On 07 Jun 2011, at 00:52, Rex Allen wrote:

On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au > wrote:
On Mon, Jun 06, 2011 at 04:42:46PM -0400, Rex Allen wrote:

How can any of those questions be approached by conscious entities in
a deterministic computational framework?

Everything you’ll ever learn, every mistake you’ll ever make, every
belief you’ll ever have is already locked in.

Your life is “on rails”. Maybe your final destination is good, maybe it’s bad - but both the destination and the path to it are static and
fixed in Platonia.

This is provably false.

What, exactly, are you claiming is provably false?

One of Bruno's important results is 3-determinism
implies 1-indeterminism.

This is sort of anti-climactic after your initial statement.

One of Bruno's important results is that if my future is determined,
in some sense it's not determined "for me" as an individual.

It is not that hard to get, so would be worth your
while trying to understand.

I think I understand this already.  The whole teleporting
moscow-washington thing, right?

In Platonia, there are many computational paths that branch out from
the current state that represents "me".

Each of these paths looks like a "possible future" from my subjective

But, they're not possible, they're actual.  In Platonia, they all
exist.  And they do so timelessly...so they're not "futures" they're a
series of "nows".

So, subjectively, I have the "illusion" of an undetermined "future".

But...really, it's determined.  Every one of those paths is
objectively actualized.

So how does this prove what I said false?  All those static "futures"
are mine.  They're all determined.  I'm still on rails...it's just
that the rails split in a rather unintuitive way.

Even if we say that what constitutes "me" is a single unbranched
path...this still doesn't make what I said false.  I'm one of those
paths, I just don't know which.  But ignorance of the future is not
indeterminism.  Ignorance of the future is ignorance of the (fully

This is an argument against any determinist theory, or any block- universe theory. It is an argument again compatibilist theory of free will, and an argument against science in general, not just the mechanist hypothesis.

Just to make things clear, although I have not yet seen an evidence against digital mechanism, my point is just that IF mechanism is true then the physical reality is an arithmetical emerging phenomenon, and physics is a branch of machine's theology. Given that theology and physics is derivable by the self-reference logic, my point is that mechanism is Popper refutable.

Now anyone pretending that comp (digital mechanism) is false has to say what is not Turing emulable in their (generalized) brain, above its constitutive matter and its consciousness, which comp makes already non Turing emulable, or they have to prove that nature refute the physics of comp (but up to now, thanks to QM, it is much more confirmed than refuted).



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