On 09 Feb 2011, at 19:13, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 9, 4:35 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 09 Feb 2011, at 15:20, 1Z wrote:



On Feb 8, 6:08 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Peter,

you say that you are a formalist. I gave you the definition of
realism
which works for the understanding of the reasoning. It is the
acceptation of (P v ~P) when P is intended on the domain of the
natural numbers.

I can accept that as  a *formal* rule that doens't mean anything
ontologically,
just like I can accept that some but not all Snarks are Boojums.

Yes, please, do that.

I already am

You are not. Never been.




You
cannot come
to ontological conclusions just by writing down an axiom.

I don't do that. But I disagree with your point. here is a
counterexample:
Theory: God and Mary ontologically exist.
Conclusion: Mary ontologically exist.


Sigh...You cannot come to ontological conclusions just by writing down
a logical or mathematical axiom.

"God and Mary exist" is not a logical or mathematical axiom. Nor is comp. But in AUDA, physics (the whole of physics) is made mathematical, for logical reason.





Worse, the
decision
to use the Law of the Exclude Middle or not (it can of course be
dropped without
incurring a contradiction) is typically motivated by ontological
considerations.
We think LEM applies to past events because we think they either
happened
or they didn't.  We doubt that it applies to future events.

I use LEM only in arithmetic.

Pure arithmetic cannot reach ontological conclusions

That is why no ontological conclusion is reached. I just don't need ontology at that stage. You argue like this: Evolution theory is bad because it does not explain how God create the world in six days. You believe (dogmatically) in "real matter", and you are the one wanting that a theory, which does not use that notion, to come up with saying something about it.





That's all.
By standard use of numbers I mean the element (N, +, *) as
taught by mathematicians. I show that comp makes *some* theology as
part of the discourse of machine. This should not give any trouble,
*especially* to a formalist.

The idea that a hypothetical machine would give certain hypothetical
responses wouldn't, but of course, you are saying more than that:
you are saying that *I* am an immaterial machine. And that's an
ontological claim which cannot be supported by a merely formal
premise.

It is not more ontological that the premise that I could survive with
a digital brain.

What does "digital" mean here? Made of silicon.... or made of numbers?

Made of numerical information which can be put into silicon, or any material (not necessarily primitively material) things.




There is a bait and switch going on here. The guy goes into the
doctor,
agrees to the digital brain, and walks out thinking the doctor is
going to
laboriously build a machine or write a programme. Instead, the doctor
sits back confident that a digital brain already exists as an
immaterial number

No doubt that such a doctor does not respect the contract.




The rest is reasoning. It is up to you to find the
mistake, if you believe there is one. Please study the reasoning,
because it makes clear what is used and meant in the hypotheses. The
point is mainly "epistemological", although we might argue on this
too. The point is that physics is a branch of arithmetic,

If there is no reality to numbers,

But there is a reality to numbers. Albeit not material. You are the one positing that "really real" is matter. I don't.


arithmetic cannot even produce the
appearance of physics. Illusions have a real basis. Again, you need
an ontological premise.

You are correct here. That ontology is the ontology of some truth (that not all numbers are even, for example, or that universal numbers exists) + the ontology of my consciousness. No need to suppose matter, unless you believe that consciousness needs matter to exist, in which case the reasoning shows that comp is false, and that you should better say no to the doctor, even if he promise to you to be reinstantiated with matter. Or there is an error in the proof, and you might try to find it.






If it is formal game playing, just play the game.

If I just play the game I am never going to conclude that
I *am* a dreaming machine, any more than I am going to
conclude I am Supermario

You forget the "yes doctor" part of comp, which plays a crucial role
in the reasoning.  I don't want to argue if it is ontological or not.

Well, you should.


I just did above. I am willing to say that in UDA I assume consciousness, and brains, doctor, etc. And I assume the existence of the numbers.



That is not needed to understand that physics is no more the
fundamental science once comp is assumed

Comp alone does not do it.

Find an error in the paper, then. Without adding a non necessary interpretative layer to the hypothesis.





The theory is enough
precise to allow that.

Do you have a definition of formalism which does not rely on
arithmetical realism.

Yes: formalism is the claim that no mathematical
entities actually exist,

Well, that is you own physicalist definition. A general formalist
believes the same for any theory, and never assume things like primary
matter. You are not a formalist in math, but a conventionalist.

"Conventionalism: This is also called formalism. In Kantian terms this
is the view that mathematics is analytical a priori. In other words,
that all mathematical statements are true by definition or
convention."

This is refuted. I gave the references.






But
then I think you have missed the failure of formalism and logicism in
math due to incompleteness.

Sigghh..no that's the failure of Hilbertian formalism, not of
game-playing formalism.

?





that mathematics is just
the exploration of the consequences of various rules
and axioms, and that mathematical truth is contextual
to the system employed and has no wider significance.

That has been refuted by Gödel a long time ago,

I disagree.

I see.





and is not what
mathematician call formalism, after Gödel.



AR is the weakest assumption on which all
mathematician agree (except ulrafinitist).

Formalists think it is true  as well,,,but it is not a truth
about anything outside the game.

Then stay in the game. Of course, if you ever say "yes" to the digital
doctor, then the consequence are no more purely formal.

Is the doctor promissing me a brain made of silicon or of numbers?


Of silicon.






Could you define *formally* 'real existence'?

There is no reason I should, and at least one reason I shouldn't:
I have stated that real existence cannot be established by formal
arguments.

Like non real existence. But then why do you keep insist that numbers
and math object have non real existence?

I am not claiming to have proven mathematically. I am arguing it
how it should be argued, as an explicitly metaphysical claim.


It is your right, but then you know that comp is false, and thus CTM, etc. Or find an error in the argument, without using more metaphysics than what is in the assumption.




Formalists do not think everything is merely formal
game playing, they think maths is *as opposed to* other
things which are not.

Not true. That's the old conventionalism.

They are synonyms.

?




All this has no relevance
for the reasoning.



Obviously, as Chalmers
rightly insists, no formal characterization of consciousness can be
given. But comp makes it possible to retrieve formality as the meta-
level. That's the S4Grz1 formalism. It makes its possible to work
on a
purely formal account of what machine cannot formalize, and it shows that machine can, like us, build meta-formal account of those things.

Once and for all, keep it mind that when I utter that a number exist,
I am just like PA proving a sentence of the form ExP(x), and
everything will flow easily (well with some effort).

Nope. The claim that I am, ontologically, an immaterial dreaming
machine
does not follow from PA.

It does from PA + comp (= CT+ YD).

No, because those are not sufficient to show that there
are any immaterial machines in the first place --  the "I am"
therefore being
irrelevant

But immaterial machine does exist. Any program are immaterial. You are confusing program and implemented program.






Adding
unnecessary metaphysics just add noise.

The conclusion is metaphysical, therefore the argument
must be or the conclusion is a non-sequitur. Therefore
metaphysics is a necessity for you.

No the conclusion is scientific, in Popper's sense.

It is perfectly possible to be both scientific and metaphysical.

I never said the contrary. I just said that the conclusion are scientific, that is testable by experimental means.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to