On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possible consciousexperience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitution level? ISTMthat both act like the idea of a coarse graining on an ensemble thatis used to define the entropy of a system in that all of the membersof the ensemble that are indistinguishable from a macroscopic pointof view.You can easily relate them.Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM are experiencesof an individual when his brain is in some computational state S.

`I have reservations about this casual identification of "observer`

`moments" and "brain states". I can accept that a brain can digitally`

`simulated and hence be realized by a succession of states. But I find`

`it very doubtful that each state corresponds to different "thought" or`

`"observation" much less conscious "thoughts". Such thoughts are slow`

`things that unfold over time and must be realized by many successive`

`digital-brain states in terms of which they overlap with other thoughts`

`both temporally and spatially. So digitizing brains doesn't imply that`

`consciousness occurs in discrete time slices.`

Brent

We assume comp, of course, so we can attribute a 1-OM to some suchstate. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computational statesS, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. For example thestate of your brain emulated by a program computing the Heisenbergevolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, or the state ofyour brain obtained by another program simulating the quantumfluctuation of the void, or the state of your brain obtained by afortran program emulating a lisp program emulating a prolog programemulating ... emulating the search of the solution of some universaldiophantine polynomial, etc. All those programs are emulated by theuniversal dovetailer, and all the finite pieces of computationsobtained by such emulation can be proved to exist in a tiny part ofarithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite piece of computations, andthey are all "run" by the UD. The first person glue them into a priori2^aleph_0 infinite computations.For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a computationwhich is more fine grained. But you, by the first personindeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are. Actually youcan be said belonging to all of them, and your physical laws aredetermined by the measure on your continuations of such computations.From this you can see that the highest level of substitution definesthe measure on the possible lowest one, which you cannot distinguish,by definition. That is why, if we look at ourselves below that level,we have to be confronted with a strong form of indeterminacy.Boltzman's idea cannot be used at this stage, though, without having ameasure on the relative computations, and this prevents a direct useof the notion of entropy. We need more physics for that, but, as Ihave already explained we have to derive that physics from the numbersand self-reference if we don't want to miss the relationship betweenthe quanta and the qualia offered by the splitting between provableself-reference and true self-reference (G and G* and their intensionalvariants).Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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