On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: >> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to" >> in the above. > > If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world, > because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of > a real world to emerge from
Yes, obviously. But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can only be true absent such difference. It seems self-contradictory to me. David > > > On Feb 3, 9:34 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: >> On 3 February 2011 13:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the >> >>> physical >> >>> world extracted from comp. >> >> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to" >> in the above. > > If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world, > because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of > a real world to emerge from > > >>> including Maudlin's Olympia/Klara and Bruno's MGA, the burden of > which >> >>> is to reveal contradictions inherent in any such conjunction of >> >>> computationalism and materialism. As it happens, Maudlin uses this >> >>> result to reject CTM, and Bruno follows the opposite tack of rejecting >> >>> materialism. >> >> >>> Yes. The basic reason is as I said that it is more easy to explain the >> >>> illusion of matter to a mind than the reality of mind to an assumed >> >>> primary >> >>> matter. >> >>> Comp is delivered with a user guide: computer science. >> >> >>> There is some controversy over these results from >> >>> supporters of CTM who continue to find ways to dispute them with >> >>> auxiliary assumptions. Personally, these auxiliaries strike me as >> >>> being rather in the nature of epicycles, but then I'm hardly an >> >>> authority. >> >> >>> Anyway, forgive me if this was already obvious, but I suppose the >> >>> conclusion might be that, if you reject fundamental computational >> >>> science as your basic theory of "matter", Bruno would expect you to >> >>> take the same tack with respect to mind. I'm sure both he and you >> >>> will put me right on this. >> >> >>> To protect a natural world primary ontology, I think Colin has to provide >> >>> a >> >>> naturalization of consciousness escaping digitalization at all nature >> >>> levels, and this without redefining the first person by its comp domain >> >>> of >> >>> indeterminacy. Well he has to justify (or not) why he would say no to all >> >>> doctors. But he can develop a theory of mind along this line. >> >>> Colin has to find a difference between the physical world and the >> >>> physical >> >>> world extracted from comp. I provide a tool for doing that (but it is >> >>> mathematically involved (the main weakness of comp: it demands the study >> >>> of >> >>> computer science)). >> >> >>> Bruno >> >> >>> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >>> On 01 Feb 2011, at 07:51, Colin Hales wrote: >> >> >>> Hi Bruno, >> >> >>> I have been pondering this issue a bit and I am intrigued about how you >> >> >>> regard the problem space we inhabit. When you say things like ... >> >> >>> "Are you aware that If comp is true, that is if I am a machine ..." >> >> >>> I cannot fathom how you ever get to this point. >> >> >>> By looking at amoeabs, then reading book on molecular genetics, smelling >> >> >>> Turing universality, then by reading Gödel's proof and the discovery of >> >>> how >> >> >>> to handle self-duplication and self-reference in representational >> >>> machine, >> >> >>> ... >> >> >>> I did not take this too much seriously until my understanding of Church >> >> >>> thesis deepens. The closure of computerland for diagonalization makes >> >> >>> universal machine extremely universal, if I can say. >> >> >>> This is a presupposition that arises somehow in the lexicon you have >> >> >>> established within your overall framework of thinking. >> >> >>> It has lead me to some interest with that hypothesis. >> >> >>> Let me have a stab at how my view and yours correlate. >> >> >>> In my view >> >> >>> ======================================================== >> >> >>> A) There is a natural world. >> >> >>> We, Turing machines dogs, computers are all being 'computed' by it. >> >> >>> This is a set of unknown naturally occurring symbols >> >> >>> The natural 'symbols' interact naturally. >> >> >>> This is 'natural computation'. NOT like desktop computing. >> >> >>> Universe U ensues. >> >> >>> Scientist S is being computed within U >> >> >>> Scientist S can observe U from within. >> >> >>> U makes use of fundamental properties of the symbols to enable >> >> >>> .... observation, from within. Call this principle P-O >> >> >>> If by natural world you mean the world of the natural numbers with >> >> >>> addition and multiplication, I am OK. I can picture your "A)". >> >> >>> No. Here's where we part company. This presupposition about the relation >> >> >>> between the abstractions for quantity we call numbers, and the natural >> >>> world >> >> >>> is one I do not make. All you can logically claim is that it is made of a >> >> >>> large set of 'something', these 'somethings' interact >> >> ... >> >> read more » > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
