On Feb 11, 7:17 pm, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/11/2011 7:56 AM, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 10, 2:06 am, Brent Meeker<[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On 2/9/2011 5:02 PM, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Feb 10, 12:19 am, Brent Meeker<[email protected]> wrote: > > >>>> On 2/9/2011 3:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > >>>>> On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 10:03 AM, John Mikes<[email protected]> > >>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> Stathis, > >>>>>> I like your implications: > >>>>>> "... I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that > >>>>>> although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the > >>>>>> behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other > >>>>>> processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what > >>>>>> evidence do you have that they exist?" > > >>>>>> I am speaking about processes we don't (yet?) know at all, like some > >>>>>> centuries ago electricity etc. etc. and in due course we learn about > >>>>>> phenomena not fitting into our existing 'models'. > >>>>>> I don't volunteer to describe such processes before we learn about > >>>>>> them (how > >>>>>> stupid of me) - netiher do I have "evidence" for the "existence and > >>>>>> behavior" of such unkown/able processes. > >>>>>> Our cultural induction allows a widening of models, processes, > >>>>>> phenomena, > >>>>>> mechanisms. > >>>>>> We even advanced from the Geocentric vision. > > >>>>> One thing that we have found with all new physical phenomena is that > >>>>> they follow physical laws that can be described algorithmically. > > >>>> Physical laws aren't "out there". They are models we invent. > > >>> It's not satisfactory to say that there is no lawfulness to the > >>> universe > >>> at all. Is there no reason the sun will rise tomorrow? > > >> That's the model. I don't know how to define a "reason" except in terms > >> of some model. > > > "We define it in terms of a model" doesn't mean "it just is a model". > > Models > > are models *of* something. > > Sure. Where did I say otherwise. We just can't be sure what the really > real is that the model is supposed to apply to.
We can't be sure about anything. However, we should bet on in our best models. > My point is that we > prefer physical laws that are algorithmic, because otherwise they aren't > very useful. Whatever that means. Deterministic? Computable? Exactly soluble? Each of those is its own can of worms. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
