Craig, I wonder what you'd think of Chalmers' "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia,
Dancing Qualia" argument at http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html which to me
makes a strong argument for "organizational invariance", which says physical
systems organized the same way should produce the same qualia, so for example a
computer which simulated each of my neurons and their interactions with
sufficient accuracy would give rise to the same qualia as my biological brain.
The basic idea of the argument is that if you gradually replaced my brain's
neurons with computer chips that simulated the behavior of the removed neurons
and had the same input/output relationships, my qualia should not change or
fade in any reasonable theory of consciousness (an unreasonable one would be
one that had a total disconnect between qualia and behavior, so that for
example my qualia could be gradually fading or changing, or even changing on a
second-by-second basis, and yet behaviorally I would argue emphatically that
they were remaining unchanged)
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