in other words... I can legitimately claim that something is, but I cannot claim that "I am"...
being = 1/0 and 1/0 = -1/-0 in other words.... when we assert self-existence.... we effectively assert something and nothing simultaneously. so why make such a empty assertion. If it was true you wouldn't have to make the assertion. It is your logical construction and nothing more. On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 6:30 PM, Constantine Pseudonymous <bsor...@gmail.com>wrote: > Yes, Bruno... i think you have made a grave grave error in assuming > self-consciousness as an intuitive indisputable. > > something is, that is for sure..... but in regards to what is we > cannot speak.... > > there is some being, but I want to call this "being" into question. > > what asserts or negates its existence.... and how is this questionable > being distinct from Being as such? > > You can name-call whatever you want, and you can assert unity... you > can make whatever assertions you want in regards to a something.... > > no one denies something is..... but no one says they know what that > Something is, or how it is distinct or different from the something > that we are. > > there is us, and there is IT.... two somethings.... one Big and the > other small.... what is the difference... and how can we determine the > difference if we know next to nothing in regards to either. > > so I want to say X and x is.... but i want to also show us that in > fact x is (being) is.... or in another words is (being) is an x. > > X = X > > but that tells us nothing. > > some people assert a distinction between consciousness and > existence... and say that you can't have one without the other.... but > don't really define the distinction or they simply claim that they are > identical.... well that doesn't really help us. > > so rather then I AM... i must say Something is... which is like say > being is unknown or is = x > > well we already knew that! > > > > On Jun 9, 10:11 pm, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 2:34 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 10:00 AM, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > >> I'm also fine with block-multiverse. And with a block-mindscape. > > > > >> Neither of which allow for free will. Since both of which are static, > > >> unchanging, and unchangeable - making it impossible that anyone "could > > >> have done otherwise" than they actually did. No one can be free of > > >> that fact - and therefore no one has free will. > > > > > 'making it impossible that anyone "could have done otherwise" than they > > > actually did.' > > > > Right. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition of freedom is that > > they must have been able to have done otherwise. > > > > This alone isn’t sufficient, because "quantum randomness" (in a > > non-block context) also makes it possible that they could have done > > otherwise - but random decisions aren't free either. > > > > > You say it is impossible that anyone could have done otherwise from > what > > > they did. Well what determined what they did? Their mind? Their > biology? > > > Their chemistry? The physics of the subatomic motions of the > particles in > > > their brain? > > > > I don’t think it matters in a “block” context, does it? > > > > > To say the mind is not doing any decision making because its behavior > can be > > > explained at a level where the mind's operation cannot be understood, > is > > > like saying a computer is not computing or a car is not driving, > because if > > > you look at a computer or a car at a low enough level you see only > particles > > > moving in accordance with various forces applied to them. > > > > The ability to make decisions is ubiquitous. Ants, wasps, lizards, > > turtles, mice, dogs - whatever. They can all be said to make > > decisions. Do ants have free will? > > > > Even computers can be said to make decisions...and saying that they do > > seems just as valid as saying that humans do. Do the computerized > > monitoring and control systems at nuclear power plants have free will? > > If they automatically "decide" to close some valve in response to > > sensor readings, are they exercising free will? > > > > > You can render meaningless almost any subject by describing > > > it at the wrong level. > > > > Wrong? What would make some level the “wrong” level and another the > > “right” level? > > > > If a subject *can* be described at some level (or should be > > describable in theory), then that has to be of some significance, > > doesn’t it? > > > > If human behavior ought to be describable at the level of quarks and > > electrons, just as computer behavior ought to be describable at the > > level of quarks and electrons, and just as rock behavior ought to be > > describable at the level of quarks and electons - then this shared > > “describability” has to tell us something significant - doesn’t it? > > > > The fact that all of these things are describable at the same level, > > the level of quarks and electrons, surely this means something. > > > > If humans could *not* be described at the level of quarks and > > electrons, but computers could, *that* would definitely tell us > > something significant, wouldn’t it? > > > > > You might as well say there is no meaningful difference between a > > > cat and a rock, since they are after all, just electrons and quarks. > > > > There’s a meaningful difference between a cat and a rock - *to me*. > > But maybe not in any other sense. > > > > > If you describe the mind at the correct level, you find it is making > > > decisions. > > > > I can interpret it that way, yes. Or I can interpret it as just > > moving through a sequence of states. > > > > I can interpret it either way I want, as the whim strikes me. It’s > > like looking at the picture of the candlestick and then seeing the two > > faces. I can go back and forth between the two interpretations. I’m > > flexible that way. > > > > The interpretation that the mind is making decisions is not *forced* on > me. > > > > Can you interpret the mind as just moving through a sequence of > > states? Maybe if you concentrate? > > > > > You say it is impossible that the decision it makes could have > > > been otherwise. This is good for the mind, it means it is guaranteed > that > > > its will is carried out. > > > > It also means that the mind’s will is not free. > > > > > That said, I don't mean to say there are not interesting implications > for > > > some of the concepts discussed on this list, such as the definition of > > > personal identity or the view that we are all part of one > mind/self/soul. > > > > Part of the same mind/self/soul? That doesn’t sound too plausible to > > me. If it were true in any meaningful way, I think I would have > > noticed. > > > > Though, it may be true in the same way that we could be part of the > > same zip code or something. > > > > > Regarding personal identity, does it make sense to punish the 50 year > old > > > man with a prison sentence if it was a different person who committed > the > > > act 20 years ago? (If you regard the two as different persons). > Further, > > > is there any role of punishment / retribution in the justice system > when had > > > we been born in another persons shoes we would have made the same > decisions > > > and ended up in the same place as that person? If ultimately we are > the > > > same person, we should have much more compassion and understanding for > > > others and their actions. > > > > Generally, I think a more mechanistic view of human behavior would > > (ironically?) result in a more humane society. > > > > A more mechanistic view would reduce the impulse to take things > > personally, and would encourage a more pragmatic, less emotional > > approach to solving society’s problems - and to dealing with each > > other. > > > > Of course, anything can be taken too far - and usually is - but still > > it seems to me like the right direction to steer towards. > > > > Compatibilism, however, totally short circuits that, and to no good end. > > > > Brent said, in an earlier thread: > > > > “That's like telling gays they should be happy with ‘civil unions’. > > 'Free will', meaning free of coercion and compulsion, as used in law, > > is useful concept referred to in many, many decisions which set > > precedents - just as 'marriage' appears in many laws and regulations. > > So there are excellent reasons of understanding to keep it. If you > > are a determinist, then compatibilism is the theory that shows this > > legal meaning is compatible with determinism; so you don't have to > > give it up and reinterpret hundreds of years of law and social > > discourse.” > > > > I think that given the vast amount that has been learned in the last > > 100 years, there is a definite need to reinterpret the hundreds of > > years of law and social discourse that permeates society, but which > > isn’t informed by this recent knowledge. > > > > One can say that what we have works, and if it ain’t broke don’t fix > > it - but I think this is a much easier position to take when you’re on > > top of the pile than when you’re on the bottom of it. > > > > It’s ironic that in that same post he used gays in his example, given > > how common it is for social conservatives (in the US) to condemn > > homosexuality as a sinful “choice”, denying that it has any biological > > basis. > > > > Until the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence vs. Texas, many US > > states still had sodomy laws on the books and were occasionally > > prosecuting them. > > > > That’s the kind of discrimination and irrationality that compatibilism > > provides cover for. That’s the “hundreds of years of law and social > > discourse” that Brent doesn’t want to give up. > > > > (I’m not actually accusing Brent of holding any particular position, > > btw. Just making a point!) > > > > Rex > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
