2011/2/11 1Z <[email protected]> > > > On Feb 10, 1:24 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 09 Feb 2011, at 16:49, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Feb 8, 6:17 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote: > > > > >>> On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > >>>> Peter, > > > > >>>> Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using > > >>>> only > > >>>> the formal definition of "arithmetical realism", > > > > >>> You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically > > >>> neutral because it has ontological conclusions. > > > > >> Wrong. > > > > > Wrong about what? > > > > You were wrong on the idea that an argument cannot be valid and > > ontological. It is enough that the premises have ontological clauses. > > So which is the ontological premise? You don't say > that Platonism is an explicit premise. But it isn't > a corollary of CT either. > > The ontological premise is that *you* could be replaced by *a digital brain* in other word a program and still be you.
> > >> See my papers. > > > > > That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological > > > premise that mathematical entities have real existence, > > > and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my > > > response to your writings. > > > > The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual > > reality (doctor, brain, etc.). > > If I agree only to the existence of doctors, brains and silicon > computers, > the conclusion that I am an immaterial dreaming machine cannot follow > > > It does not assume that physical things > > "really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers really > > exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense. > > There is no generally agreed mathematical sense. If mathematical > anti-realists are right, they don't exist at all and I am therefore > not one. > > > >> Read a book on logic and computability. > > > > > Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of > > > apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical ontology. > > > > You are the one opposing a paper in applied logic in the cognitive and > > physical science. I suggest you look at books to better see what i am > > taking about. > > You are the one who is doing ontology without realising it. > > > >> Boolos and > > >> Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are > > >> excellent. > > >> It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in arithmetic. > > > > > I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes > > > out of hypothetical machines. > > > > You mean mathematical machine. They are not hypothetical. Unless you > > believe that the number seven is hypothetical, > > I do. Haven't you got that yet? > > > in which case I get > > hypothetical minds and hypothetical universes. > > I am not generated by a hypothesis: I generate hypotheses. > > > It is not a big deal to > > accomodate the vocabulary. > > > > > >> Recently Brent Meeker sent an excellent reference by Calude > > >> illustrating how PA can prove the existence of universal machine (or > > >> number). > > > > > Oh good grief....it can only prove the *mathematical* existence. If > > > mathematical "existence" is not real existence, I am not an immaterial > > > machine. > > > > Comp can explain why mathematical machine believes that they are made > > of stuff. If you have an argument that stuff is primary, then you have > > an argument against comp. > > That doesn't follow. An immaterial machine might believe it is > material, > but so might a material machine. So arguing that matter is prmiary > has no impact on comp. > > > Not against the validity of the reasoning. > > > > > what is at is the side of formalism > > > that says maths is ontologically non-commital game playing. > > > > That is not formalism. That is conventionalism (in math). > > So you say. I have quoted a source saying they are the same > > >This has > > been refuted. > > By whom? > > >We know today that we have to posit numbers to reason on > > them. We don't have to posit their "real" existence (whatever that > > means), but we have to posit their existence. > > Unreal existence is not enough to support the conclusion > that I am a number > > > Without assuming the > > natural numbers, we cannot prove they exist, not use any of them. > > > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
