On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has
to"
in the above.
If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world,
because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of
a real world to emerge from
Yes, obviously. But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has
to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can
only be true absent such difference. It seems self-contradictory to
me.
?
I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the
first person indeterminacy.
So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed
physics' is different from the comp extracted physics.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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