Hi Stephen,

On 10 Feb 2011, at 16:20, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Bruno,

-----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2011 8:24 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its

The only ontology is my conciousness, and some amount of consensual
reality (doctor, brain, etc.). It does not assume that physical things "really" or primitively exists, nor does it assume that numbers really
exist in any sense. Just that they exist in the mathematical sense.

Are you claiming that numbers have an existence that has no connection what so ever to the possibility of being known or understood or any other form of prehension or whatever might be considered as being the subject of
awareness in any way?

I was just saying that number does not need to be real in a sense deeper than the usual mathematical, informal or formal, sense. The usual sense is enough to understand that the additive and multiplicative structure emulates the UD, and that universal machines project their experience on its border so that they perceive (and at the least pretend and belief so) a physical reality, and this correctly, assuming comp.

  What then establishes the mere possibility of this existence?

The existence of the natural number is forever a mystery, provably so assuming comp. You cannot extract the integers from a hat without integers already in the hat.

I have the idea that your reasoning behind your argument is a very deep
and subtle version of Goedel's diagonalization. Is this true?

Only the translation (AUDA) of the reasoning in arithmetic (with the classical theory of knowledge). The reasoning itself is made possible by the closure of the class of partial computable functions for the diagonalization, and that runs deep, indeed. But that's part of arithmetical truth.



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