On Mar 8, 11:47 am, Andrew Soltau <andrewsol...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
> > On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com>  wrote:
> >> On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote:>  Collapse "appears" to instruments 
> >> as well as people
> >> We don't have any evidence for that,
> > Of course we do
> That was a rather blanket statement. But if we can doubt the existence
> of everything but our minds, then we don't have any evidence for it!
> But I think it is perfectly tenable to say that we cannot prove that the
> instruments which appear to us to be collapsed are in fact not
> collapsed, that there is only the appearance of collapse subjectively.

That they really are collapsed is tenable too.

> How could one possibly disprove that?>> indeed, if we take either the
> >> concept of Wigner's friend or Rovelli's RQM seriously,
> > We shouldn't take Wigner's friend as proving CCC, since it is
> > intended as a reductio ad absurdum of it.
> OK, but I happen to think it is a precise explanation of how reality works.

It is strange to regard something intended as a paradox as an

>> And RQM doesn't remotely have that implication.

> Yes it does. In RQM the environment is determinate where, and only
> where, the observer has observed it.

In RQM, the observers knowledge becomes determinate
when they observe something.

>If I am Wigner, and my friend goes
> off and does an experiment, the result is indeterminate in my version of
> the environment.

Well, you don't know it. But you don't cause the friend to collapse,
there is no collapse in RQM.

>> this is not the
> >> case.>  - that's why we can shared records of experiments and agree on 
> >> them.
> >> Or, we can deduce those phenomena simply from the coherence of our
> >> personal systems.>  I'm not sure what you mean by "account for" collapse.
> >> I mean that if there is a unitary linear dynamics, with no collapse, as
> >> in Everett, no physical collapse, then there is the appearance of
> >> collapse only 'in consciousness'.
> > But Everett can explain the apperarance of collapse to instruments...
> > he doesn't need consciousness.
> Everett states very clearly that with respect to the physical body of
> the observer there is no collapse. I think the intruments the observer
> is using come under the same banner, the linear dynamics. He makes it
> very clear that it is only with regard to the "record of sensory
> observations and machine configuration" which I equate in his
> formulation with the functional identity of the observer, that there is
> the appearance of collapse.

SInce you didn't say whether you mean human or machine observer,
that doesn't clarify matters. As it happens, Everettian record
making can be automated.

> This is pretty much exactly the definition
> of access consciousness, that of which the observer is directly and
> immediately aware.

Access consciousness involves record making, and so
do any  number of non-conscious machines...seismographs,
video recorders, etc. I don't think you can argue
that consciousness is involved just because record making is.

> (In the human observer, I take the record of machine
> configuration to be the observations of the internal state of the
> observer, as I explain in detail elsewhere.)>>>    At least one 
> interpretation of QM, advocated by Peres, Fuchs, an

> >>> Omnes for example, is that the "collapse" is purely epistemological.  
> >>> All that changes is our knowledge or model of the state and QM merely
> >>> predicts probabilities for this change.
> That's what I thought I was saying!
> >> Fits my view.
> >>> Brent

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