Hi Stephen,

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On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Bruno, -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.comSubject: Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be falsebefore itsfalse?The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensualreality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physicalthings"really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbersreallyexist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has noconnectionwhat so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or anyotherform of prehension or whatever might be considered as being thesubject ofawareness in any way?

`I was just saying that number does not need to be real in a sense`

`deeper than the usual mathematical, informal or formal, sense. The`

`usual sense is enough to understand that the additive and`

`multiplicative structure emulates the UD, and that universal machines`

`project their experience on its border so that they perceive (and at`

`the least pretend and belief so) a physical reality, and this`

`correctly, assuming comp.`

What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence?

`The existence of the natural number is forever a mystery, provably so`

`assuming comp. You cannot extract the integers from a hat without`

`integers already in the hat.`

I have the idea that your reasoning behind your argument is a verydeepand subtle version of Goedel's diagonalization. Is this true?

`Only the translation (AUDA) of the reasoning in arithmetic (with the`

`classical theory of knowledge). The reasoning itself is made possible`

`by the closure of the class of partial computable functions for the`

`diagonalization, and that runs deep, indeed. But that's part of`

`arithmetical truth.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.