On 2/11/2011 4:41 PM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 11, 7:17 pm, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>  wrote:
On 2/11/2011 7:56 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 10, 2:06 am, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>    wrote:
On 2/9/2011 5:02 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 10, 12:19 am, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>      wrote:
On 2/9/2011 3:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 10:03 AM, John Mikes<jami...@gmail.com>        wrote:
I like your implications:
"... I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that
although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the
behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other
processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what
evidence do you have that they exist?"
I am speaking about processes we don't (yet?) know at all, like some
centuries ago electricity etc. etc. and in due course we learn about
phenomena not fitting into our existing 'models'.
I don't volunteer to describe such processes before we learn about them (how
stupid of me) - netiher do I have "evidence" for the "existence and
behavior" of such unkown/able processes.
Our cultural induction allows a widening of models, processes, phenomena,
We even advanced from the Geocentric vision.
One thing that we have found with all new physical phenomena is that
they follow physical laws that can be described algorithmically.
Physical laws aren't "out there".  They are models we invent.
It's  not satisfactory to say that there is no lawfulness to  the
at all. Is there no reason the sun will rise tomorrow?
That's the model.  I don't know how to define a "reason" except in terms
of some model.
"We define it in terms of a model" doesn't mean "it just is a model".
are models *of* something.
Sure.  Where did I say otherwise.  We just can't be sure what the really
real is that the model is supposed to apply to.
We can't be sure about anything. However, we should bet on
in our best models.

If we must make a decision; but in science (as opposed to engineering) we don't have to bet except in the sense of pursuing on thread of research or another. We never have to come down and say, "This is IT."

  My point is that we
prefer physical laws that are algorithmic, because otherwise they aren't
very useful.
Whatever that means. Deterministic? Computable? Exactly soluble? Each
of those is its own
can of worms.

But not as big a can as non-algorithmic, non-computable. Exactly soluble isn't very important if we can prove some approximation scheme - hardly any real physical problem is exactly soluble. Deterministic isn't important if there's a well-defined, computable measure. That's pretty much where QM is.


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