review at the moment. The video depicts the >>> >>> currents originating the biologically realistic EM fields around a neuron >>> >>> due to the ion channels involed in an action potential. It was produce by >>> >>> the package NEURON. In it you will see a pair of red/blue interfaces >>> >>> travelling away from the soma. These interfaces are virtual evanescent >>> >>> current-dipoles. They are mathematically describable, but form no part of >>> >>> the mathematical description that generated them. THAT is what is >>> missing. >>> >>> These are the virtual relationships not accessed by the mathematics of a >>> >>> Turing machine. No matter what is going on in a Turing machine, NONE of >>> this >>> >>> kind of phenomenon are accessed by it. >>> >>> The question is 'what is it like to BE those fields'. It cannot be >>> claimed >>> >>> to be like the mathematical description that represents them, nor can it >>> be >>> >>> claimed to be 'like' being the computer running the simulation. >>> >>> A final demo that tells you what can't be emulated...using, yes, actual >>> >>> natural numbers. >>> >>> Here's a 1. >>> >>> Here another 1. >>> >>> If I 'be' the first 1, you 'be' the second 1. what 'law' captures the >>> >>> relationship between the two instances of 1? That 'law' is not any law >>> that >>> >>> you and I concoct sitting up here, staring down at them like a god. No >>> >>> amount of abstraction of 'one-ness' capture that relationship. >>> >>> I am glad I don't have to battle lower case comp any more. So I guess >>> I'll >>> >>> leave it there for now. Progress has been made. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> colin >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> >>> "Everything List" group. >>> >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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