On Feb 6, 6:45 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:37, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >>>> On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote: > > >>>> I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are > >>>> derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the > >>>> first person indeterminacy. > >>>> So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed > >>>> physics' is different from the comp extracted physics. > > >>> They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion > >>> by > >>> refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA > > >> Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical > >> Realism). > > > Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). > > Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete > Sigma_1 truth.
As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few > Please don't put metaphysics where there is only > religion Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can argue for anti realism. > (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. <And with comp, > it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. > Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in > computer science and in arithmetic. The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible with anti realism. >To understand the fundamental > consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program > computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or > partial, or that a program will stop or not. And I can accept that by positing LEM as a formal rule. I don;t have to posit an immaterial Plato's heaven > Only ultrafinitist denies AR. Wrong. Anti realists deny it. I have pointed this out many times. You think the only debate is about the minimal set of mathematical objects, and that is not the only debate. Anti realists can accept a maximal set of objects, with the proviso that their existence is fictive and not real existence > AR+, the idea that we don't need more than AR, in this setting, is a > consequence of the math. From 'outside' the tiny effective universal > sigma_1 complete set is enough. from inside, even mathematicalism is > not enough (it is more 'theologicalism'). > > > The ontological status of > > mathematical > > objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not > > straightforwardly > > proven by mathematics itself. > > With comp, you don't need more than the part on which almost everybody > agrees: arithmetical realism. Anti realists do not agee on the real existence of any part. There are no pixies at all, not just a few pixies. >The engineers, the scientists, most > philosophers. > Except for Thorgny Tholerus I never met an ultrafinitist. You don't > have to decide if numbers are idea of the mind or sort of angel in > Plato Heaven. With comp the very idea of number will itself be a > number, a sort of second order number, relative to universes > (universal numbers). ULtrafinitism has nothing to do with it. For formalists no number exists. They have no prejudice about any kind, > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics > > >> And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if > >> you have a refutation of MGA you should present it. > > > See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia. > > We have already discussed this and Colin Klein does not touch the > movie graph argument. Then you had better stop saying the MGA and Olympia are equivalent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
