On 5/1/2011 7:08 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

I think that in this discussion one is assuming that the classicalpicture of an OM applies and that then leads to the false notion thatyou need to look at a sequence of states. But this is completelyfalse. Obviously the brain is effectively classical, but classicalityfrom quantum dynamics is only achived because of decoherence, so thebrain gets entangled with the environment. The same is true, ofcourse, if you run any classical machine, like your PC.## Advertising

Now, the computational state of your brain, represented as anentangled state with the environment, can be written in the suggestiveform:sum over input of |input, corresponding output>In fact, the entire computational history will be present in thestate, as it exist at any moment.

`I don't see how that can be. Simply from an informational perspective,`

`the computational history can have a lot more bits than the digitized`

`brain can store as a state - at least as a classical system. I think`

`you must be including all the information that exists in the environment`

`due to interaction with the brain. This of course has been spreading`

`out from the brain at the speed of light; so it's not clear to me where`

`this history starts. With birth? At the big bang? At the last Everett`

`split? At the last Everett split that corresponds to a different`

`quasi-classical "thought??`

Brent

This is why I think that in Bruno's program, which apart from thetechnical details, involves deriving physics from the theory ofcomputation, one can jump to quantum mechanics much morestraightforwardly. Also, since decoherence happens in the positionbases, one should be able to derive space-time from first principlesas well. Simply put, if you have well defined computational states,you should get quantum mechanics plus general relativity free of charge.Saibal Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:On 30 Apr 2011, at 09:09, meekerdb wrote:On 4/29/2011 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 29 Apr 2011, at 02:42, Stephen Paul King wrote:Please allow me to ask another question. Is the notion of an“observer moment” corresponding to “the smallest possibleconscious experience” related to Bruno’s concept of substitutionlevel? ISTM that both act like the idea of a coarse graining onan ensemble that is used to define the entropy of a system inthat all of the members of the ensemble that areindistinguishable from a macroscopic point of view.You can easily relate them.Let us distinguish the 1-OMs from the 3-OMs. The 1-OM areexperiences of an individual when his brain is in somecomputational state S.I have reservations about this casual identification of "observermoments" and "brain states". I can accept that a brain candigitally simulated and hence be realized by a succession ofstates. But I find it very doubtful that each state corresponds todifferent "thought" or "observation" much less conscious "thoughts".I was identifying the 3-OM with the brain state. The 1-OM, withconsciousness, are in Platonia, and are related with the wholestructure of the computations, notably through the measure space.Locally we can still associate consciousness with some open interval,but comp attaches consciousness (and matter) to something much moresophisticated than a "sequence of states". It is thecounter-intuitive part of computationalism: the failure of theidentity thesis.Such thoughts are slow things that unfold over time and must berealized by many successive digital-brain states in terms of whichthey overlap with other thoughts both temporally and spatially. Sodigitizing brains doesn't imply that consciousness occurs indiscrete time slices.You are completely right on this. I did simplify my talk a little biton purpose, so as not being too much technical. With comp we canassociate a consciousness to a third person event (like "my sleepingfriend"). But my friend's consciousness is realized only through aninfinity of number relations.BrunoBrentWe assume comp, of course, so we can attribute a 1-OM to some suchstate. The 3-OMs are given by all the equivalent computationalstates S, S', S'', ... obtained in the universal dovetailing. Forexample the state of your brain emulated by a program computing theHeisenberg evolution of the Milky Way at the level of strings, orthe state of your brain obtained by another program simulating thequantum fluctuation of the void, or the state of your brainobtained by a fortran program emulating a lisp program emulating aprolog program emulating ... emulating the search of the solutionof some universal diophantine polynomial, etc. All those programsare emulated by the universal dovetailer, and all the finite piecesof computations obtained by such emulation can be proved to existin a tiny part of arithmetic. There are aleph_0 such finite pieceof computations, and they are all "run" by the UD. The first personglue them into a priori 2^aleph_0 infinite computations.For each of them, you can always find in arithmetic a computationwhich is more fine grained. But you, by the first personindeterminacy, cannot know in which computation you are. Actuallyyou can be said belonging to all of them, and your physical lawsare determined by the measure on your continuations of suchcomputations. From this you can see that the highest level ofsubstitution defines the measure on the possible lowest one, whichyou cannot distinguish, by definition. That is why, if we look atourselves below that level, we have to be confronted with a strongform of indeterminacy. Boltzman's idea cannot be used at thisstage, though, without having a measure on the relativecomputations, and this prevents a direct use of the notion ofentropy. We need more physics for that, but, as I have alreadyexplained we have to derive that physics from the numbers and self-reference if we don't want to miss the relationship between thequanta and the qualia offered by the splitting between provableself-reference and true self-reference (G and G* and theirintensional variants).Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com .For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com .For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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