# Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

```in other words... I can legitimately claim that something is, but I cannot
claim that "I am"...```
```
being = 1/0 and 1/0 = -1/-0

in other words.... when we assert self-existence.... we effectively assert
something and nothing simultaneously.

so why make such a empty assertion. If it was true you wouldn't have to make
the assertion. It is your logical construction and nothing more.

On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 6:30 PM, Constantine Pseudonymous
<bsor...@gmail.com>wrote:

> Yes, Bruno... i think you have made a grave grave error in assuming
> self-consciousness as an intuitive indisputable.
>
> something is, that is for sure..... but in regards to what is we
> cannot speak....
>
> there is some being, but I want to call this "being" into question.
>
> what asserts or negates its existence.... and how is this questionable
> being distinct from Being as such?
>
> You can name-call whatever you want, and you can assert unity... you
> can make whatever assertions you want in regards to a something....
>
> no one denies something is..... but no one says they know what that
> Something is, or how it is distinct or different from the something
> that we are.
>
> there is us, and there is IT.... two somethings.... one Big and the
> other small.... what is the difference... and how can we determine the
> difference if we know next to nothing in regards to either.
>
> so I want to say X and x is.... but i want to also show us that in
> fact x is (being) is.... or in another words is (being) is an x.
>
> X = X
>
> but that tells us nothing.
>
> some people assert a distinction between consciousness and
> existence... and say that you can't have one without the other.... but
> don't really define the distinction or they simply claim that they are
> identical.... well that doesn't really help us.
>
> so rather then I AM... i must say Something is... which is like say
> being is unknown or is = x
>
> well we already knew that!
>
>
>
> On Jun 9, 10:11 pm, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 2:34 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 10:00 AM, Rex Allen <rexallen31...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > >> I'm also fine with block-multiverse.  And with a block-mindscape.
> >
> > >> Neither of which allow for free will.  Since both of which are static,
> > >> unchanging, and unchangeable - making it impossible that anyone "could
> > >> have done otherwise" than they actually did.  No one can be free of
> > >> that fact - and therefore no one has free will.
> >
> > > 'making it impossible that anyone "could have done otherwise" than they
> > > actually did.'
> >
> > Right.  A necessary (but not sufficient) condition of freedom is that
> > they must have been able to have done otherwise.
> >
> > This alone isn’t sufficient, because "quantum randomness"  (in a
> > non-block context) also makes it possible that they could have done
> > otherwise - but random decisions aren't free either.
> >
> > > You say it is impossible that anyone could have done otherwise from
> what
> > > they did.  Well what determined what they did?  Their mind?  Their
> biology?
> > >  Their chemistry?  The physics of the subatomic motions of the
> particles in
> > > their brain?
> >
> > I don’t think it matters in a “block” context, does it?
> >
> > > To say the mind is not doing any decision making because its behavior
> can be
> > > explained at a level where the mind's operation cannot be understood,
> is
> > > like saying a computer is not computing or a car is not driving,
> because if
> > > you look at a computer or a car at a low enough level you see only
> particles
> > > moving in accordance with various forces applied to them.
> >
> > The ability to make decisions is ubiquitous.  Ants, wasps, lizards,
> > turtles, mice, dogs - whatever.  They can all be said to make
> > decisions.  Do ants have free will?
> >
> > Even computers can be said to make decisions...and saying that they do
> > seems just as valid as saying that humans do.  Do the computerized
> > monitoring and control systems at nuclear power plants have free will?
> >  If they automatically "decide" to close some valve in response to
> > sensor readings, are they exercising free will?
> >
> > > You can render meaningless almost any subject by describing
> > > it at the wrong level.
> >
> > Wrong?  What would make some level the “wrong” level and another the
> > “right” level?
> >
> > If a subject *can* be described at some level (or should be
> > describable in theory), then that has to be of some significance,
> > doesn’t it?
> >
> > If human behavior ought to be describable at the level of quarks and
> > electrons, just as computer behavior ought to be describable at the
> > level of quarks and electrons, and just as rock behavior ought to be
> > describable at the level of quarks and electons - then this shared
> > “describability” has to tell us something significant - doesn’t it?
> >
> > The fact that all of these things are describable at the same level,
> > the level of quarks and electrons, surely this means something.
> >
> > If humans could *not* be described at the level of quarks and
> > electrons, but computers could, *that* would definitely tell us
> > something significant, wouldn’t it?
> >
> > > You might as well say there is no meaningful difference between a
> > > cat and a rock, since they are after all, just electrons and quarks.
> >
> > There’s a meaningful difference between a cat and a rock - *to me*.
> > But maybe not in any other sense.
> >
> > > If you describe the mind at the correct level, you find it is making
> > > decisions.
> >
> > I can interpret it that way, yes.  Or I can interpret it as just
> > moving through a sequence of states.
> >
> > I can interpret it either way I want, as the whim strikes me.  It’s
> > like looking at the picture of the candlestick and then seeing the two
> > faces.  I can go back and forth between the two interpretations.  I’m
> > flexible that way.
> >
> > The interpretation that the mind is making decisions is not *forced* on
> me.
> >
> > Can you interpret the mind as just moving through a sequence of
> > states?  Maybe if you concentrate?
> >
> > > You say it is impossible that the decision it makes could have
> > > been otherwise.  This is good for the mind, it means it is guaranteed
> that
> > > its will is carried out.
> >
> > It also means that the mind’s will is not free.
> >
> > > That said, I don't mean to say there are not interesting implications
> for
> > > some of the concepts discussed on this list, such as the definition of
> > > personal identity or the view that we are all part of one
> mind/self/soul.
> >
> > Part of the same mind/self/soul?  That doesn’t sound too plausible to
> > me.  If it were true in any meaningful way, I think I would have
> > noticed.
> >
> > Though, it may be true in the same way that we could be part of the
> > same zip code or something.
> >
> > >  Regarding personal identity, does it make sense to punish the 50 year
> old
> > > man with a prison sentence if it was a different person who committed
> the
> > > act 20 years ago?  (If you regard the two as different persons).
>  Further,
> > > is there any role of punishment / retribution in the justice system
> > > we been born in another persons shoes we would have made the same
> decisions
> > > and ended up in the same place as that person?  If ultimately we are
> the
> > > same person, we should have much more compassion and understanding for
> > > others and their actions.
> >
> > Generally, I think a more mechanistic view of human behavior would
> > (ironically?) result in a more humane society.
> >
> > A more mechanistic view would reduce the impulse to take things
> > personally, and would encourage a more pragmatic, less emotional
> > approach to solving society’s problems - and to dealing with each
> > other.
> >
> > Of course, anything can be taken too far - and usually is - but still
> > it seems to me like the right direction to steer towards.
> >
> > Compatibilism, however, totally short circuits that, and to no good end.
> >
> > Brent said, in an earlier thread:
> >
> > “That's like telling gays they should be happy with ‘civil unions’.
> > 'Free will', meaning free of coercion and compulsion, as used in law,
> > is useful concept referred to in many, many decisions which set
> > precedents - just as 'marriage' appears in many laws and regulations.
> > So there are excellent reasons of understanding to keep it.  If you
> > are a determinist, then compatibilism is the theory that shows this
> > legal meaning is compatible with determinism; so you don't have to
> > give it up and reinterpret hundreds of years of law and social
> > discourse.”
> >
> > I think that given the vast amount that has been learned in the last
> > 100 years, there is a definite need to reinterpret the hundreds of
> > years of law and social discourse that permeates society, but which
> > isn’t informed by this recent knowledge.
> >
> > One can say that what we have works, and if it ain’t broke don’t fix
> > it - but I think this is a much easier position to take when you’re on
> > top of the pile than when you’re on the bottom of it.
> >
> > It’s ironic that in that same post he used gays in his example, given
> > how common it is for social conservatives (in the US) to condemn
> > homosexuality as a sinful “choice”, denying that it has any biological
> > basis.
> >
> > Until the 2003 Supreme Court decision in Lawrence vs. Texas, many US
> > states still had sodomy laws on the books and were occasionally
> > prosecuting them.
> >
> > That’s the kind of discrimination and irrationality that compatibilism
> > provides cover for.  That’s the “hundreds of years of law and social
> > discourse” that Brent doesn’t want to give up.
> >
> > (I’m not actually accusing Brent of holding any particular position,
> > btw.  Just making a point!)
> >
> > Rex
>
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