Hi Stephen,

I have to do a Part I now and get into Part II later on.

>   How does this "causality flows in both directions " work? I have a
>model of something that has that kind of feature, but I am curious about
>yours.

Subjectively we feel, (and see, hear, remember, understand) that we
can voluntarily cause our mind to focus on different subjects or to
exert our will (motive/motor functionality). We know that this
correlates to electromagnetic activity in the brain and nervous system
which can physically cause muscles to contract or relax themselves.
When we choose to move our arm, it's for a semantic reason known by
our conscious mind rather than a biochemical or physiological purpose
which we just imagine is meaningful. We do actually control our body
and conscious mind to some extent and through that are able to control
our responses to our lives to some extent.

If you're looking for a more mechanical explanation of how subjective
will and objective determinism work I would start with objective
properties being rooted in an ontology of separateness added together
by relativity while subjective properties are subtractive as well -
they use your participation to fill in the blanks between seemingly
separate perceptions (I think of 'black magic', the crayon and
toothpick kind: 
http://paintcutpaste.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/DSC_0182.jpg)

>   How, exactly, are you defining identity as implicit in your
>question here? To say that X is X, as in the phrase "...what they are
>...", is to assume that you known what X is exactly, no? Is this public
>or private information?

I try to avoid definitions if I can help it (I think they can detract
from meaning as well as clarify), and I'm not very familiar with
philosophy conventions. I'm just talking about an atom can do things
that my idea of an atom could not, since at some point groups of
groups of atoms get together and form a living cell which eventually,
we know, can host or facilitate human consciousness. As far as X is X,
I don't think that's strictly true. In that sentence the first X is
located five chars to the left of the second X, which is followed by a
comma rather than a space. X is only X because we subjectively make
that semantic equation. In an absolute sense, nothing is anything else
but what it is. There is no truly identical identity.

>     Are you taking into account, for example, decoherence? Are you
>assuming a classical or quantum world?

Yes, I'm aware of decoherence. As with probability and superposition
it can be used by QM to explain away just about anything that may
threaten it. I think that QM is likely to be the postmodern version of
Ptolemaic deferent and epicycle as far as it being useful (and precise
to a fantastic degree in the case of QM...because it's the consequence
of extreme occidental focus rather than pre-occidental archaic) but
ultimately getting it completely wrong. I think the whole Standard
Model needs to be completely reimagined as a map of observed atomic
moods rather than physical phenomena.

>     What difference in kind is there between a component that is
>equivalent in function *and* is integrable with the system to be
>substituted? To say that it is made of cobalt alloy would be merely an
>argument from illicit substitution of identicals!

Not entirely sure what you're asking. I'm just saying that the
function we assume isn't necessarily the only factor. I don't know if
it's an illicit substitution, I'm just saying cobalt blood isn't
identical (enough) for the body to treat it as blood for all of the
functions that blood performs. If it's not cells for instance, maybe
your bone marrow goes crazy and produces leukocytes, or maybe it
atrophies and you become dependent on the synthetic blood. You can't
assume that just because a fluid delivers oxygen that you can use it
instead of blood indefinitely, and you can't assume that a silicon
sculpture of neural logic can be used to feel anything.

>     How is the specification of wires relevant to the claim?

Earlier I had said that a tangle of wires isn't going to feel anything
regardless of how long or tangled it is. Jason responded that he
thinks it can. I'm asking what else can wires do? Everything? Can
anything do anything if put into the right shape? I think organization
doesn't matter at all unless the units you are organizing have
potentials to develop those particular emergent properties you desire.

>     Umm, are you not implicitly assuming cartoons in the process of
>generation where the constructors of the cartoons have, as available
>information, the changing positions of colored lines and points?

I don't think so. I'm looking at a finished cartoon as it is being
watched and saying that it is a machine of visual image, different
from computer logic only in it's physical substrate.

>     From whence obtains meaning? Is the yellow an illusion or some
>phantom to bewitch the mind? How do you know what yellow is like from
>the first person aspect of an algae? I don't think that they do not, but
>exactly how could they, in your opinion?

Yellow is visual feeling. I don't know what algae sees, I'm just
speculating that our cone cells seem to be resolving optical sense at
a single celled level. Since life on this planet originated from
phytoplankton that photosynthesize, I'm connecting the dots that the
retina is practicing a form of photosynthesis and we see what it sees
- more or less.

>     How could you know if you could not act that question to the rock?
>So the question become whether or not communication is possible with you
>and a rock.

Right, we can't know. I don't think communication is possible with a
rock, although it is possible that some people with unusual
sensitivity could pick up images or experiences from reading objects
or places. That's at the far subjective end of the spectrum though,
pushing perception out so far oriental that it comes out the other
side. Too flaky to rely upon.

>Where the specifics of a language and the attributions of
>meanings to the objects of experience the result of a computation? If
>not, what determined them? If they are not determined then how are they
>different from noise?

Where they are is in/from/through the singularity and it's projection
of self division through time-space induction. It's not a computation,
more like a gigantic lookup table, but accessed blind. Pure
speculation of course.

>     "Idiosyncratic" http://www.thefreedictionary.com/idiosyncratic " A
>structural or behavioral characteristic peculiar to an individual or
>group." What determined or selected that group from the universe of all
>similar entities? If that selection process is not equivalent to some
>computational process then it is indistinguishable from noise, aka, some
>random process! (Please do not involve some form of a "god in the gap"
>argument!)

What determines the color of a particular stitch in a tapestry? Sense.
Appropriateness. The universe makes sense on a lot of different
levels. How things seem to us is neither random, nor noise, nor
computational process, it's multivalent, participatory, semantic
coherence. Detection, sensation, perception, feeling, instinct,
cognition, intuition, genius, creativity, calculation, computation,
communication... all points on the continuum of sense. It doesn't only
compute, it collapses and simplifies - iconicizes, essentializes,
extracts, guesses, jumps to conclusions, recapitulates, expresses,
etc.


>> Red is also different from sour, does that mean sour is a color? You
>> don't need color to tell berries from bush. It could be accomplished
>> directly without any sensory mediation whatsoever, just as your
>> stomach can tell the difference between food and dirt. (Not that the
>> stomach cells don't have their own awareness of their world, they
>> might, just not one that requires us to be conscious of it)

>>> That would be confusing, I couldn't tell if I were looking at a bush or
>>> eating.  I wouldn't know the relative position of the bush in relation to
>>> myself or other objects either.
>> You're trying to justify the existence of vision in hindsight rather
>> than explaining the possibility of vision in the first place. Again,
>> omnipotence would be really convenient for me, it doesn't mean that my
>> body can magically invent it out of whole cloth.

>[SPK]
>     As in "I think therefore I was!" as opposed to the a priori "I
>think therefore I am"? Omnipotence would not solve the problem of
>computation here! Not only would you need infinite physical resources,
>but you would also need infinite time to perform the computation, or
>else you have to admit a random process caused it to be the only case of
>colors that you experience!!! The dichotomy is not false!

Not sure what the cogito has to do with the presumption of the
necessity of color. Omnipotence solves all problems by definition,
doesn't it? I'm just using it as an example to show that it's
ridiculous to think that the idea of color can just happen in a
physical environment that doesn't already support it a priori. It does
not evolve as a consequence of natural selection, not only because it
serves no special function that unconscious detection would not
accomplish, but because there is no precursor for it to evolve from,
no mechanism for cells or organs to generate perception of color were
it not already a built in possibility. I'm saying that color
perception is more unlikely to exist in a purely physical cosmos than
time travel or omnipotence as a possible physical adaptation. I'm
trying to get at Jason's radical underestimation of the gap between
zoological necessity and the possibility of color's existence.

On Jul 12, 12:22 am, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> Hi Craig!
>

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