On Feb 6, 6:45 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:37, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote:
>
> >>> On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >>>> I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are
> >>>> derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the
> >>>> first person indeterminacy.
> >>>> So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed
> >>>> physics' is different from the comp extracted physics.
>
> >>> They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion  
> >>> by
> >>> refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA
>
> >> Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical
> >> Realism).
>
> > Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth).
>
> Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete  
> Sigma_1 truth.

As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least
how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to.
It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few

> Please don't put metaphysics where there is only  
> religion

Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can
argue for anti realism.

> (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor).

Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your
immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence.

AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr.

<And with comp,  
> it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic.
> Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in  
> computer science and in arithmetic.

The excluded middle is a much of  a formal rule as
anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible
with anti realism.

>To understand the fundamental  
> consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program  
> computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or  
> partial, or that a program will stop or not.

And I can accept that by positing LEM as a formal rule. I don;t
have to posit an immaterial Plato's heaven

> Only ultrafinitist denies AR.

Wrong. Anti realists deny it. I have pointed this out many
times. You think the only debate is about the minimal
set of mathematical objects, and that is not the only debate. Anti
realists
can accept a maximal set of objects, with the proviso that their
existence is fictive and not real existence

> AR+, the idea that we don't need more than AR, in this setting, is a  
> consequence of the math. From 'outside' the tiny effective universal  
> sigma_1 complete set is enough. from inside, even mathematicalism is  
> not enough (it is more 'theologicalism').
>
> > The ontological status of
> > mathematical
> > objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not
> > straightforwardly
> > proven  by mathematics itself.
>
> With comp, you don't need more than the part on which almost everybody  
> agrees: arithmetical realism.

Anti realists do not agee on the real existence of any
part. There are no pixies at all, not just a few pixies.

>The engineers, the scientists, most  
> philosophers.
> Except for Thorgny Tholerus I never met an ultrafinitist. You don't  
> have to decide if numbers are idea of the mind or sort of angel in  
> Plato Heaven. With comp the very idea of number will itself be a  
> number, a sort of second order number, relative to universes  
> (universal numbers).

ULtrafinitism has nothing to do with it. For formalists
no number exists. They have no prejudice about any kind,

> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics
>
> >> And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if
> >> you have a refutation of MGA you should present it.
>
> > See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia.
>
> We have already discussed this and Colin Klein does not touch the  
> movie graph argument.

Then you had better stop saying the MGA and Olympia are equivalent

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