On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote: > > > > > On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote: > > >> I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are > >> derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the > >> first person indeterminacy. > >> So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed > >> physics' is different from the comp extracted physics. > > > They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion by > > refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA > > Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical > Realism).
Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). The ontological status of mathematical objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not straightforwardly proven by mathematics itself. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics > And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if > you have a refutation of MGA you should present it. See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia. > I could say that Fermat theorem is false, because in one billion years > someone will eventually find a flaw in Wiles' proof! > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
