On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote:
> > On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:
> >> I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
> >> derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the
> >> first person indeterminacy.
> >> So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed
> >> physics' is different from the comp extracted physics.
> > They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion by
> > refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA
> Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical
Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). The ontological status of
objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not
proven by mathematics itself.
> And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if
> you have a refutation of MGA you should present it.
See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia.
> I could say that Fermat theorem is false, because in one billion years
> someone will eventually find a flaw in Wiles' proof!
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