On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Peter, Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using only the formal definition of "arithmetical realism",You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically neutral because it has ontological conclusions.

Wrong. It is enough it has ontological premise.

.which is that amachine is arithmetical realist if she believes in the axiom of elementary arithmetic *with* (the realist part) the principle of thethird excluded middle (allowing non constructive reasoning, asusual).What machine? Show me one!

`See my papers. Read a book on logic and computability. Boolos and`

`Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are excellent.`

`It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in arithmetic.`

`Recently Brent Meeker sent an excellent reference by Calude`

`illustrating how PA can prove the existence of universal machine (or`

`number). I will search it.`

`And I encourage you to interpret all this, including my thesis in`

`purely formal term. AUDA shows, notably, that this is possible.`

`You might also read the book by Judson Webb, which has been recently`

`republished and which shows the positive impact of Gödel on both`

`formalism and mechanism. Actually Webb argues that formalism and`

`mechanism are basically the same philosophy, or the same type of`

`philosophy. And I do follow him on that. A machine is before all a`

`form. A digital machine is a form which can be described locally`

`(relatively to a universal number) by a number. Webb call the kind of`

`AR used here: finitism.`

And with AUDA you get a conversation with a machine, and a quasi correct explanation why she is not a machine? How could a formalist not love that .... Gödel is not just the discovery of the provability limitations of formalisms and machines,Godel has no impact on "game playing" formalism.

?

`(Well the more usual critic in our context is that Gödel has *only*`

`impact on "game playing" formalism).`

`I was just saying that Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is a`

`theorem in Peano arithmetic, about Peano arithmetic. Or by Peano`

`Arithmetic, about Peano arithmetic.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.